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ABSTRACT
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SECURITY AND ROBUSTNESS
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Doctor of Philosophy, 2008
Dissertation directed by: Professor John S. Baras
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
In this thesis we propose that the addition of a satellite overlay to large or dense
wireless networks will result in improvement in application performance and network
reliability, and also enable efficient security solutions that are well-suited for wireless
nodes with limited resources. We term the combined network as a hybrid wireless net-
work. Through analysis, network modeling and simulation, we quantify the improvement
in end-to-end performance in such networks, compared to flatwireless networks.
We also propose a new analytical method for modeling and estimating the perfor-
mance of hybrid wireless networks. We create a loss network mdel for hybrid networks
using the hierarchical reduced loss network model, adaptedfor packet-switched networks.
Applying a fixed point approximation method on the set of relations modeling the hierar-
chical loss network, we derive a solution that converges to afixed point for the parameter
set. We analyze the sensitivity of the performance metric tovariations in the network
parameters by applying Automatic Differentiation to the performance model. We thus
develop a method for parameter optimization and sensitivity analysis of protocols for de-
signing hybrid networks.
We investigate how the satellite overlay can help to implement b tter solutions for
secure group communications in hybrid wireless networks. We propose a source authen-
tication protocol for multicast communications that makesintelligent use of the satellite
overlay, by modifying and extending TESLA certificates. We also propose a probabilis-
tic non-repudiation technique that uses the satellite as a proxy node. We describe how
the authentication protocol can be integrated with a topology-aware hierarchical multi-
cast routing protocol to design a secure multicast routing protocol that is robust to active
attacks.
Lastly, we examine how the end-to-end delay is adversely affected when IP Security
protocol (IPSEC) and Secure Socket Layer protocol (SSL) areapplied to unicast commu-
nications in hybrid networks. For network-layer security with low delay, we propose the
use of the Layered IPSEC protocol, with a modified Internet Key Exchange protocol.
For secure web browsing with low delay, we propose the Dual-mode SSL protocol. We
present simulation results to quantify the performance improvement with our proposed
protocols, compared to the traditional solutions.
IMPROVING NETWORK PERFORMANCE, SECURITY AND




Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment













To my family -





I would like to thank my advisor, Professor John S. Baras for his support and en-
couragement over the years and for giving me the opportunityto work on several chal-
lenging projects and problems. Working with him has been a privilege and it has greatly
enhanced my knowledge and technical abilities.
I would also like to thank Professor Alexander Barg, Professor Manoj Franklin,
Professor Raymond Miller and Professor Gang Qu for kindly agreeing to serve on the
dissertation committee and for reviewing my dissertation.
My graduate work has been supported by the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration under award No.NCC8235 and I am grateful for that support.
I would like to acknowledge the invaluable help and support tha I have received
from the staff at ISR and the ECE Department. Kimberley Edwars, Diane Hicks and
Althia Kirlew have over the years taken care of all non-research-related, but nonetheless
critical, aspects of graduate studies. Peggy Jayant and Carlos Luceno have been very
helpful with my numerous requests for technical support. Maria Hoo has smoothed all
interactions with Graduate School. I am very grateful to them.
Special thanks are due to my colleagues and friends in ISR with hom I have
worked on projects and discussed various technical ideas that have contributed to this
dissertation. I would particularly like to mention Dr. Michael Hadjitheodosiou, Dr. Ma-
jid Raissi-Dehkordi, Nicolas Rentz, Dr. Gun Akkor, Dr. Vahid Tabatabaee, Karthikeyan
Chandrashekhar, Hui Zengh and Georgios Papageorgiou.
The successful completion of my Ph.D. dissertation is the culmination of a long
iii
journey which started when I was a young kid curious about theworld, interested in
knowing more and hoping to grow up a learned person. I have been encouraged and
supported in this journey by many in my family. Some are no longer around to share in
my success -SejodaduM.N. Roy Choudhury,JethuSamir Roy Choudhury,PutaDipika
Roy Choudhury,PishimoniMonika Basu,SundarpishoAmitabha Sarkar andJaharkaku
Capt. J.L. Roy, but I am remembering them today with love and gratitude. Thankfully
there are many who are around today to know how grateful I am tothem for everything
they have done for me. Foremost are my parents Probir and Sabita Roy Choudhury and
my sister Preetha and brother-in-law Joyjit Nath, who have be n the pillars of support
in my life. Their love and encouragement sustain me in my endeavors. My thanks also
to my aunts and uncles - especiallyMejomeshoSamudra Prasad Sinha andChhotomashi
Sumi Dutta.
I am also thankful to my wonderfully supportive friends who have helped me nav-
igate the difficult stretches in my graduate student life. They include Dr. Brinda Ganesh,
Dr. Ayush Gupta, Nipamanjari Dutta, Raj Sarkar, Dr. Madhubanti Mukherjee and Anir-
van and Deboja Das. Joyce Lehrer and Jay Wolvovsky also deserve my heartfelt thanks
for considering me a part of their family.
Finally, my undying gratitude and love to Eric Wolvovsky foreverything he has
done and continues to do for me and for loving me and believingin me and helping me
cross the finish line.
iv
Table of Contents
List of Tables viii
List of Figures ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Organization of the Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 4
2 Achieving Performance Improvement in a Wireless Network with a Satellite Over-
lay 6
2.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1 Proposed Network Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.2 Example Hierarchical Topologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
2.3 Simulation Model and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
2.3.1 Network Models with Stationary Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
2.3.2 Network Model for Urban Rescue Scenario with Mobile Nodes . 17
2.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3 Performance Modeling of Hybrid Satellite/Wireless Networks Using Fixed Point
Approximation and Sensitivity Analysis for Network Design 25
3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 Generalized Loss Network Model for Hierarchical Networks . . . . . . . 27
3.2.1 Network Abstraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2.2 Hierarchical Model for Fixed Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 29
3.2.2.1 Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2.2.2 Route Segments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2.2.3 Initial Offered Load and Local Relaxation . . . . . . . 30
3.2.2.4 Reduced Load and Higher Layer Relaxation . . . . . . 32
3.2.2.5 Updating Lower Layer Load With Higher Layer Loss . 34
3.2.3 Summary Outline of the Fixed Point Approximation Algorithm . 34
3.3 Physical and Link Layer Model for the Terrestrial Wireless Segment . . . 36
3.4 Analytical Model for the Satellite Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4.1 Satellite Channel Loss Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4.2 Multiple-Access Throughput Model for the Satellite Channel . . . 40
3.5 The Fixed Point Algorithm for the Hybrid Network . . . . . . .. . . . . 41
3.5.1 Lower Layer Loss Model and Fixed Point Method . . . . . . . .41
3.5.1.1 Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.5.1.2 First Mapping: Fromǫ to λ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.5.1.3 Second Mapping: Fromλ to ǫ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.5.2 Higher Layer Loss Model and Fixed Point Method . . . . . . .. 46
3.5.2.1 Mapping from Loss Parameter to Traffic Rate . . . . . 47
3.5.2.2 Mapping from Traffic Rate to Loss Parameter . . . . . 48
v
3.6 Network Design by Automatic Differentiation . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 49
3.7 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.9 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4 Efficient Source Authentication in Hybrid Satellite/Wireless Networks 59
4.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2 Methodology for Source Authentication in Group Communications . . . . 63
4.2.1 Review of TESLA Authentication Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2.2 Review of TESLA Certificate Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.2.3 Extending TESLA Certificates: Protocol Assumptions .. . . . . 67
4.2.4 Initial Setup: Key Generation by CA and Source Node . . .. . . 69
4.2.5 Message Transmission from Source to Receiver . . . . . . .. . 72
4.2.6 Message Authentication at Receiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 73
4.2.7 Revocation of TESLA Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2.8 Non-repudiation of TESLA Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2.9 Key Disclosure Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.2.9.1 Time Synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.2.9.2 Computation of the Key Disclosure Delay . . . . . . . 82
4.3 Analysis of Protocol Correctness of the Extended TESLA Certificate Ap-
proach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3.1 Strand Space Model for extended TESLA Certificate Algorithm . 86
4.4 Security Analysis: Prevention of Authentication Attacks . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4.1 Malicious Node with Connectivity to Source and Receiver . . . . 90
4.4.2 Attack on the CA Revocation Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.5 Performance Analysis of extended TESLA Certificate Algorithm . . . . . 92
4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.7 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5 Efficient and Secure Multicast Routing in a Hybrid Satellit/Wireless Networks 110
5.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.2 A Hierarchical Framework for Multicast Routing . . . . . . .. . . . . . 115
5.2.1 Role of Multicast Group Leader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.2.2 Multicast Group Formation in a LAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.2.2.1 Core Notification Message on Member Join/Leave . . . 119
5.2.3 Multicast Group Formation across LANs . . . . . . . . . . . . .120
5.2.3.1 Core Hello Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.2.3.2 Core Join Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.2.3.3 Core Leave Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.2.4 Multi-path Routing in the Satellite Overlay . . . . . . . .. . . . 124
5.2.5 Dealing with Network Partitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127
5.3 Methodology: Authenticated Multicast Routing using TESLA Certificates 128
5.3.1 Security Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.3.2 TESLA Certificate with Source/Receiver Information .. . . . . 130
5.3.3 Hop Count Authentication Using Hash Chains . . . . . . . . .. 131
vi
5.3.4 Secure Multicast Protocol Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 133
5.3.4.1 Route discovery and establishment . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.3.4.2 Multicast tree branch pruning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.3.4.3 Group Hello messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.3.4.4 Authenticating Core Hello, Core Join and Core Leave
messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.4 Security Analysis of the Routing Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 139
5.4.1 Active-y-xAttacker Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.4.2 Security Against Active Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .140
5.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
6 Performance-aware Security of Unicast Communications inHybrid Satellite Net-
works 148
6.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.1.1 Use of Performance Enhancing Proxy Server (PEP) and HTTP
Proxy Server in Satellite Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.1.2 Proxy Performance Problem with Unicast Communication Security151
6.2 Methodology: Layered IPSEC for co-existence with TCP PEs . . . . . . 154
6.2.1 Modification to Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) for Lay-
ered IPSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.2.2 Performance Evaluation of Layered IPSEC with IKE modifica-
tions for Hybrid Satellite Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.3 Dual-Mode SSL: HTTP proxy-friendly Secure Web Browsing. . . . . . 168
6.3.1 DSSL: Protocol Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.3.2 Performance Evaluation of Dual-Mode SSL . . . . . . . . . . .. 175
6.3.3 DSSL Two Phase Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.3.4 DSSL Quick Mode Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
6.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
7 Conclusions 190
7.1 Dissertation Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190




3.1 Comparison of simulation runtime between fixed point method and Opnet
(in seconds). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.1 RSA signature timings (ms) per packet on 500MHz Pentium III . . . . . 99
4.2 Energy cost of digital signature algorithms and HMAC, for C mpaq iPAQ
H3670 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
viii
List of Figures
2.1 Hybrid network topology with a satellite overlay for civilian/commercial
applications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Hybrid wireless network topologies with a satellite overlay for military
operations and disaster relief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 11
2.3 Performance evaluation of 200-node flat wireless network and hybrid
wireless network with satellite overlay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Comparison of voice traffic delay characteristics in 200-node flat wireless
network and hybrid wireless network with satellite overlay(X-axis is the
simulation duration in minutes). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
2.5 Comparison of voice traffic jitter in 200-node flat wireless network and
hybrid wireless network with satellite overlay (X-axis is the simulation
duration in minutes). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6 Comparison of AODV parameters in 200-node flat wireless network and
hybrid wireless network (X-axis is the simulation durationn minutes). . . 17
2.7 Comparison of the wireless channel statistics in 200-node flat wireless
network and hybrid wireless network (X-axis is the simulation duration
in minutes). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.8 Comparison of the wireless channel throughput in 200-node flat wireless
network and hybrid wireless network (X-axis is the simulation duration
in minutes). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.9 Comparison of voice traffic sent and received in a 1065-node flat wireless
network and a hybrid wireless network with satellite overlay (X-axis is
the simulation time in minutes). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.10 Voice traffic delay statistics in a 1065-node flat wireless network and a
hybrid wireless network with satellite overlay (X-axis is the simulation
time in minutes). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.11 Voice traffic jitter in a 1065-node flat wireless networkand a hybrid wire-
less network with satellite overlay (X-axis is the simulation time in minutes). 22
2.12 A hybrid wireless architecture for urban rescue operations with satellite-
UAV overlay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.13 Simulation results for urban rescue scenario hybrid wireless network with
satellite-UAV overlay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
ix
3.1 Hybrid network with three clusters - lower layer abstraction . . . . . . . . 28
3.2 Hybrid network with three clusters - higher layer abstraction. . . . . . . . 32
3.3 Hybrid network with three wireless clusters and satellite - lower layer . . 42
3.4 Hybrid network higher layer - source, destination and intermediate segments 46
3.5 Simulation setup: hybrid network topology with 5 connections across 2
clusters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.6 Throughput comparison between fixed point method and Opnet discrete
event simulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.7 Comparison of aggregate network throughput for number of available
paths, 500kbps input load. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.1 TESLA key generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.2 TESLA Certificate for nodeA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3 Time diagram for packet authentication using TESLA certificate algorithm 75
4.4 Time synchronization between the protocol participants i the extended
TESLA certificate protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.5 Key disclosure delayd as a function of key use interval∆ . . . . . . . . . 84
4.6 Strand Space Model representation of initial message exchange in the
extended TESLA certificate protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86
4.7 Receiver buffer size for varying network bandwidths andkey use intervals 93
4.8 Key use interval∆ as a function of receiver buffer size and network band-
width . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.9 Comparison of percentage byte overhead due to authentication for 500MB
data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.10 Percentage size overhead comparison between HMAC-MD5and HMAC-
SHA1, 500MB data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.11 Number of keys required for authenticating 1GB message. . . . . . . . . 98
4.12 Comparison of authentication processing delay for 500MB data, PIII500MHz 99
4.13 Energy consumption for HMAC-MD5 authentication only,iPAQ H3670 . 102
x
4.14 Total number of packets processed by extended TESLA with HMAC-
MD5 on iPAQ H3670 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.15 Comparison of total energy required for authenticating 500MB data on
iPAQ H3670 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.16 Energy performance comparison of different authentication protocols on
iPAQ H3670 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.17 Total energy required for authenticating 500MB data, ARM1176JZ(F) . . 105
4.18 Energy consumption of extended TESLA protocol on ARM1176JZ(F) for
different message sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.1 Hierarchy in the hybrid satellite network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.2 Multicast Core Table maintained by each core (gateway) node . . . . . . 121
5.3 Multicast distribution tree in the wireless hybrid network . . . . . . . . . 125
5.4 Message exchange for authenticated route discovery using TESLA cer-
tificate algorithm.A is the source andD is a node that responds toA with
a fresh route to the group.B andC are intermediate nodes. . . . . . . . . 135
5.5 Authenticated MACT message for activating the chosen route fromA to D.136
5.6 AuthenticatedMACT Prune message for deleting the multicast branch
from nodeD to A. HereA is a group receiver, andD is the root of the
branch withA as leaf node. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.7 Authenticated Group Hello message broadcast from the core node. Here
N is the diameter of the network, and nodeB is one-hop away from the
core. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.1 Proxy server placement in a commercial satellite network . . . . . . . . . 151
6.2 Packet format for IPSEC and Layered IPSEC encryption. Key 1 is
shared between end-points only. KeyK2 is shared between end-points
and TCP PEPs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
6.3 IPSEC and SSL encryption on a packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .153
6.4 Addition to IKE handshake mechanism for Layered IPSEC key management157
6.5 Opnet Modeler Simulation Testbed for Layered IPSEC withIKE Modifi-
cations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
xi
6.6 TCP Enhancements for Layered IPSEC Simulation Testbed .. . . . . . . 160
6.7 Comparison of custom application response time (globalaverage) of Lay-
ered IPSEC, IPSEC and unsecured transmission.X-axis is the simulation
time in minutes; Y-axis is the application response time in seconds.. . . . 162
6.8 Custom application average response time at client for Layered IPSEC,
IPSEC and unsecured transmission.X-axis is the simulation time in min-
utes; Y-axis is the application response time in seconds.. . . . . . . . . 164
6.9 Average of overall TCP delay for Layered IPSEC, IPSEC andunsecured
transmission.X-axis is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is the TCP
delay time in seconds.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.10 Average count of overall TCP retransmissions for Layered IPSEC, IPSEC
and unsecured transmission.X-axis is the simulation time in minutes; Y-
axis is the TCP retransmission count.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
6.11 Average TCP load at client for Layered IPSEC, IPSEC and unsecured
transmission.X-axis is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is the TCP
load in bytes/second.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
6.12 Effect of IKE handshake on application response times,BER1×10−6. X-
axis is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is the application response
time in seconds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.13 Comparison of IKE handshake time and application respon e times for
HTTP traffic with Layered IPSEC, IPSEC and unsecured transmis ion.
X-axis is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is the application response
time in seconds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
6.14 Comparison of HTTP application response times with Layered IPSEC
and IPSEC with pre-shared keys and unsecured transmission.X-axis is
the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is the application response time in
seconds.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.15 Dual-Mode SSL for HTTP optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.16 Handshake between client, server and proxy in DSSL . . . . . . . . 172
6.17 Opnet Modeler simulation testbed for the DSSL protocol. . . . . . . . . 176
6.18 Performance improvement with HTTP proxy server in satellite networks
and the detrimental effect of SSL on HTTP proxy performance.X-axis is
the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is the application response time in
seconds.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
xii
6.19 A comparison of the effect of TCP enhancements versus HTTP proxy
acceleration on web browsing performance in satellite networks. X-axis
is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is the applicationresponse time
in seconds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.20 DSSL (full) handshake times and comparison of SSL, DSSLweb brows-
ing response times.X-axis is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is the
application response time in seconds.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.21 DSSL two phase handshake times and comparison of SSL, DSSL web
browsing response times.X-axis is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis
is the application response time in seconds.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
6.22 Comparison of handshake times and web response times for different ver-
sions of DSSL and SSL.X-axis is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis
is the application response time in seconds.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
6.23 HTTP response times for different versions of DSSL and comparison to
SSL and unsecured web browsing.X-axis is the simulation time in min-
utes; Y-axis is the application response time in seconds.. . . . . . . . . 184
6.24 Comparison of HTTP application load and traffic received by client for
multiple servers, multiple sessions.X-axis is the simulation time in minutes.185
6.25 Comparison of TCP load at client for multiple servers, multiple sessions.




Wireless ad hoc networks hold the promise of ubiquitous connectivity, but their
widespread deployment has not become a reality due to serioulimitations on their per-
formance. Information-theoretic studies have shown that te per-node available through-
put of the wireless channel can degrade severely with increase in the number of nodes in a
flat wireless network [1]. The lack of robustness of the wireless networks is also a major
issue. Many envisioned applications of wireless networks ae in adverse environments
like military operations or disaster relief, situations where the possibility of node failure
is high, or the terrestrial wireless channel might be disrupted and connectivity between
source-destination pairs might not be available.
Security of the communication in a wireless environment is also very important.
Due to the open nature of wireless transmission, any outsider can eavesdrop on the com-
munication, or try to disrupt the communication by injecting, modifying or deleting pack-
ets. Traditional methods for data encryption, authentication or message integrity were
designed for wired networks where nodes are mostly stationary and connected to power
supplies. The solutions could thus be powerful in terms of security without having to
consider any constraints on the available energy of the network nodes. However, this ap-
proach designing powerful security algorithms that are note ergy-conscious, make them
unsuitable in the wireless setting, since the wireless nodes usually have a limited amount
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of energy and also their processing power is less due to the energy constraints. The wired
security solutions can actually be security threats in the wir less environment as their
execution can lead to a rapid drainage of the wireless node energy and thus render the
wireless nodes inoperative.
In this research work, we investigate whether the addition of a satellite overlay net-
work can improve the performance, security and robustness of large wireless networks.
We define a satellite overlay network as comprised of high-power terrestrial gateway
nodes placed amongst the wireless user nodes and interconnected by high-bandwidth
satellite links. We postulate that the addition of such a satellite overlay network can offer
significant improvement in performance, network reliability and availability in large wire-
less networks, and also enable efficient security solutionshat are well-suited for wireless
nodes with limited resources. Thus, we define a hybrid wireless network as composed
of terrestrial wireless LANs with a satellite overlay network, and we try to answer the
following questions:
1. how does the satellite overlay network improve the communication performance
and network reliability in a hybrid wireless network,
2. can we make use of the satellite overlay to design efficients curity protocols that
are well-suited for the resource-limited user nodes, and
3. what are the disadvantages, if any, introduced by the satellite overlay and how do
we address these disadvantages efficiently.
We address the above questions in our research work in chapters 2 to 6 of this
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dissertation. A outline of the work contained in chapters 2 to 6 is as follows1.
1. Through network modeling and simulation, we investigatewh ther the end-to-end
performance for high data-rate traffic is improved in a hybrid wireless network
when a satellite overlay is added, compared to a flat wirelessn twork.
2. We develop analytical models to estimate the performanceof hybrid networks and
demonstrate the use of mathematical tools to allow us to design optimal hybrid
network topologies.
3. We analyze the security requirements for group communication in hybrid wire-
less networks and examine how the presence of the satellite overlay can help to
implement better security solutions. We focus on source authentication in group
communication, and we design a protocol for multicast source authentication that
makes intelligent use of the satellite overlay.
4. We investigate the requirements of wireless multicast rou ing protocols for group
communication in the hybrid network and propose an efficient, topology-aware
multicast routing protocol. We integrate the multicast routing protocol with the
source authentication protocol to propose a design for secure m lticast routing in
hybrid networks that is robust to attacks by malicious adversaries.
5. We discuss the various performance enhancement solutions that have been pro-
posed to overcome the high propagation delay of satellite links, and how these per-
1In the rest of this dissertation, we use the terms ”hybrid network”, ”hybrid wireless network” and
”hybrid satellite/wireless network” interchangeably.
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formance improvements are adversely affected by traditional u icast security pro-
tocols like the IP Security Protocol (IPSEC) at the network layer or Secure Socket
Layer (SSL) protocol for secure HTTP (HTTPS) at the application layer. Through
modeling and simulation, we investigate whether the proposed layered IPSECpro-
tocol can overcome the performance problems associated with traditional IPSEC.
For secure HTTP, we propose the Dual-SSL protocol as an altern tive to SSL and
investigate its performance in comparison to SSL.
1.1 Organization of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows.
In chapter 2, we describe the hybrid network topologies thatwe consider and some
of their important applications. We also describe the network models that we have built
for simulations and give the results of the simulations to compare the performance of the
hybrid network topologies with that of flat topologies.
We describe analytical methods to estimate the performanceof hybrid networks in
chapter 3. Here we show how we can apply loss network models tothe hybrid network,
and perform fixed point iterations on the loss network model to estimate performance
metrics for various network parameters. We also show how we can combine the analytical
model with mathematical computational techniques to fine-tune the network parameters
and thus do network design.
In chapter 4, we propose a source authentication protocol for the wireless nodes
for securing group communication. The source authentication protocol takes advantage
4
of the presence of the satellite overlay network. We demonstrate he major savings in
energy and processing delay that are possible with the proposed protocol, compared to
commonly-used authentication methods.
In chapter 5, we discuss why secure multicast communicationis important in hy-
brid satellite networks and propose a multicast routing protoc l that makes efficient use
of the physical hierarchy present in the hybrid network. We also propose a design for se-
cure multicast routing that combines the multicast protocol with the source authentication
protocol described in chapter 4.
Chapter 6 deals with the issue of secure unicast communication in satellite net-
works. We discuss why the introduction of the satellite overlay has a detrimental effect
on the performance of unicast communication between a pair of network nodes, and the
TCP and HTTP proxy enhancements that are used by satellite networks to mitigate the
adverse effects. We show how the network enhancements are brok n by the introduction
of IPSEC and SSL protocols for unicast security, and we describe novel methods that
we propose to allow both the performance enhancements and the security protocols to
function simultaneously.
We conclude the dissertation in chapter 7, highlighting themajor contributions of
our research efforts and by giving a roadmap for future research endeavors related to the
work presented in this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Achieving Performance Improvement in a Wireless Network with a
Satellite Overlay
2.1 Overview
Deployment of large-scale ad hoc wireless networks suffer from several major prob-
lems. Recent studies have shown that the per-node wireless channel throughput in a wire-
less network is inversely proportional to the square root ofthe number of nodes in the
network [1]. Therefore, as the network increases in size, the individual throughput of the
nodes decreases rapidly. Even if the network is connected, th ad hoc routing protocol
might fail to find routes between the source and the destinatio when they are widely sep-
arated. For many traffic profiles, a fully wireless network might not be able to satisfy the
quality of service (QoS) requirements of the traffic. For example, the end-to-end delay
for voice traffic might be unacceptably high. Also, wirelessad hoc networks are ideally
suited for applications like military battlefield and disaster relief due to the lack of infras-
tructure requirement and rapid deployment capability. Such applications are typically in
hostile environments where there is a high probability of failure of the wireless nodes. In
the event of node failures, the network might get partitioned and the path between sources
and destinations might become unavailable. Wireless networks therefore are not robust to
node failures.
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Based on the above issues with wireless networks, we addressthe question of feasi-
bility of large-scale wireless networks. We propose that the addition of a satellite overlay
network can effectively solve the problems with performance and robustness of wireless
networks and make it possible to implement wireless networks with a large number of
nodes.
2.2 Methodology
We define a satellite overlay network as consisting of one or mre satellite nodes
and multiple terrestrial “gateway” nodes that have interfaces for both satellite links and
terrestrial wireless communications. For our network model, w consider one satellite in
geostationary orbit. We divide the terrestrial network into multiple “clusters” of wireless
nodes, with each cluster being served by a gateway node. Ordinary terrestrial user nodes
reach the gateway node through multi-hop terrestrial paths. T is satellite overlay network
provides multiple advantages to the wireless network. The advantages are outlined below.
• The forwarding over the satellite links is single-hop, compared to multi-hop for-
warding path on the ground. Thus the overlay provides shortcut paths between a
terrestrial source and a destination when the source and destination are separated
by several hops.
• The bandwidth of the satellite links is higher than the terrest ial wireless channels,
and thus the overlay network provides high-bandwidth alternate paths for the appli-
cation traffic.
• The satellite is always on, and the characteristics of the sat llite links are well-
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known. In the event of forwarding node failure on the terrestrial path between a
source and destination, the satellite overlay provides alternate, forwarding paths.
The satellite overlay thus provides reliable communication paths to the terrestrial
nodes.
2.2.1 Proposed Network Model
We consider the terrestrial network to be composed of wireless nodes that are
grouped into either separate local area networks (LANs), orthey are spread in a sin-
gle large wireless network covering a large area. The terrestrial network has no wired
infrastructure. The wireless nodes have limited energy andprocessing power, and they
are also limited in their transmission range. In this chapter, w consider unicast communi-
cations between source-destination pairs, and we treat thecase of group communications
involving multiple sources and multiple destinations in chapter 5. The source and desti-
nation can be in different physical LANs, or they might be widely separated in the same
wireless network. At a given time, there can be multiple source-destination pairs com-
municating with one another. Communications between the source and destination pairs
are via multi-hop routing paths established with intermediate nodes acting as forwarding
routers. The bandwidth available is limited by the maximum bandwidth of the wireless
channel, which is shared by all the nodes. The communications ca involve a wide range
of applications with different QoS requirements:
• Video stream: high bandwidth, low jitter
• Voice: low bandwidth, low jitter
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• Data traffic: high reliability, medium delay
Based on the above traffic types and communications capabilities of the user nodes,
we propose to add a satellite overlay network for improved performance and network
availability in the event of node failures. The satellite overlay network consists of a geo-
stationary (GEO) satellite and multiple terrestrial “gateway” nodes that have interfaces
for both satellite links and terrestrial wireless communications. In our present model, we
assume each ground cluster is served by one gateway node. A cluster can be a physical
wireless LAN, or clusters can be logical subdivisions of a large wireless network, created
using different wireless base station set (BSS) identifiers. We assume that the GEO satel-
lite has multiple spot-beams. It is capable of on-board processing and switching between
the different spot-beams. The GEO satellite has a large footprint and therefore it can in-
terconnect all the terrestrial LANs in a large area. The satellite is managed from a remote
Network Operations Center (NOC) through a dedicated high-bandwidth channel. The
NOC has wired broadband link to the Internet. The satellite supports high bandwidth for
downlink (approximately 90Mbps) and moderate bandwidth for uplink (approximately
1.5Mbps). These assumptions about the GEO satellite are consiste t with the features of
several next-generation satellites in development or already deployed (for example, [2]).
The wireless terrestrial network and the satellite overlaytogether form a hierarchi-
cal hybrid network with varying node capabilities and different channel characteristics.
Every node in the network, including the satellite, is IP-addressable and can support IP-
based protocols. The wireless user nodes in a cluster or LAN communicate with one
another and the local gateway node using multi-hop ad hoc routing protocols over the
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terrestrial wireless channels. The gateway nodes have multiple communication paths to
other gateway nodes: either through terrestrial multi-hopwireless paths using ad hoc
routing protocols, or in a single-hop over the satellite channel. The satellite overlay thus
provides space diversity to the network. Communication betwe n a source and a desti-
nation located in different LANs can take one of multiple forwa ding paths: multi-hop
ad hoc paths through forwarding user nodes (assuming the LANs are connected terrestri-
ally), or multi-hop ad hoc paths to the local gateway, which forwards to the destination
gateway either terrestrially or over the satellite links, and from there to the destination
node. If the gateway nodes can route terrestrially or through the satellite links, the path
selection is based on the end-to-end delay and the throughput required for the data traffic.
Each terrestrial wireless LAN creates a mesh network with the local gateway node acting
as the core of the mesh network. In the overlay level, the terrestrial paths between the
gateway nodes create a mesh architecture, while the satellite defines a star network where
the bandwidth can be dynamically distributed amongst the underlying gateway nodes.
2.2.2 Example Hierarchical Topologies
Based on the network model outlined in section 2.2.1, figure 2.1 shows a represen-
tative architecture that is suitable for civilian or commercial use. The network comprises
wired LANs, wireless LANs with fixed and mobile access points(APs), and mobile ad
hoc networks (MANETs) that are connected to one another, andto the wired Internet,
through a GEO satellite. Mobile APs serve networks where theinfrastructure is not read-
ily available, or a network in a moving vehicle. A subset of the nodes in the MANET
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Figure 2.1: Hybrid network topology with a satellite overlay for civil-
ian/commercial applications.
have satellite uplink/downlink capability and can therefoconnect to the rest of the hy-
brid network.
(a) Hybrid network topology for military operations(b) Hybrid network topology for emergency opera-
tions/disaster relief
Figure 2.2: Hybrid wireless network topologies with a satellite overlay for
military operations and disaster relief.
Figure 2.2(a) illustrates a hybrid wireless network for military use. The terrestrial
segment is composed of MANETs with wireless mobile nodes (e.g., ground soldiers).
Each MANET has one or moreforwarding nodes(FN) with higher capabilities (e.g.,
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armored vehicles). The FNs have wireless communication with both the basic mobile
nodes, and with spacecraft flying at low altitudes. The spacecr ft are Unmanned Air
Vehicles (UAVs) or manned aircraft like helicopters etc, ora combination of both. The
basic mobile nodes can communicate with the spacecraft throug the FNs. The UAVs
and other low-altitude spacecraft have satellite uplink/downlink to a GEO satellite. The
different spacecraft can communicate with one another either through horizontal commu-
nication links or through the satellite. The satellite alsolinks to a command and control
center in a different location, and therefore connects the MANETs and the low altitude
spacecraft to the command and control center.
Figure 2.2(b) illustrates a hybrid wireless network suitable for emergency opera-
tions like disaster relief. The terrestrial segment is comprised of low-power sensor nodes
grouped into clusters. Each sensor node cluster has one or more mobile base station nodes
with higher capabilities. The mobile nodes communicate with the sensors, with low alti-
tude spacecraft, and also with a GEO satellite. The base stations also receive command
and control messages from the satellite and broadcast the messag s to the sensors. The
low altitude spacecraft (UAVs and/or helicopters) have satellite uplink/downlink. The
satellite connects the low altitude spacecraft and the mobile nodes on the ground to a com-
mand and control center. The sensor nodes collect data aboutconditions on the ground.
The mobile nodes, which can be emergency vehicles, process th da a collected from the
sensors and relays the data via the spacecraft and satelliteto th command center. The
command center processes the collected information and sends operational commands to
the spacecraft and the mobile vehicles to facilitate the disaster relief operations.
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2.3 Simulation Model and Results
2.3.1 Network Models with Stationary Nodes
We have created models of hybrid wireless networks in Opnet Modeler [3] and ob-
tained performance results for voice and video traffic through simulations. In the network
models, we have used IEEE 802.11 11Mbps as the MAC layer for the wireless ground
segment. We use AODV as the ad hoc routing protocol for the ground segment. For
the satellite overlay network, the ground wireless segmentis divided into four clusters,
with one gateway in each cluster. The gateways are located within one-hop transmission
range of the source and destination nodes. Over the satellite links, we used point-to-point
static routing. The satellite is located in geostationary orbit. For the simulation runs, we
consider the nodes in the network to be stationary.
We ran simulations for network sizes of 200 nodes and 1065 nodes. Figure 2.3(a)
shows the simulation model for the hybrid wireless network with 200 nodes. For this
network, there are two source-destination pairs sending medium data rate voice traffic
using multi-hop forwarding paths. The voice traffic received by the destinations in the
hybrid wireless network with satellite overlay, compared to a similar flat network without
the overlay, is shown in figure 2.3(b). For the hybrid network, all the voice traffic is
received, while a large percentage is dropped by the flat network. A comparison of the
voice traffic parameters is given in figures 2.4 and 2.5. The end-to-end delay for the voice
traffic is substantially less in case of the hybrid wireless network, and is mostly due to the
propagation delay over the satellite links (figure 2.4(a)).Similarly, the voice traffic delay
variation (figure 2.4(b)) and the voice jitter (figure 2.5) are much less when the satellite
13
overlay is used for forwarding the traffic. For the ad hoc routing protocol AODV, the time
taken to discover routes to the destination, and the number of hops in the route are shown
in figure 2.6. As shown in figure 2.6(a), the satellite overlayprovides a reliable forwarding
path that is available for the duration of the traffic flow, while the terrestrial forwarding
paths change due to route timeouts, channel contention, etc, and thus the forwarding path
has to be re-established multiple times. This also contributes to the delay and the data
drop. The number of hops is also limited in the case of the overlay forwarding, compared
to terrestrial paths (figure 2.6(b)).
(a) Simulation model for 200-node hybrid wireless
network with satellite overlay
(b) Comparison of voice traffic received (X-axis is the
simulation duration in minutes)
Figure 2.3: Performance evaluation of 200-node flat wireless network and
hybrid wireless network with satellite overlay.
The statistics for the wireless channel for the hybrid overlay network and the flat
wireless network are compared in figures 2.7 and 2.8. Figure 2.7(a) shows that even with
limited application traffic, the wireless channel for the flat network drops a large amount
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(a) End-to-end delay for voice traffic (b) End-to-end delay variation for voice traffic
Figure 2.4: Comparison of voice traffic delay characteristics in 200-node flat
wireless network and hybrid wireless network with satellitoverlay (X-axis
is the simulation duration in minutes).
of the data, while the satellite overlay has no data drops dueto the very high bandwidth
and the reliable forwarding path it provides. The wireless channel delay is much higher
for the flat network as all the nodes contend for the shared mediu , whereas for the
hybrid network the delay is almost negligible because once the overlay forwarding path is
established, all the traffic flows through it and there are no additional resource reservation
requests from the sources for the wireless channel (figure 2.7(b)) For similar reason, the
overall throughput for the wireless channel for the hybrid network is much less compared
to the flat network, since most of the data is transmitted overth satellite links and the
wireless channel is not utilized much.
In the network model with 1065 nodes, there are three source-destination pairs.
One pair of the sources are located one-hop away from each other, and their respective
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of voice traffic jitter in 200-node flat wireless net-
work and hybrid wireless network with satellite overlay (X-axis is the simu-
lation duration in minutes).
destinations are also one-hop neighbors. These sources anddestinations are at the extreme
ends of the network, which covers an area of 30km x 30km. The otr source-destination
pairs are located close to the center of the network. A comparison of the voice traffic
sent and received when the network has 1065 nodes is shown in figure 2.9. The graph
shows that when the one-hop neighboring sources are transmitting simultaneously, there
is a significant traffic drop due to collision in the wireless channel and also due to buffer
overflow in the forwarding nodes. When the overlay network isused, the high bandwidth
provided by the satellite links ensures that traffic does notget backed up in the gateway,
and also there is no collision in the wireless channel. The delay statistics for the voice
traffic are given in figures 2.10 and 2.11 and their analyses arimilar to the case for the
200-node network.
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(a) AODV route discovery time (seconds) (b) AODV number of hops per route
Figure 2.6: Comparison of AODV parameters in 200-node flat wireless net-
work and hybrid wireless network (X-axis is the simulation duration in min-
utes).
2.3.2 Network Model for Urban Rescue Scenario with Mobile Nodes
We have created a hybrid network topology model for an urban rescue operation
scenario (figure 2.12(a)) in Opnet Modeler and ran simulations to evaluate its perfor-
mance. In this scenario, there are wireless sensor nodes deployed to different locations on
the ground to collect and transmit sensory information. There are low altitude spacecraft,
Organic Air Vehicles (OAVs), flying over the scenario and generating sensory informa-
tion. UAVs flying at medium altitude function both as sensorsand relays for the data
collected by the ground sensors and the OAVs. The UAVs are covred by a GEO satellite
that relay the data from the UAVs to a remote command center. Data from the remote
command center is also relayed by the satellite and the UAVs to ground vehicles which
directs their trajectory based on the information from the sensors. The UAV relays there-
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(a) Data dropped by the wireless channel (b) Wireless channel delay
Figure 2.7: Comparison of the wireless channel statistics in 200-node flat
wireless network and hybrid wireless network (X-axis is thesimulation dura-
tion in minutes).
fore act as the gateway nodes for the ground sensors and the OAVs. The ground sensors,
OAVs and the ground vehicles constitute a mobile ad hoc mesh ntwork that increases
the possibility of finding paths from the ground sensors to the UAV relays. Each relay
defines a local star network where the bandwidth can be dynamically distributed between
the underlying nodes. The UAV relays follow the movement of the ground nodes to pro-
vide constant coverage. The number of UAV relays and the location of the UAV relays,
is determined by the heuristic placement algorithm proposed in [4]. The ground sensors
have only a single terrestrial wireless interface, while the OAVs and the vehicles have two
interfaces - one for terrestrial wireless communication, while the other for communicat-
ing with the UAV relays. The UAV relays have two interfaces each - one for talking to the
underlying spacecraft and vehicles, while the other for communicating with the satellite.
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Figure 2.8: Comparison of the wireless channel throughput in 200-node flat
wireless network and hybrid wireless network (X-axis is thesimulation dura-
tion in minutes).
The simulation model in Opnet is shown in figure 2.12(b). The number of ground
nodes, their locations and movement patterns are obtained from US military data. The
network has 118 ground sensors, 122 OAVs and 28 vehicles. TheUAV placement algo-
rithm [4] generated 4 UAV relays for the network at specific loations. The altitude of the
UAV relays is 4.5km, while the communication range with eachOAV is set at 6km. DSR
is used as the ground routing protocol, while the ground MAC is IEEE 802.11 1Mbps.
The bandwidth for the UAV relay to OAV link is 2.5Mbps each. The UAVs do static
routing of the data. The UAV MAC protocol and the satellite access are both reservation-
TDMA. For the simulations, the nodes are configured with custom traffic. On average, 20
OAVs generate streaming traffic simultaneously and send to the UAV relays for further
transmission to the satellite. 8 ground sensors generate detection frames in random times
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(a) Voice traffic sent (b) Voice traffic received
Figure 2.9: Comparison of voice traffic sent and received in a1065-node flat
wireless network and a hybrid wireless network with satellite overlay (X-axis
is the simulation time in minutes).
throughout the simulation and send to the UAV relays throughthe OAVs. The traffic gen-
erated by the ground nodes is shown in figure 2.13(a). The ground sensors generate about
25% of the total traffic, while the rest is generated by the OAVs. The delay is mostly due
to the ground sensor traffic when a sensor node cannot connectto a OAV. The node con-
tinues to generate route requests until an OAV comes within transmission range. Figure
2.13(b) shows that high traffic generation by the ground sensors loads the wireless LAN.
The throughput is sometimes greater than the link capacity of 1Mbps. This is because not
all the ground nodes interfere with one another and sometimes two or more sensors can
transmit simultaneously by sending traffic through separate OAVs (space diversity). The
larger delays (figure 2.13(c)) are mainly due to the delays ofthe ground sensor frames for
multi-hop paths and also due to the storage delay when a path is not available initially but
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(a) Voice packet end-to-end delay (b) Voice packet delay variation
Figure 2.10: Voice traffic delay statistics in a 1065-node flat wireless network
and a hybrid wireless network with satellite overlay (X-axis is the simulation
time in minutes).
is established later. The delays due to the OAV frames are much smaller in comparison.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have examined whether adding a satelliteoverlay network to
interconnect large terrestrial wireless networks can leadto improvements in the net-
work throughput. We have defined the network topology thus created as a hybrid satel-
lite/wireless network. We have given examples of such networks and highlighted some of
their important applications. We have built simulation models of the proposed hybrid net-
work architecture, both for stationary wireless nodes and for mobile wireless nodes. The
results of discrete event simulations clearly demonstratehat there is major improvement
in end-to-end traffic delivery and delay characteristics when the overlay network is used,
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Figure 2.11: Voice traffic jitter in a 1065-node flat wirelessnetwork and a
hybrid wireless network with satellite overlay (X-axis is the simulation time
in minutes).
in comparison to flat wireless networks.
2.5 Related Work
Gupta and Kumar have obtained theoretical results that showt at the capacity of
wireless networks improve by a factor of 1.5 when the networks are 3-dimensional, for
example, hierarchical networks with a satellite backbone [5]. In [6], the authors have
considered a hybrid terrestrial cellular network with a satellite backbone and have formu-
lated a multi-faceted cost function composed of call-blocking and dropping probabilities,
to determine the optimal channel partitioning between the cellular and the satellite sys-
tems and to decide on the optimal call assignment policy. They have obtained optimal
solutions for sub-problems of the original complex optimizat on problem, whereby they
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(a) Urban rescue operation network model (b) Network simulation model for the hier-
archical architecture
Figure 2.12: A hybrid wireless architecture for urban rescuoperations with
satellite-UAV overlay
conclude that double coverage through both cellular and satellite systems, results in sub-
stantial improvement over pure terrestrial or pure satellite systems. Dousse et al [7] study
the connectivity properties of large-scale ad hoc and hybrid wireless networks where fixed
base stations can be reached in multiple hops. The authors find that the introduction of
a sparse network of base stations increases the connectivity to a large extent. They also
show that bottlenecks become unavoidable at low spatial densiti s. Ryu et al [8] have
proposed an architecture for multi-tier mobile ad hoc networks and developed simulation
tools for this hybrid network. To address the challenges of connectivity asymmetry and
node heterogeneity, the paper proposes a cross-tier MAC protocol for the access layer, the
multi-virtual backbone protocol for ad hoc routing using the hierarchical backbone archi-
tecture, and a multi-modal TCP protocol. Wu et al [9] have modele a hierarchical low
earth orbit/medium earth orbit (LEO/MEO) satellite network using generalized stochastic
Petri nets and obtained performance results of the Petri nets model through Opnet sim-
23
(a) MANET Sent and Received Traf-
fic
(b) Wireless LAN throughput (c) End-to-end traffic delay
Figure 2.13: Simulation results for urban rescue scenario hybrid wireless
network with satellite-UAV overlay
ulations. The paper demonstrates that the double-layered sat llite network outperforms
single-layered ones for heavy traffic loads. [10] describesth European CAPANINA
project, which is investigating the viability of integrating difficult-to-reach areas into the
broadband Internet using different types of aerial platforms. The paper describes the work
that is being done on possible applications and services forthis hybrid architecture, on
solutions to integrate the aerial platforms into the network architecture, and on methods
to use the aerial platforms to deliver broadband content to high-speed moving vehicles.
The role of satellite networks in future telecommunications networks and service pro-
visioning is examined in [11]. The authors argue that the future of satellite systems is
to complement terrestrial networks to provide multimedia services to fixed and mobile
systems in an integrated architecture. Jetcheva et al [12] have designedAd Hoc City, a
multi-tier mobile ad hoc network architecture for wide-area communication, where the
backbone network is a mobile multi-hop network composed of wireless devices mounted
on moving vehicles. The design integrates cellular networks with ad hoc networking and
uses a modified version of DSR for unicast routing.
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Chapter 3
Performance Modeling of Hybrid Satellite/Wireless Networks Using
Fixed Point Approximation and Sensitivity Analysis for Network Design
3.1 Overview
There is a lack of systematic methodologies and toolkits forthe design and dimen-
sioning of hybrid satellite/wireless networks such that there can be predictable bounds on
performance, as measured by key performance metrics. Due toth variability in perfor-
mance of the wireless links at the terrestrial level, and theint rdependence of the link
data rates at the terrestrial level and the satellite overlay, performance analysis and net-
work design for hybrid networks is a complicated task.
Our objective is to develop analytical and numerical models, or a combination
thereof, which are simple to use but can efficiently approximate, to a great degree of
accuracy, hybrid network performance. These models have several applications in the
design and analysis of hybrid networks - for example, in the evaluation of protocol per-
formance and robustness, and component-based design and par meter tuning for optimal
performance.
We propose a novel approach based on the fixed point approximation method and
loss network models for performance evaluation and design optimization for hybrid net-
works. The primary challenges in developing loss network models for hybrid satel-
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lite/wireless networks are (i) the coupling between wireless links in the terrestrial seg-
ments due to the transmission interference between neighboring nodes, and (ii) the cou-
pling of loss and data rates between the terrestrial segments and the satellite overlay. In
the terrestrial segments, we propose to approximate interference and contention as inter-
link traffic dependent loss factors by using probabilistic physical and MAC layer models
developed in [13]. This approximate model provides a systemof equations describing the
relations between reduced link rates. For the satellite overlay, we use the Gilbert-Elliot
loss model [14, 15] to derive a relationship between traffic arriv l rate and the link loss on
the satellite channel. We then use the hierarchical reducedload network model from [16],
to create an overall network model for the hybrid network that couples the arrival rates in
each layer with the associated loss rates, and interconnects the arrival rates and loss rates
between the layers. We then use a fixed point approximation method for this set of rela-
tions to derive a solution that converges to a fixed point for the set of parameters arrival
rate and link loss, while satisfying all the equations in theset. The result is an implicit
model of the selected performance metric (for example, throughput), as a function of the
network design variables, for example, path routing probabilities, node power levels or
link bandwidths.
In addition to the performance model, we are interested in developing a method-
ology for design of hybrid networks, through sensitivity analysis of performance metrics
for parameter optimization and robustness evaluation. We use Automatic Differentiation
(AD) [17] for the sensitivity analysis of performance metrics. AD is a powerful method
to numerically compute the derivatives of a software-defined function (i.e. a computer
program implementation of the function). The analysis model that we generate based on
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the loss network models and fixed point iterations, is the input function to the AD and the
output of the AD is the partial derivative of the performancem tric (for example, through-
put) with respect to defined input parameters (which in our case are the network design
variables). As an example, we show how we can use this methodology to find the optimal
load distribution amongst multiple paths between source-destination pairs to maximize
throughput. In this example the gradient projection algorithm is used to find the optimal
load distribution, and AD is used to compute the gradient of the network throughput with
respect to the load distribution parameters.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we briefly describe the
hierarchical loss network model from [16] that we apply to the hybrid satellite/wireless
network. Section 3.3 describes the analytical models that we use for the wireless terres-
trial section of the hybrid network. The description in section 3.3 is originally from [18].
Section 3.4 describes the analytical models that we use for the satellite overlay segment
of the hybrid network. We detail the fixed point approach to the problem in section 3.5,
which integrates the models developed in the two preceding sections. Once the hierarchi-
cal reduced load model has been developed, we discuss in section 3.6 how to use
3.2 Generalized Loss Network Model for Hierarchical Networks
We briefly describe the hierarchical loss network model for fixed point approxima-
tion that was proposed in [16], since we use this model to build our network model.
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Figure 3.1: Hybrid network with three clusters - lower layerabstraction
3.2.1 Network Abstraction
For the loss network model design we consider large networksthat have either phys-
ical or routing hierarchies in the architecture, as shown inthe abstract network example in
figure 3.1. The three dashed regions in the example each represent a cluster in the lower
layer, which are labeled1.x, with x ∈ {1, 2, 3}. 1.1 signifies Layer 1, Peer Group 1. Each
node has an address too - for example, 1.2.5 represents node 5in peer group 2 of layer
1. Each peer group or cluster has one or more border nodes, which are shown in black,
and multiple non-border nodes, which are shown in white. Node aggregation and network
abstraction are done as follows:
• All border nodes are kept in the higher layer (layer 2 in this example).
• Border nodes in the same cluster are fully connected via “logical links”.
This results in the higher layer abstraction as shown in figure 3.2.
Mapping the hybrid satellite/wireless network to this model is straightforward. The
terrestrial wireless networks are analogous to the layer onclusters in the example above.
The gateway nodes in each wireless network are the border nodes; the satellite overlay
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comprising the gateway nodes and the satellite form the higher layer.
3.2.2 Hierarchical Model for Fixed Routing
3.2.2.1 Notations
G(1.n): nth cluster/peer group in layer 1, wheren = 1, ..., N1 andN1 is the total
number of clusters.
1.n.xi: nodex in clusterG(1.n), wherei = 1, ..., Xn andXn is the total number of
nodes inG(1.n).
1.n.yi: border nodes in clusterG(1.n), wherei = 1, ..., Yn and Yn is the total
number of border nodes inG(1.n).
1.n1.x1 −→ 1.n2.x2: directional link from node1.n1.x1 to node1.n2.x2.
λs(1.n1.x1 −→ 1.n2.x2): offered load for class traffic from source1.n1.x1 to
destination1.n2.x2, wheres = 1, ..., S andS is the total number of traffic classes. It is
also written asλps with p as thepth source-destination pair.
P : (1.n1.x1 −→ 1.n2.x2): the route between node pair〈1.n1.x1, 1.n2.x2〉. Pp is
the route between thepth node pair.
3.2.2.2 Route Segments
The route between a source-destination pair is broken down into route segments
whenever the source and destination are in different clusters. This is done to segregate
local computation within a cluster from the higher layer computation between clusters.
Each cluster that the route traverses has its own segment. Therefore, a routeP :
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(1.n1.x1 −→ 1.n2.x2) has the following segments assuming thatn1 6= n2 and that neither
1.n1.x1 nor1.n2.x2 is a border node:
P 1 : (1.n1.x1 −→ 1.n1.y2)
P 2 : (1.n1.y2 −→ 1.ni.y1)
P 3 : (1.ni.y1 −→ 1.ni.y2)
...
P k−1 : (1.nj.y2 −→ 1.n2.y1)
P k : (1.n2.y1 −→ 1.n2.x2)
(3.1)
wherey1 represents a border node through which traffic enters a cluster, whiley2
represents a egress border node for traffic. The set of route segments for thepth source-
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p }.
3.2.2.3 Initial Offered Load and Local Relaxation
Let λ0s(1.n1.x1 −→ 1.n2.x2) be the offered load for classs traffic of thep
th node
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p },
the initial offered load is:
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λ0ps(1.n1.x1 −→ 1.n1.y2) source cluster traffic
λ0ps(1.n1.y2 −→ 1.ni.y1) inter-cluster traffic
λ0ps(1.ni.y1 −→ 1.ni.y2) inter-cluster traffic
...
λ0ps(1.nj.y2 −→ 1.n2.y1) inter-cluster traffic
λ0ps(1.n2.y1 −→ 1.n2.x2) destination cluster traffic
(3.2)
Each term above takes the value of the initial offered loadλ0s(1.n1.x1 −→ 1.n2.x2). Thus
the same initial load is assigned to all segments.
For theith cluster, the aggregate initial offered load between a node pair, for traffic
classs, is the sum of the classs traffic that passes through this node pair for all source-
destination pairs:





λ0ps(1.ni.x1 −→ 1.ni.y2) (3.3)
where we assume, without loss of generality, that the destinatio node is a border node.
In equation (3.3), we also assume the initial condition of zero blocking in remote clusters
and between clusters.
The reduced load model for fixed routing is then applied to every cluster individu-
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Figure 3.2: Hybrid network with three clusters - higher layer abstraction.
ally using the above offered loads to calculate group-wide blocking probabilities:
Bs(P
1) = Bs(1.n1.x1 −→ 1.n1.y2)
...
Bs(P
3) = Bs(1.ni.y1 −→ 1.ni.y2)
...
Bs(P
k) = Bs(1.n2.y1 −→ 1.n2.x2)
(3.4)
3.2.2.4 Reduced Load and Higher Layer Relaxation
The network consists of only the border nodes in the higher layer. As shown in
figure 3.2, the abstraction in the higher layer is a new network c mposed of the border
nodes, the inter-group links and the logical links within the clusters. In this layer, the
route segments from equation (3.1) are consolidated into three parts:
• the source cluster segmentP 1,
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• a new segment that comprises all the clusters between the source and destination





• the destination cluster segmentP k.
The aggregate offered load in the higher layer (between the egr ss gateway node
in the source cluster and the entry gateway node in the destination cluster) is the initial
offered load thinned by blocking in both the source and destination clusters:






















Equation (3.6) gives the complete traffic input in the higherlayer. Now running the
reduced load approximation algorithm at this layer gives thblocking probability between
the remote nodes:
Bs(1.ni.y1 −→ 1.ni.y2) blocking in intermediate cluster
Bs(1.ni.y2 −→ 1.nj .yi) blocking between clusters
(3.7)
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3.2.2.5 Updating Lower Layer Load With Higher Layer Loss
The higher layer blocking probabilities obtained in equation (3.7) are fed back to
the lower layer offered load in (3.3) to accurately reflect the fact that the original offered
load is thinned by blocking in the remote clusters and the intr-cluster links:












Equation (3.8) becomes the new input for local relaxation atthe lower layer. Fixed
point approximations at the local and higher layers are thenrepeated till the difference
between the results from successive iterations are within acert in criteria.
3.2.3 Summary Outline of the Fixed Point Approximation Algorithm
Based on the performance model described in section 3.2.2, the algorithm for fixed
point approximation of hierarchical networks can be summarized in the following steps.
For each source-destination pair:
1. Divide the traffic route between a source-destination pair into segments.
2. Assign the same initial load to all the segments.
3. For any intermediate segment, aggregate the offered loadon the path between
boundary nodes as the sum of the initial load and the offered loa s for all source-
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destination pairs whose traffic route includes the path in question (for a given class
of traffic).
4. Run the fixed point approximation in each segment separately to compute the block-
ing probability (or equivalently, loss factor) in each segment.
5. Abstract the higher layer into three segments - the sourcesegment, destination seg-
ment, and one intermediate segment which is the union of all intermediate clusters
and inter-cluster links.
6. For the aggregate intermediate segment in the higher laye, the aggregate load on
any path is the sum of the initial offered load on that path andthe aggregate of the
offered load for each source-destination pair whose trafficroute includes the path in
question, thinned by blocking (or equivalently, loss) in both source and destination
clusters for each source-destination pair.
7. Run the fixed point approximation in the intermediate segmnt of the higher layer to
obtain the blocking probability between border nodes with each cluster and between
the clusters.
8. Update the initial aggregate offered load in each lower layer cluster with the block-
ing probabilities computed from the higher layer approximat on.
9. Iterate the computations in the lower and higher layers till the results converge.
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3.3 Physical and Link Layer Model for the Terrestrial Wireless Segment
In the wireless segment, we assume that the MAC layer protocol is IEEE 802.11. In
[13] Bianchi describes a simple but accurate analytical model to compute the IEEE 802.11
throughput, under the assumptions of finite number of terminals and ideal channel condi-
tions. The analysis applies to both packet transmission schemes used in 802.11, namely,
the basic access mechanism and the RTS/CTS access mechanism. We use Bianchi’s
model to approximate the MAC layer induced loss factor that we use in our performance
model. In the following we briefly describe Bianchi’s model,as outlined in [19].
Consider a fixed numbern of contending connections. In Bianchi’s model every
connection is in saturation condition, i.e. it always has a packet available for transmission.
This is appropriate for our problem and method, since we are interested in design and
performance bounds. Since all packets are consecutive and there is no empty queue, each
packet needs to wait for a random backoff time before the transmission attempt. LetW
be the minimum contention window size andm be the maximum backoff stage, then the
maximum contention window size is2mW .
Let b(t) be the stochastic process representing the backoff time counter for a given
connection andq(t) the stochastic process representing the backoff stage of the connec-
tion at timet. Let τ be the stationary probability that the connection transmita packet
in a generic time slot. It is also assumed that at each transmission attempt, regardless
of the previous retransmissions numbers, each packet collides with constant and inde-
pendent probabilityp. The random process(q(t), b(t)) is modelled as a two-dimensional
discrete-time Markov process. Hence, we can compute the stat transition probabilities
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and the stationary distribution of the corresponding Markov chain. We can also obtain the
following relations [13] between the key parametersp andτ :




(1− 2p)(W + 1) + pW (1− (2p)m)
Note that the above two equations represent a nonlinear system in the two unknowns,
which can be solved using numerical techniques. The system has a unique solution. To
reproduce Bianchi’s result, we use a fixed point method to solve those two equations. For
each value ofn we solve these equations once and use the results in our fixed point model.
Let S be the normalized system throughput, defined as the fractionof time the
channel is used to successfully transmit payload bits. Nextstep is to computePtr, the
probability of at least one transmission in one time slot andPs the probability that a
transmission occurring in the channel is successful.









(1− Ptr)σ + PtrPsTs + Ptr(1− Ps)Tc
(3.11)
Here,Ts andTr are the average times the channel is busy due to successful transmission
and collision respectively. The parameterσ is the duration of an empty slot andE[P ] is
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the expected packet length. To specifically compute the throughput for a given Distributed
Coordination Function (DCF) scheme it suffices to specifyTs andTc.
For a system completely based on the basic access mechanism,with H = PHYhdr+
MAChdr being the packet header,δ the propagation delay, and with fixed packet sizeP ,
we have,
T bass =H + P + SIFS + δ + ACK
+ DIFS + δ
(3.12)
T basc =H + P + DIFS + δ
For a system based on the RTS/CTS access mechanism, collision can only occur
for RTS frames, hence,
T rtss =RTS + SIFS + δ + CTS + SIFS
+ δ + H + P + SIFS + δ + ACK
+ DIFS + δ
(3.13)
T rtsc =RTS + DIFS + δ
Note that the slot timeσ is also given in Table 1 of [13].
The saturation throughput of IEEE 802.11 depends on the number of contention
nodes in the same neighborhood.
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3.4 Analytical Model for the Satellite Channel
In this section we describe the channel loss model for the satellite link that we con-
sider for the fixed point algorithm in the higher layer. We consider that for transmission
the gateway nodes access the satellite channel using a multiple access protocol and the
loss in the channel is due to physical conditions only. We also describe the multiple access
protocol that we use for computing the channel throughput for he fixed point algorithm
in the higher layer.
3.4.1 Satellite Channel Loss Model
We model the satellite channel by a threshold-based 2-stateM rkov chain. In this
model the channel is either in “GOOD” state, if the transmitted signal experiences less
thanΓ dB attenuation, or it is in “BAD” state, if the signal fade is more thanΓ dB, where
Γ is the fade attenuation threshold [14, 15]. We assume that ifthe channel is in “GOOD”
state, channel coding is capable of correcting all bit errors and for simulation purposes the
probability of bit error at the output of the channel decoderis zero. In the “BAD” state, the
channel behaves as a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) with biterror probability equal to
ǫ at the output of the channel decoder. The channel state is characterized by the transition













whereg and1 − b are the probabilities that the channel will be in the “GOOD” state
at thekth symbol duration, given that the channel was in “GOOD” and “BAD” states,
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respectively, at the(k− 1)st symbol duration. Using the results of the ACTS Propagation
Experiments [20], for a fade attenuation threshold ofΓ = 10 dB., we haveg = 0.9999813,
and1− b = 0.00172.
In order to develop a loss model in section 3.5, we need to calculate the bit error
probability at the output of the channel decoder. In order toestimate the value ofǫ, we
use the link budget calculations of a commercial satellite system proposed in [2]. The
calculations confirm that for signal attenuation of less than 10 dB, link budget margins
and channel coding are capable of keeping the bit error probability around10−9 at the
output of the channel decoder. For signal attenuation of more than 10 dB, on the other
hand, bit errors occur with probabilityǫ ≥ 0.1 at the decoder output of a typical concate-
nated channel encoder/decoder pair which employs a RS(204,188) Reed-Solomon outer
code and rate-punctured inner convolutional codes (capable of supporting rates 1/2, 2/3,
3/4, 5/6, 7/8 to compensate for fading) [21, 22]. Using this re ult, we evaluate the time
progress of the channel state for every bit transmission andassume that a bit is in error
with probabilityǫ = 0.1 when the channel is in “BAD” state and no errors occur when the
channel is in “GOOD” state. Since these errors are at the output of the channel decoder,
we further assume that a packet is corrupted if at least one bit is in error. We use this
packet loss pattern in our fixed point algorithm.
3.4.2 Multiple-Access Throughput Model for the Satellite Channel
To compute the throughput of the satellite channel on the uplink, we assume that
multiple gateway nodes contend for the channel during transmission using theslotted
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ALOHA multiple access scheme [23]. Therefore ifλn is the total traffic forn gateway
nodes transmitting, the satellite channel throughput is given by:
S = λne
−λn (3.15)






whereW is the channel bandwidth in hertz andP/N is the average signal-to-noise power
ratio of the channel.
We use the multiple-access capacityCa in computing the channel loss factor from
the traffic rate in section 3.5.2.2, equation (3.27).
3.5 The Fixed Point Algorithm for the Hybrid Network
We follow the methodology described in section 3.2 for the performance model of
the hybrid network. We assume unicast communication with the source and destination
nodes being in separate terrestrial clusters. For example,as shown in the network repre-
sentation in figure 3.3, we have a sourceS in cluster 1.1 and a destinationD in cluster
1.3.
3.5.1 Lower Layer Loss Model and Fixed Point Method
We assume IEEE 802.11 RTS/CTS as the link layer protocol in each terrestrial
cluster and thus model the relation between the traffic rate and the link losses using the
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Figure 3.3: Hybrid network with three wireless clusters andsatellite - lower layer
set of equations described in 3.3. In our model, this is the instantiation of the lower layer
model as described in 3.2.2.3.
3.5.1.1 Notations
We first introduce notation and definitions that we use in deriving the set of implicit
equations, where we use the fixed point algorithm. The network topology graph consist-
ing of N nodes is given. Each node has the ability to transmit packetsat the rate ofΛ
bits/second to the nodes that are connected to it, i.e., for simplicity, we assume that the
physical layer capacity of all links is fixed and equal toΛ. The extension to different rates
for every pair of adjacent links is straightforward; it onlycomplicates notation and thus
the main thrust of the argument may be hidden. All nodes use omni-directional anten-
nas, and all neighbor nodes of the transmitting node receivethe signal. The connectivity
and interfering property between each node pair is decided by the Signal-to-Noise ratio
(SNR) (transmission power, distance, modulation, etc). Note that two nodes are neigh-
bors and connected if they can directly communicate, and twonodes are interfering if
one of them cannot receive data, while the other one is transmitting data to a third node.
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Let c = 1, · · · , C be the set ofcommoditiesin the network. Each commodity is speci-
fied by its source-destination pair(I(c), O(c)), and traffic demand raterc between them.
Network links (connections between neighbor nodes) are specified either by their index
l = 1, · · · , L or their source-destination pair( , j). Note thatrc is the average traffic rate
generated at the source node (the incoming rate), which may not be equal to the traffic
received at the destination node (the outgoing rate) if there is packet loss in the network.
We assume thatηl, the PHY layer link loss probability is known and fixed.
The routing is known and fixed and it is defined by the set of end-to-end paths
(i.e. the paths between the origin and destination of each comm dity) and the fraction
(probability) of the incoming traffic that is transmitted oneach of these paths. LetΠc be
the set of the paths that are used for commodityc. Consider a pathπc,k ∈ Πc, thenαπc,k
is the fraction (probability) of commodityc traffic transmitted over pathπc,k at I(c), the
source node of commodityc. We have
∑
πc,k∈Πc
απc,k = 1, for each c = 1, · · · , C (3.17)
Our goal is to find a consistent set of link loss parameters andtraffic rate parame-
ters that satisfy two sets of equations. The first set is derived from the network loss model
and computes the link outgoing traffic ratesλl, l = 1, · · · , L from the MAC layer effec-
tive loss parametersǫl, l = 1, · · · , L. The second set is based on Bianchi’s model and
computes the loss parametersǫl from the ratesλl. The fixed point method applies these
two mappings iteratively, until convergence to a consistent solution(ǫ⋆, λ⋆) that satisfies
both mappings is achieved. The existence of a consistent solution follows from the facts
that both mappings are continuous and bounded and map a compat subset ofR2L into
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itself, via an application of a fixed point theorem [25]. We deriv the two mappings in the
following sections 3.5.1.2 and 3.5.1.3.
3.5.1.2 First Mapping: Fromǫ to λ
We assume that the packet loss probabilities due to MAC layercontention are given.
We compute theλl’s, which are theeffective(outgoing) data rates of the network links.
Let (lπ(1), · · · , lπ(kπ)) be the set of the links in pathπ, which are ordered from the first
to the last hop in the path. Letsπ be the commodity that pathπ is serving. Then,λπlπ(i),





(1− ηlπ(j))(1− ǫlπ(j)). (3.18)
Note thatrsπ is the corresponding source incoming traffic rate for commodity sπ, απ is
the fraction of that traffic routed on pathπ. The two terms in parentheses specify the
percentage of the traffic that is successfully transmitted over the firsti links of the pathπ.





The notation convention in the last equation is that there exist an indexjπ for pathπ
such that the linkl whose total traffic rate we calculate is identical with the link lπ(jπ)
of pathπ. Equations (3.18), (3.19), taken together, provide the desired mapping from
the vector ofǫ’s to the vector ofλ’s. These computations are executed throughout the
network synchronously.
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3.5.1.3 Second Mapping: Fromλ to ǫ
This mapping is based on Bianchi’s results [13], which we reviewed in section 3.3.
Let Hi be the set of interfering nodes with nodei. The set of nodes that interfere in the
transmission from nodei to j is the union of nodei’s andj’s sets of interfering nodes.






{j}} contends with each other














whereN is the total number of nodes in the network.
For now assume that we have calculatedS for this channel. Recall thatS is the
fraction of time that the channel is successfully used to transmit data packets. We assume
that the contending links have equal capacityΛ. Therefore, the channel capacity isSΛ.
We assume that the channel capacity is divided proportionally between all contending
















λij if Xij ≤ SΛ
SΛ
Xij
λij if Xij > SΛ
(3.21)





Assume now that we are at iterationk+1, the new value for MAC layer loss factor of link




(i,j) + (1− β)ǫ
′(i, j) (3.23)
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Figure 3.4: Hybrid network higher layer - source, destination and intermediate segments
whereβ is the weight,0 ≤ β ≤ 1. The weighted average is introduced to avoid
rapid changes and oscillations in the computation ofǫ andλ in the fixed point iterations.
In summary, for each connection (link) in the network we havedefined and com-
puted the channel capacity. The channel capacity is based onthe Bianchi’s saturation
model, and hence a function of the number of interfering nodes with the corresponding
link. After convergence, the total effective (outgoing) data rate of each channel is less than
its throughput. Equations (3.20), (3.21), (3.22), (3.23) taken together, provide the desired
mapping from the vector ofλ’s to the vector ofǫ’s. These computations are executed
throughout the network synchronously.
3.5.2 Higher Layer Loss Model and Fixed Point Method
For the higher layer relaxation, we consider the overlay comprising the satellite and
the two gateway nodes 1.1.1 and 1.3.1 logically connected toone another via satellite
links. This form the intermediate segment at the higher layer, similar to section 3.2.2.4,
and as shown in figure 3.4. We assume symmetric links for the satellite uplink and down-
link.
In the higher layer, our goal is to find a consistent set of traffic rate parameters and
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satellite channel loss parameters that satisfy two sets of equations. The first set is de-
rived from the loss model in the satellite layer and computesth outgoing traffic rate as a
function of the channel loss and the incoming traffic rate. The second set is derived from
the satellite channel capacity model described in section 3.4.2 and computes the satellite
channel loss from the traffic rate. The fixed point method applies the two mappings itera-
tively until the convergence to a consistent solution that satisfies both set of equations. We
subsequently feed the convergence values to the offered load in the destination cluster in
the lower layer, namely to equation (3.19) and iterate localand higher layer computations
till the difference between successive iterations are within certain criteria.
3.5.2.1 Mapping from Loss Parameter to Traffic Rate
The aggregate offered load (for classs of traffic) between the gateway nodesi and












wherep refers to any source-destination pair whose traffic passes through the link con-
necting the gateway nodesi, j whileP is the total number of source-destination paths that
pass throughi, j. The first term on the RHS of equation (3.24) is the initial load between
the gateway nodes, while the second term is the initial load fr each source-destination
pair whose path passes through gateway nodesi, j, thinned by physical layer lossesηsrcp
and MAC layer lossesǫsrcp in the source cluster.
Let ǫ be the satellite link loss due to physical and MAC layer conditions, computed










ij is the loss due to data drop in the satellite link betweeni, j, computed from
(3.28). In the initial run of the algorithm, we take its valueto be zero.
3.5.2.2 Mapping from Traffic Rate to Loss Parameter
From equation (3.24),λ1ijs is the offered load on the connection between one pair
of gateway nodesi, j. Let us express this asλ1k. Assuming there areL such connections






We assume that the multiple-access channel capacityCa is divided proportionally




































In order to avoid rapid changes and oscillations in the computation of the fixed
point, we update the value of the loss factor as the weighted av rage of its value in the
previous iteration and the intermediate value computed in (3.28). Therefore the value of
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the loss factor at iterationk + 1 is:
ǫk+1ij = γǫ
k
ij + (1− γ)ǫ
′
ij (3.29)
where the value of the dampening factorγ, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, is chosen such that the algorithm
converges to a fixed point.
The fixed point values〈ǫ⋆, λ⋆〉 are fed back to the incoming channel traffic rate in
(3.19) and the lower layer and higher layer computations arerep ated till the difference
in the throughput between successive iterations is within pre-determined limits.
Upon convergence of the fixed point iterations, denotingλfirst,p andλlast,p to be
respectively the arrival rate of packets of the source or destination of pathp, we define the









3.6 Network Design by Automatic Differentiation
The fixed point method provides a computational scheme that,when it converges
(that is, at the fixed point), gives the value of the performance metric (for example,
throughput) for certain values of the network design parameters (for example, routing
parameters). We do not get any explicit analytical expression of the performance metric
as a function of the network parameter. However, we are also interested in developing
a methodology for network design by optimizing the network parameters - for example,
finding the set of values of the routing parameters that optimize the network throughput.
This can be achieved from the set of equations used in the fixedpoint model by
computing the sensitivities of the performance metrics with respect to the network pa-
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rameters. Sensitivity analysis of the performance metricscan be done by the gradient
projection method. The gradient projection method requires iterative computation of the
throughput gradient. Since no explicit functional description exists for the performance
metric, we need to rely on computational methods that numerically approximate the gra-
dients. For this, we use Automatic Differentiation (AD).
AD is a numerical method to compute the derivatives of a program [17]. Using
the fact that a computer program is in fact a sequence of primary operations, automatic
differentiation records the relationships between them and using the chain rule, it is able
to provide the derivative of a function in a short amount of time [19].
In this section, we present the methodology employed to optimize the overall through-
put in the network by changing the path probability distribution of each connection on the
network. The description of the methodology is from [19].
We denote byPc the set of paths used in connectionc and byC the set of all active















Then, assuming that there arem = |C| active connections in the network,nc paths used
in the connectionc and denoting byπi,c the probability associated with using pathi in
connectionc, the total throughput is a function of these input probabilities, namely:
T = T (π1,c1 , · · · , πnc1 ,c1, · · · , πncm ,cm) (3.32)
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Thus, we can write our optimization problem in the followingway:




πi,c = 1, ∀c ∈ C (3.33)
πi,c > 0, ∀(i, c) ∈ Pc × C
This optimization problem is solved by gradient projection. Let∇c be the average gradi-
ent obtained for connectionc, the value is subtracted from each of the gradients obtained
for the paths inPc to ensure that the constraint
∑
i∈Pc
πi,c = 1 is met. In other words, at each
iteration the set of routing probabilities is updated usingthe following formula:
πi,ck = max (0, πi,ck + β(
δT
δπi,ck
−∇ck)), ∀k ∈ {0, · · · , m} (3.34)
β is a parameter used to control the size of the steps taken durig the update process of
each iteration so that none of the parameters become negativ. This iteration is continued
until for each connection, every path with non-zero probability of being used has equal
gradient. Namely, the iteration stops when:
∀πi,c 6= 0 ∈ Pc,
δT
δπi,c
= ∇c, ∀c ∈ C (3.35)
Once the algorithm converges, we output a new set of results for he network configuration
containing: a) the optimized throughput of each active connection in the network and
b) the set of routing probabilities for each connection needed in order to achieve such
throughput.
In order to compute the gradient values, we use the ADIC package [26] that is
a source translator augmenting ANSI-C programs with statements for the computation
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of derivatives using the AD method. In our case, the input to ADIC is the fixed point
algorithm that we developed in ANSI C code. ADIC generates a new version of the
program that computes both the original result, which is throughput, and its derivatives
with respect to the input parameters, which are the path routing probabilities. We then
use the computed gradients to find the optimal routing parameters which maximize the
throughput.
We have implemented the Dreyfus K-shortest path algorithm [27] for path selec-
tion. For a given set of link weights and integer valuek and source-destination pair, this
algorithm findsk loop free paths with minimum total weight. We set all link weights to
one, but it is possible to use other weights based on the distance, bandwidth, interference
or other performance related criteria.
3.7 Numerical Results
We have implemented the loss network model for the hybrid satellite network in
C code alongwith the proposed fixed point approximation of the loss network model to
derive an estimate of the network performance.
For our simulations, we built a simple two-cluster hierarchical network, presented
in figure 3.5. The network has five connections across the two clusters: (i) from node 1
to node 20, (ii) from node 2 to node 32, (iii) from node 3 to node16, (iv) from node 6 to
node 30 and (v) from node 4 to node 48. The communication between the two clusters is
only over the satellite link, through the gateway nodes - node 4 in cluster 1 and node 15
in cluster 2. Therefore, all the paths for the five connections go through the two gateway
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Figure 3.5: Simulation setup: hybrid network topology with5 connections across 2 clus-
ters.
nodes. We assume that the physical layer loss parameters arefixed and equal to 0.001. The
MAC layer loss parameters depend on the link data rates and weuse the proposed fixed
point method to compute them. For the MAC layer, we use the IEEE 802.11 FHSS with
1 Mbps capacity for each link. For the satellite link, the per-gateway capacity is allocated
at 266kbps according to SAMA, while the combined channel error rate is computed to be
0.001080, using the model and the numerical figures described in section 3.4.1. The base
user traffic between the two gateway nodes is set at 128kbps, while the traffic on each
of the connections considered in the simulations is varied between 100kbps and 550kbps
for different scenarios. The number of paths allowed per connection is also varied for
different simulation scenarios, between 1 and 5.
We have also conducted discrete event simulations on an identical etwork topology
in Opnet Modeler [3], to establish a point of reference for the fixed point model results,
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Figure 3.6: Throughput comparison between fixed point method and Opnet discrete event
simulation.
and for comparison.
The first experiment compares the variation of the throughput computed by our
fixed point method according to the desired load in the network ith the same metric es-
timated by the Opnet simulations. Our routing algorithm finds the shortest paths between
the source and destination nodes having nodes involved in different connections. Using
these paths we then employ our set of fixed point equations to compute the throughput
of these connections according to the desired load. As can beseen in figure 3.6 the fixed
point model results are close to the Opnet results. The Opnetresults in figure 3.6 thus
validate the trend of the curves obtained by our model. The fact that our computations
slightly overestimate the throughput as predicted by OPNETcan be justified by the ap-
proximations we make when computing losses.
Another metric of interest is the time taken for the computation of throughput in
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Number of Connections 1 3 5 7 9 11
Fixed Point Method 0.089 0.124 0.702 0.907 1.103 1.295
Opnet Simulation 229 218 228 242 265 265
Table 3.1: Comparison of simulation runtime between fixed point method and Opnet (in
seconds).
both cases. Our fixed point method converges really fast - on aIntel Centrino 1.66GHz
dual-core computer with 2GB of memory, it takes on the order of seconds for our model
to compute the throughput achieved in 10 steps between 100kbps and 500kbps, while
corresponding Opnet simulations on the same machine take onthe order of several min-
utes. Table 3.1 compares the time needed by our model and by Opnet as a function of the
number of active connections in the network. Therefore the main advantage of our fixed
point model over discrete event simulation platforms such as Opnet, is the computation
time. This makes our model more suitable to compute approximations of throughput for
network management and design which require fast and/or multiple simulations.
We have also run simulations of the fixed point method with AD to enhance the
routing performance. Here we assume that a fixed set of paths are given and we want to
tune the probabilities (portions) of sending traffic over the paths to maximize the through-
put. We consider three inter-cluster connections in the network topology of figure 5 -
nodes 1 to 20, nodes 2 to 32 and nodes 3 to 16. We consider three alternative routing
strategies: (1) using shortest path only, (2) using all avail ble paths with equal probabil-
ity, and (3) using AD and gradient projection method to find the optimal probabilities.
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of aggregate network throughput fornumber of available paths,
500kbps input load.
Figure 3.7 shows the aggregate network throughput for the three connections, versus the
number of available paths. The performance of the optimization algorithm improves as
the number of available paths increases and it clearly outperforms other policies. If there
are more paths available, the optimization algorithm will use them to find the best traffic
allocation and thus achieve the highest total throughput.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have described a new method for performance alysis of hy-
brid networks, by combining loss network models for the MAC and PHY layers, with
routing, through fixed point iterations. We have split the network into two levels based
on the node and link characteristics, by taking into consideration the natural hierarchy
present in the hybrid architecture. We have applied the technique of hierarchical reduced
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loss network model, adapted for packet-switched networks,to create a reduced load net-
work model for the hybrid network that connects the packet arriv l rates in the different
levels with the associated physical and link loss rates. Forthe lower level of terrestrial
wireless nodes, we have used Bianchi’s 802.11 throughput model and designed a simple
throughput loss model that couples the physical, MAC and routing layers. The model
provides quantitative statistical relations between the loss parameters used to character-
ize multiuser interference and physical path conditions onthe one hand and traffic rates
between origin-destination pairs on the other. For the higher layer consisting of the terres-
trial gateway nodes interconnected by the satellite overlay, we have used the Gilbert-Elliot
bit error loss model coupled with Slotted Aloha Mutliple Access protocol, to derive a sim-
ilar relationship between traffic arrival rate and the link loss. We then apply a fixed point
approximation approach on each set of relations for the lower layer to derive a solution
that converges to a fixed point for the set of parameters arrival rate and link layer loss,
while satisfying all the equations in the set. We feed the throughput arrived at by the fixed
point method in the lower layer, to the total throughput for the higher layer and perform
the fixed point iterations on the higher layer to derive a soluti n that converges to a fixed
point for the parameter set arrival rate and link loss. The higher layer throughput ob-
tained as a result is fed back to the lower layer and the fixed point method is repeated on
both layers till the difference in throughput in each layer,between successive iterations,
is within pre-determined limits. We thus obtain an implicitmodel of the selected perfor-
mance metric, parameterized by the design variables. We usethe fixed point method on
the loss network model with Automatic Differentiation to compute sensitivities of the per-
formance metrics with respect to design parameters. We thushave a tool for fine-tuning
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the network parameters to create an optimal network topology. We have illustrated the
proposed analysis and design models through the simulations. Comparing the results ob-
tained from the fixed point method to Opnet discrete event simulations, we have shown
that our method can compute the network throughput to a greatdegree of accuracy, while
taking significantly less time.
3.9 Related Work
Loss network models [28] were originally used to compute blocking probabilities
in circuit switched networks [29] and later were extended tom del and design ATM
networks [30, 31, 32, 33]. In [33] Liu and Baras have used reduc load approximations
to evaluate quite complex ATM networks, with complex and adaptive routing protocols,
and multi-service multi-rate traffic (different service requirements). The authors in [33]
also describe using Automatic Differentiation for networkdesign and have shown that the
method allows for complex network design parameters to be implicitly embedded in the
input function to the AD module.
In [34], Dai and Chan propose a unified mathematical framework using a two-stage
stochastic programming formulation, to find the most cost-effective network topology for
hybrid broadband terrestrial/satellite networks. The soluti n to the problem formulation
gives optimal link capacities and optimal routing strategyfor different network topologies.
The authors show that for certain parameter values, the hybrid topology is more cost
effective than non-hybrid topologies.
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Chapter 4
Efficient Source Authentication in Hybrid Satellite/Wireless Networks
4.1 Overview
Security is a necessary parameter in hybrid wireless networks if the communication
between a pair of nodes, or a group of nodes, is to be protectedfrom unauthorized access.
Due to the open nature of the wireless channel, intruders caneavesdrop on the commu-
nication between other nodes if the messages are sent in the clear; they can inject fake
messages into the network, purporting to come from other nodes, or attempt to modify or
delete messages between other nodes. Therefore, strong security mechanisms to prevent
such attacks are important, especially for scenarios like military operations where hybrid
networks can be of great use. Security of communication can be achieved using sev-
eral different mechanisms. Encryption hides the messages in ciphertext and thus prevents
eavesdropping on the communication. In the process of authentication, each message is
“stamped” with a unique “marker” of the originating node whic ensure that messages are
accepted from legitimate nodes only, and fake messages are discar ed. Associated with
authentication are message integrity protocols where eachmessage is similarly stamped
with a unique marker by the originating node so that any unauthorized modification in
transit invalidates the marker and thus the modification canbe easily detected.
The thrust of our research effort is to enable communications and ensure that mes-
sages between communicating nodes are correctly delivered. W are not so much con-
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cerned with ensuring the confidentiality of the communications. We therefore focus on
user authentication and associated message integrity protocols. These security mecha-
nisms are required to prevent attacks against the network prtocols and ensure their cor-
rect and robust operation.
For unicast communications, solutions for authenticationand message integrity are
trivial - the two parties communicating nodesA andB share a secret exclusively between
themselves and make use of this secret, or a key derived thereof, to “sign” the messages
between themselves. Since no other node knows the secret,A can be assured that the
message originated atB, and vice versa. The secret or key used can be based on sym-
metric cryptography that is fast, efficient, and does not consume significant computation
or energy resources at the communicating nodes. The correspnding message signature
is usually aMessage Authentication Code, or MAC in short (for example, HMAC [35]),
which is resource-efficient to compute and to verify, and limited in size.
The problem is more complicated for group communications. When multiple par-
ties are taking part in a communications session, a shared secret between the parties is
not a solution. Since everyone knows the same secret, it is impossible for the receivers to
know for sure whether the message originated at the alleged source, or was it spoofed by
another node in the group that knows the secret. At best, a shared secret in this setting can
assure the involved nodes that the message originated from someone within the group (as-
suming the secret has not been leaked to outsiders). It is also possible that all the nodes do
not share secret beforehand, for example when a group of nodes with no prior knowledge
of one another take part in a communications session, and erase the security information
once the session terminates (this is true even for two nodes with no prior history together).
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In this situation authentication is done based on asymmetric t chniques where each node
possesses a unique secret known to no other node, and makes use of that secret to authenti-
cate itself, or the messages it generates. Public key cryptography allows such asymmetric
authentication to take place. In public-key cryptography,each source uses its private key
to sign messages it generates, creating a digital signaturethat is appended to the message
[36]. The receivers can verify the signature using the corresponding public key of the
node, which is known to everyone from the source’s certificate. The primary requirement
is that all users have access to a common third party node called the Certificate Authority
(CA) that is universally trusted. The CA is responsible for binding a node’s identity to its
public key in the node’s public-key certificate - for example, PGP [37] and X.509 [38],
which are the two most commonly used certificate formats. Thecertificate can be freely
distributed to all nodes in a network, and the correctness ofthe certificate is verifiable by
any node that has access to the CA. Apart from facilitating secure authentication of nodes
and message integrity checks, public-key cryptography also providesnon-repudiation- a
node cannot deny later that it generated a message that has been igned using its private
key.
Public-key cryptography is a powerful tool that facilitates authentication, message
integrity and also data encryption. However, it is computationally very expensive (both in
CPU cycles and energy expenditure) to generate digital signatures for messages, and also
to verify them [39, 40, 41, 42]. The public and private keys are l ger in size compared to
symmetric keys, and the certificates also take up considerable storage space. In wireless
networks where many of the nodes might have resource constraint , public-key cryptog-
raphy can be a severe burden. For example, handheld devices hav limited processor
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power, storage capacity and available energy. Performing digital signature generation and
verification frequently can consume significant processor capa ity and drain the battery
quickly. Therefore in hybrid wireless networks it is preferable to use authentication pro-
tocols that are based on symmetric cryptographic primitives - being efficient in terms of
processing load, symmetric operations would expend less node energy. However, design-
ing authentication protocols for group communications using symmetric cryptography is
a significant challenge. The primary difficulty is how to create the asymmetry such that
each participant has a unique secret with which to authenticate its messages, while al-
lowing all the receivers the capability for validation. (Here we assume that the security
association between each source and the group of receivers is generated on-the-fly, and
does not make use of pre-shared secrets between every pair ofnodes, which is the trivial
solution that does not scale well.)
Our objective, therefore, is to design an asymmetric user authentication protocol for
group communications for resource-constrained devices. We propose a source authenti-
cation algorithm that uses symmetric cryptographic primitives to achieve asymmetric au-
thentication of nodes in group communications, and also message integrity. The protocol
can be efficiently implemented in a hybrid wireless network by taking advantage of the
presence of the satellite overlay. The protocol considers the resource limitations of the
wireless nodes and the wireless characteristics of the terrstrial segment. It avoids the
assumption that the user nodes have some sort of security associ tion established apriori,
as many other protocols assume.
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4.2 Methodology for Source Authentication in Group Communications
We propose to achieve authentication using a new class of certificates calledTESLA
Certificate. TESLA certificates are based on a symmetric cryptographic primitive - MAC
computation using keyed hash functions - and use delayed disclosure of the key by the
CA, to achieve the asymmetry required for authentication ingroup communications. Due
to the use of MACs to generate and verify certificates, the schme is very fast, has low
processing overhead, and consumes much less energy that public key signature gener-
ation/verification. Therefore the scheme is well-suited toterrestrial wireless nodes with
limited resources. The size overhead due to MAC addition to messages is lower compared
to digital signatures, and therefore consumes less bandwidth for sending the control mes-
sages that are required for secure multicast routing.
The TESLA certificate concept was originally proposed in [43], and we have sug-
gested modifications and extensions to it in [44]. We use the modified TESLA certifi-
cate design in proposing a mechanism for authentication andmessage integrity, using the
satellite as the CA.
4.2.1 Review of TESLA Authentication Protocol
The TESLA broadcast authentication protocol [45, 46] represents a fundamental
paradigm shift in source authentication in a group setting.TESLA achieves asymmetric
authentication between a source and receivers through the use of symmetric cryptographic
MAC functions. The asymmetry is obtained through thedelayed disclosureof the authen-
tication keys. We give a brief description of TESLA in the following paragraphs.
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Figure 4.1: TESLA key generation
TESLA divides the time of transmission by the source intointervals of equal
duration. The source generates a random key seedn for interval n, and computes a
one-way hash chain by repeatedly applying a one-way functioF1 to sn. The number of
elements of the hash chain correspond to the number of intervals that the source transmits.
The source computes the MAC computation key for each time interval by applying a
second one-way functionF2 to each element of the hash chain. The functionsF1, F2 are
publicly-available and known to all the receivers. The algorithm is illustrated in fig. 4.1.
The sender uses the keys in the reverse order of their generation, that is, starting with
K1 in interval 1, followed byK2 in interval 2, and so on. Owing to the one-way property
of F1 andF2, it is computationally infeasible for any node to generatesi knowing Ki,
or to generatesi+1 knowingsi. The sender bootstraps the hash chain by broadcasting to
all the receivers the anchor element of the chain, for example s0, signed with its private
key (in case of public-key based bootstrapping), or by encryptings0 with the secret key it
shares with each receiver in the network (for symmetric-keybased bootstrapping).
For each packet generated in time sloti, the source uses the authentication keyKi
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to compute a MAC on the packet. The MAC is then appended to the packet, which is
transmitted to the receiver(s). When a node receives a packet, it first checks whether
the packet isfresh, that is, it was sent in a time interval whose corresponding TESLA
key has not been disclosed. This is the fundamental securitycriterion in TESLA. Each
receiver discards any packet that does not meet the securityriterion, and buffers only the
packets that satisfy the freshness condition. The receivercannot authenticate the packets
immediately since it does not know the corresponding keyKi. The sender discloses the
key Ki at a later instant in time by broadcasting the correspondingkey seedsi. Upon
receivingsi, each receiver first verifies the authenticity ofsi by checkingsi
F1−→ si−1
(and therefore ultimately verifying against the anchor elements0 which has already been
authenticated). Ifsi verifies correctly, each receiver can computeKi : si
F2−→ Ki and
subsequently use the computedKi to verify the MAC on the packets received during
intervali.
Oncesi is disclosed, any node with knowledge ofsi can computeKi and attempt to
masquerade as the sender by forging MACs usingKi. Therefore,Ki is used to compute
MACs on packets generated only during the intervali, other time intervals use different
keys to compute the MACs. The key seedsi is disclosed onlyd time slots afteri so
that no malicious node can computeKi and forge packets in the intervening period.d is
computed based on the maximum network delay from the source to all the receivers. This
is the principle of delayed disclosure of keys.
The major advantage of TESLA in this regard is that it allows similar authentica-
tion through the use of computationally efficient MAC functions, and is therefore very
attractive for authentication in devices of limited capabilities.
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The above is a basic description of TESLA. The algorithm has several enhance-
ments to mitigate various drawbacks, they are described in [46].
4.2.2 Review of TESLA Certificate Algorithm
The idea of certificates based on TESLA was proposed in [45]. The idea has been
formalized to form a TESLA-based public key infrastructure(PKI) in [43].
In the algorithm described in [43], there is a certificate authori y CA who creates
certificates for an entityB. During time slotn, the CA generates authentication key
aKBn for B to use to compute the MAC on its messages in that interval. TheCA creates
a certificateCertCAn (B) to bindaKBn to B for intervaln. The CA uses its TESLA key
tKCAn to encryptaKBn in the certificate, and uses the same key to compute a MAC on
the certificate:
CertCAn(B) = (IDB, {aKBn}tKCAn , n + d, MACtKCAn (..)) (4.1)
aKBn is known only to the CA andB during periodn, while tKCAn is known only to
the CA.n + d indicates the time at which the CA will disclosetKCAn to the nodes, that
is, it is the expiration time of the certificate. The CA sendsCertCAn (B) to B alongwith
aKBn , which is encrypted with keyKCA,B that is shared between the CA andB.
In the time interval〈n, n + d〉, a low-powered deviceD sends a request toB for
usingB′s service:D → B : (request). To authenticate itself toD, B sends an authenti-
cation packet containing its certificate and a MAC on the request:
B → D : (CertCAn(B), MACaKBn (request)) (4.2)
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WhenD receives the authentication message, it checks the timestap of CertCAn (B)
to make sure it has arrived before timen + d. If the certificate is “fresh”,D buffers
the authentication packet. At timen + d, the CA disclosestKCAn . Upon receiving the
key,D verifiesCertCAn (B) by checking the MAC in the certificate usingtKCAn . If the
MAC verifies correctly,D obtainsaKBn from the certificate by decrypting withtKCAn .
Subsequently,D checksMACaKBn (request) to verify the authenticity ofB. Therefore,
D is able to verify the identity ofB only if it receivesCertCAn(B) beforen + d. Once
the CA discloses its TESLA keytKCAn , any node could forge a certificate for the time
intervaln.
The TESLA certificate algorithm described above allows a node to add authenti-
cation to packets for asingleperiod in time. Therefore, a source nodeB that transmits
for multiple time intervals will need several TESLA certificates from the CA. If there are
many sources that send data over long intervals, this can addup to a substantial overhead.
4.2.3 Extending TESLA Certificates: Protocol Assumptions
We propose a new algorithm for source authentication by modifying the initial con-
cept of TESLA certificates, which we described briefly in section 4.2.2. Our proposal
includes the folowing modifications:
• we add mechanisms to extend the lifetime of the TESLA certificate from single use
to multiple uses, and
• we allow disclosure of source TESLA keys via proxy.
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The TESLA certificate implementation requires the presenceof a dedicated Certifi-
cate Authority (CA) to generate the certificates. In our algorithm, the CA broadcasts the
TESLA keys of the source nodes to the network at periodic key disclosure intervals. In
the hybrid network topology, we use the satellite for providing CA services. The reasons
for using the satellite as the CA are as follows. The satellite is a network node that is
always available, connected to the entire network, and is phy ically secure. The satellite
has higher computing power with on-board processing capability and higher storage com-
pared to terrestrial wireless nodes. Its energy is technically infinite, since it is renewable
via solar power. Therefore the satellite can perform processing-intensive cryptographic
operations more efficiently compared to the terrestrial nodes. The presence of the satellite
thus allows implementation of highly efficient and secure centralized authentication pro-
tocols that would have been difficult to implement in terrestrial wireless networks without
the centralized satellite infrastructure. We thus consider th satellite as the root CA in our
authentication protocol design and assume that the satellite is trusted by all other nodes
in the network. In our authentication protocol, the satellit generates the TESLA certifi-
cates for all the terrestrial user nodes, and it acts as the proxy for the terrestrial nodes
for disclosing the TESLA MAC keys used by the nodes for authentication and message
integrity - instead of the source node, the satellite broadcasts the TESLA keys at regular
time intervals. Therefore the TESLA keys reach all the user nodes in one broadcast trans-
mission. This saves the delay in TESLA authentication, and reduces the processing load
on the source nodes, and also the network transmission overhead. We describe the details
of our source authentication protocol in the following sections.
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In order to describe the operation of the authentication protocol, let us consider a
group of three wireless nodesA, B andC, whereA sends messages toB andC. Our
objective is to design an authentication mechanism that allowsB andC to securely au-
thenticate messages fromA using a computationally efficient algorithm that expends low
node energy. We make the following assumptions about the initial security setup of the
network for authentication purposes:
• all three nodes have limited energy and processing power, and no e has any pre-
existing security information about the others;
• the public key+KCA of the CA is available to all nodes;
• all nodes are time-synchronized with the CA;
• appropriate security policies are in place to allow each node t securely identify
itself to the CA during the initial bootstrapping phase, andeach nodeX shares a
unique secret keyKCA,X with the CA;
• one-way functionsF1 andF2 [47] are publicly available;
• message transmission fromA to B andC start at timet0;
• time is divided into intervals, each of duration∆.
4.2.4 Initial Setup: Key Generation by CA and Source Node
During the initial setup, before any messages are transmitted in the network, the
CA and all sources generate the keys that each will need for messag authentication. The
sets of keys are generated using the TESLA algorithm.
69
The CA uses a TESLA key chain{tKCA,i}, i = {1, .., N} to authenticate the
TESLA certificates that it generates for the group sources. The CA generates a random






whereN > 0 is equal to the number of unique MAC keys that the CA expects touse
for authenticating the certificates and messages it generates. The valueN depends on
the length of each time interval and the total duration that te CA node will perform the
function of the CA. We assume that in each time interval, the CA uses only one key for
computing the MACs on all the messages it generates in that time interval Therefore, if




Subsequently the CA applies functionF2 to each element of the hash chain to obtain
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(4.4)
sCA,0 is theanchor elementof the CA’s authentication key chain. All TESLA certificates
and signed messages from the CA are authenticated using the anc or element during the
protocol run.sCA,0 is broadcast to the network at timet < t0 (4.5):
CA→ network : (sCA,0, SIGN−KCA (..)) (4.5)
The anchor element itself is authenticated using traditional public-key cryptography: the
CA generates a signature on the message containing the anchor element and broadcast the
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message with the signature. All network nodes receiving thebroadcast message verify
the signature on the message using the public key+KCA of the CA. If the signature is
verified, the nodes store in local memory the keysCA,0 along with the broadcast message.
In a manner similar to the above, each source nodeA g nerates a random seedsA,n
and applies one-way functionF1 to sA,n to form ahash chain, before any messages are































Heren > 0 is equal to the number of unique MAC keys thatA expects to use for au-
thenticating its messages. The valuen depends on the length of each time interval and
the total duration ofA’s transmission. We assume that in each time interval∆, a source
uses only one key for computing the MACs on all the messages itgenerates in that time
interval Therefore, if the total time ofA′s transmission isT , we haven = T
∆
.
At time t < t0, A sendssA,n, n to the CA, along with details on A’s key disclosure
interval. The message fromA to the CA is secured using the shared secretKCA,A between
A and theCA. The CA can obtain all the elements ofA’s TESLA key chain fromsA,n
andn, as in equation (4.3).
On successful verification ofA′s identity, the CA generates the TESLA certificate
for A. The keysA,0 is included in the certificate as the anchor element of A’s keychain.
It is encrypted using keytKCA,1 from the CA’s key chain. The certificate also includes
the identity of the source nodeA and the timet0 + d upto which the certificate is valid,
i.e., after timet0 + d, key sA,0 is made public to the group and it can no longer be used
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Figure 4.2: TESLA Certificate for nodeA
for new messages. The certificate also contains a MAC for authentication, computed on
the previous elements usingtKCA,1. For added security, the certificate might also contain
CA’s public-key signature on all the previous elements (4.7).
CertCA (A) =
(
IDA, {sA,0}tKCA,1 , t0 + d, MACtKCA,1 (..) , SIGN−KCA (..)
)
(4.7)
CA→ A : CertCA (A) (4.8)
Hered ≥ ∆ is the key disclosure delay for the CA TESLA signature key, and tKCA,1 is
the CA MAC key for the time period〈t0, t0 + d〉. A schematic of the TESLA certificate
for A is given in figure 4.2.
4.2.5 Message Transmission from Source to Receiver
A sends messages toB andC starting in the time interval〈t0, t0 + d〉. A computes
a MAC over the messagem0 usings′A,0 and includes its TESLA certificateCertCA (A)
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with the message.




(m0) , CertCA (A)
)
} (4.9)
Each ofB andC checks thefreshnessof the certificate by checking the timestamp of
CertCA (A) to make sure it has arrived within the period〈t, t0 + d〉. The receivers also
check thats′A,0 is not publicly known, i.e.,MACs′A,0 (m0) cannot yet be computed by
them. If all the checks pass,B and C storeM0 in their respective buffers, else they
discard the message.
Checking the timestamp onCertCA (A) is critical for the security of the algorithm.
Once the CA disclosessCA,1 at timet1 ? t0 + d, any node in the network can create a
fake certificate with timestampt0 + d, allegedly generated by the CA, similar to (4.7).
Therefore receivers will only accept certificates for whichthe CA TESLA key has not
been disclosed at the time of receiving the certificate.
4.2.6 Message Authentication at Receiver
At time t1 = t0 + d, the CA broadcasts the keysCA,1 to the network:
CA→ network : (〈t0, t0 + d〉, sCA,1, SIGN−KCA (..)) (4.10)
If receiverB or C has received the anchor elementsCA,0 (4.5), they can check the authen-
ticity of sCA,1 by verifyingsCA,1 againstsCA,0:
sCA,1
F1−→ sCA,0 (4.11)
Otherwise,B or C can verifysCA,1 from the signature using+KCA. If verification is
successful, each receiver derivestKCA,1 from sCA,1 (4.4) and usestKCA,1 to verify the
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MAC on CertCA (A). If the MAC is correct, receiverB obtainssA,0 from CertCA (A) by
decrypting withtKCA,1. B obtainss′A,0 from sA,0 (4.6). ThenB checksMACs′A,0 (m0)
usings′A,0 and acceptsm0 if the MAC verifies correctly.B savesCertCA (A) and the an-
chor elementsA,0 of A′s key chain in long-term memory - they are used for authenticating
future keys and messages fromA.
Messages fromA to B in subsequent time intervals use the corresponding key of
A′s key chain to compute the MAC.A does not have to include its TESLA certificate in
messages subsequent toM0, under the assumption that every receiver has receivedM0
correctly. For example, in the period〈ti, ti + ∆〉, messageMi from A to B would look
like:







At time ti+d, the CA broadcastsA,i to the network. Sinced > ∆, whensA,i is disclosed,
A is no longer usings′A,i for computing the MACs on its messages. Any receiverB that





The above verification is correct sinceF1 is a secure one-way function andsA,0 has al-
ready been verified fromCertCA(A). However, ifB wants to be additionally careful,
it can verify sA,i going through the additional steps described above, using the CA key
broadcast message andCertCA (A). Figure 4.3 gives a timing diagram representation of
the protocol.
After the initial anchor element broadcast message from theCA signed with−KCA,
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Figure 4.3: Time diagram for packet authentication using TESLA certificate algorithm
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chains. For example, CA discloses the keysCA,i used in period〈ti, ti + d〉 at timeti + d.





wheresCA,0 has been verified before using+KCA. B does not need to check CA’s signa-
ture to verifysCA,i.
Thus messages fromA to B andC can be authenticated. The above algorithm
requiresA to perform one signature verification to verify the certificate it receives from
the CA (4.7). Each receiver also performs one signature verification on the anchor element
broadcast message from the CA (4.5). SinceA is not a receiver, it does not need the
verification in (4.5). All other messages from the CA and the sources can be authenticated
using low-computation symmetric MACs. Moreover, sources and receivers do not have to
perform clock synchronization directly with one another, synchronizing with the CA is a
necessary and sufficient condition for the protocol. This save additional message rounds
and protocol complexity, and also breaks the cyclical dependency between authentication
and clock synchronization.
4.2.7 Revocation of TESLA Certificates
The CA might need to broadcast a certificate revocation messag at any time cir-
cumstances warrant that the TESLA certificate of a node has tobe revoked. Assume the
CA revokes the TESLA certificate of nodeA in the time period〈ti, ti + d〉. Then the CA
broadcasts the following message to the network:
CA→ network :
(




The receiver buffers the message and waits for the CA to disclosesCA,i+1 at time
ti +d. The traffic received fromA in the intermediate period is also buffered, awaiting the
verification of the revocation message, due to the possibility that the revocation message
might be a fake. At timeti+1 = ti + 2d, the CA broadcastsCA,i+1 to the network.B can
verify the authenticity ofsCA,i+1 from (4.14) and thus validate the revocation message. If
the revocation message is correctly verified, the receiver discards the buffered messages
from A and adds the sender to the revoked users list.
The revocation message can be merged with the key disclosuremessage, the com-
bined message looks like:
CA→ network :
(
〈ti, ti + d〉, REV OKE(..), sCA,i, MACtKCA,i+1 (..) , SIGN−KCA (..)
)
(4.16)
where the REVOKE field will contain the TESLA certificates to be revoked, the MAC is
computed on the revoked certificates and the signature verifiessCA,i for nodes that might
need the verification (instead of verifyingsCA,i using (4.14)).
4.2.8 Non-repudiation of TESLA Certificates
Non-repudiation is not provided by the TESLA authentication algorithm [45] or the
prior TESLA certificate proposal [48]. The symmetric natureof the basic cryptographic
primitive used here - MACs - does not allow for non-repudiation. Once the hash key for
a particular MAC is disclosed, any group member would be ableto generate the MAC
for the given message. Therefore, at a later instant in time,t is impossible to prove
that the message was generated by a particular source. The lack of non-repudiation is a
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major drawback of the TESLA certificate protocol compared toigital signatures based
on public keys.
In our extended TESLA certificate algorithm, we propose to add non-repudiation
by taking advantage of the satellite infrastructure and theproposed mechanism of key
disclosure by proxy. This is achieved as follows. The sourceauthenticates each message
by two or moreMACs, computed using keys from two or more key chains, respectively.
The anchor element of the root key of each chain is shared between the source and the
CA (the satellite) as described in 4.2.4. The source includes all the MACs with each
message transmission. Each receiver buffers the message along with all the MACs if the
basic security check is satisfied, as described in the protocol in 4.2.6. At the time of key
disclosure, the CA broadcastsonly one of the MAC keysout of the set of MAC keys for
the given source and message. Each receiver verifies the singl MAC associated with the
key broadcast by the CA, and accepts the message as correct ifthe MAC is verified. If any
receiver wants to be able to check the message for non-repudiation at a later time instant,
it saves the message along with all its MACs.
The MAC key that is disclosed by the CA is chosen at every disclosure instant, with
uniform probability from the set of available keys for that time interval. Therefore, the
source cannot know in advance, with a high degree of probability, which key will be used
by the receivers for authentication. Hence, if the source would like its messages to be
accepted by the receivers, it will have to include all the MACs correctly computed with
the corresponding keys.
If at a later instant in time, a receiver would like to prove that a message was in-
deed generated by the source (i.e., non-repudiation), the receiver can simply send a non-
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repudiation request to the CA. Upon receiving the request, the CA discloses one of the
previously undisclosedMAC keys for the message in question. The receiver can compute
the MAC for the message with the newly disclosed key and compare the MAC with the set
of MACs it had saved previously. If the CA and the receiver operates correctly, the newly
computed MAC will match one of the saved MACs. Since: (i) the undisclosed MAC keys
were known only to the source and the CA, and (ii) the CA is universally trusted, therefore
the saved MAC must have been computed by the source using its MAC key and hence the
message must have been generated by the source. Thus non-repudiation is achieved.
The security of the above algorithm is proportional to the number of MACs included
with each message. For two MACs per message, the probabilityof a particular key being
disclosed by the CA is 0.5. We term this probability ther-factor, wherer is acronym
for repudiation. It is computed as the inverse of the number of MACs included with each
message. A non-conforming source who includes only one corrtly computed MAC with
its message in order to avoid non-repudiation, can expect thmessage to be accepted by
the receivers only with 50% probability. If four MACs are included with every message,
the r-factor drops to 0.25, and so on. There is hence a trade-off between the strength of
the non-repudiation algorithm and the security overhead per message in terms of number
of MACs involved. There is also the processing overhead at the source since it node has
to computeM , number of MACs per message whereM > 1.
The number of MACs per message also affect the security of thealgorithm in the
context of the receivers. If there are two MACs per message, the non-repudiation mech-
anism will be successful for the request from one receiver. Fo any subsequent request
from other receivers for that particular message, non-repudiation will fail since both MAC
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keys are now known to the receivers. The number of successfulnon-repudiation requests
for a given message is therefore directly proportional to the number of MACs per mes-
sage. This drawback can be solved by modifying the protocol steps for non-repudiation.
Instead of sending a request for an undisclosed key, the receiver can send the entire mes-
sage along with the saved MACs, to the CA. The CA itself will compute the MACs on
the message with any one of the undisclosed keys and compare with the saved MACs sent
by the receiver. Since the undisclosed keys are known only tothe CA and the source,
in the event of a match, the CA can confirm to the receiver that the message was indeed
generated by the source. The security of this mechanism depen s only on the amount
of trust placed on the CA and is independent of the number of MACs per message. The
tradeoff is the additional load on the CA and the network overhead in transmission of the
message with the MACs, to the CA.
4.2.9 Key Disclosure Delay
4.2.9.1 Time Synchronization
Time synchronization between various parties taking part in the communication is
important for the correct operation of the protocol. Due to the global reach of the satellite,
we consider it as the time reference. It periodically broadcasts its local time to the network
and each terrestrial node synchronizes its time with the satllite reference. Figure 4.4
illustrates the time synchronization of the terrestrial nodes with the satellite/CA. The time
synchronization works as follows.
• At periodic intervals, the CA broadcasts its local timetCA to the network, authen-
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Figure 4.4: Time synchronization between the protocol participants in the
extended TESLA certificate protocol
ticated with a digital signature. The local times at that insa t at a terrestrial source
nodeS and receiver nodeR aret1 andt2, respectively.
• SenderS receives the CA time broadcast at its local timetS. The sender computes
the maximum difference in time from the CA astS − tCA = tS − t1 + t1 − tCA =
δS + ǫS whereǫS is the synchronization error of the source clock with the time
reference. Therefore the upper bound on the CA’s local time,with reference toS,
is t ≤ tS + δS + ǫS.
• ReceiverR receives the CA time broadcast at its local timetR. The receiver com-
putes the maximum difference in time from the CA astR−tCA = tR−t2+t2−tCA =
δR + ǫR whereǫR is the synchronization error of the source clock with the time ref-
erence. Therefore the upper bound on the CA’s local time, with reference toR, is
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t ≤ tR + δR + ǫR.
The above method of time synchronization with the CA also indirectly synchro-
nizes the time between the terrestrial nodes. After synchronization, the difference in time
between the nodesS andR is δS − δR + ǫS − ǫR. It can be deduced from figure 4.4 that
δS andδR are the network propagation times from the satellite to the terrestrial nodes, i.e.,
δS − δR and hence the difference in local time is onlyǫS − ǫR = ǫSR. If S andR are
well-synchronized with the CA, we haveǫSR ≈ 0.
4.2.9.2 Computation of the Key Disclosure Delay
The key disclosure delayd is a critical parameter affecting both the security and the
performance of the proposed protocol. The key disclosure delay depends on the duration
of each time interval∆ and the network propagation delay from the sources to the re-
ceivers. As is shown below, if the message transmission fromthe sources to the receivers
happen exclusively over the satellite links, then the key disclosure delay depends only on
∆ and the satellite link propagation delay, which is known andfixed.
We follow the method outlined in [46] in computing the key disclosure delay for
our proposed protocol. Let us consider a packetpj being sent from sourceS to receiver
R in time intervalIj. Let the local times atS be tjS when the packet is sent, while the




R + δR + ǫR − t0
∆
⌋ − Ij < d (4.17)
whereδR and ǫR are the propagation delay from the CA to the receiver and the tim
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synchronization error respectively, as explained in section 4.2.9.1.
Also, we must have:
tj
S < t0 + Ij ∗∆ + ∆ (4.18)
If DSR is the network propagation delay fromS to R, then:
DSR = tj
R + ǫR − tj
S − ǫS (4.19)
whereǫS is the time synchronization error forS.
From (4.17), (4.18), (4.19), we get:
⌊
DSR − ǫR + tj
S + ǫS + δR + ǫR − t0
∆
⌋ − Ij < d
i.e., ⌈
DSR + t0 + Ij ∗∆ + ∆ + ǫS + δR − t0
∆
⌉ − Ij < d
i.e., ⌈
DSR + ǫS + δR
∆
⌉+ 1 < d
(4.20)
If we assume that the packet transmission fromS to R is over the satellite links, then
DSR is one-way propagation delay over the satellite fromS to R, while δR is the direct
propagation delay from the satellite to any terrestrial node. We thus haveDSR = 2 ∗ δR
and hence from (4.20), we get:
⌈
3 ∗ δR + ǫS
∆
⌉+ 1 < d (4.21)
For a given satellite configuration,δR is known and fixed. For example, for a geo-
stationary satellite,δR is of the order of 0.12 seconds. Moreover, for good synchronization
of the terrestrial nodes with the time reference,ǫS is negligible compared to the satellite




⌉+ 1 < d (4.22)
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Figure 4.5: Key disclosure delayd as a function of key use interval∆
Figure 4.5 shows the variation in the key disclosure delayd s a function of the key
use interval∆. As the figure demonstrates, the product of the disclosure delay and the key
use interval is bounded by the network propagation delay, which is a constant. Hence as
the key use interval increases from 1ms to upto 50ms, the disclosure delay varies between
361ms and 410ms.
4.3 Analysis of Protocol Correctness of the Extended TESLA Certificate
Approach
The modified TESLA certificate approach provides strong authentication guaran-
tees to a protocol participant. We analyze the correctness of the protocol using the Strand
Space Model (SSM)[49]. SSM has several advantages over other security protocol cor-
rectness analysis methods, especially that it models exactcausal relation information be-
tween events which makes the proofs concise. In our protocolanalysis, we make use of
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the definitions and propositions that are explained in [49],including defining the follow-
ing:
• T ⊂ A is the set of texts representing the atomic terms, whereA is the set of terms.
• K ⊂ A is the set of cryptographic keys, disjoint fromT and equipped with unary
operatorinv:K→K. For symmetric keys,inv(K) = K, while for asymmetric keys,
inv(K) = K−1.
• Tname ⊆ T is the set of names, containing elements such asA, B.
• K : Tname →K is an injective mapping that associates a public key with eacprin-
cipal. For example, the public key of the Certificate Authority would be:K(CA) =
KCA. The corresponding private key: inv(KCA)=KCA
−1.
• We model the penetrator as defined in section A.4 of [50], having apenetrator set
of keysKp and and penetrator strand with traces of the typeM, K, C, S, E or D.
Correctness proofs in SSM make use of the authentication agreement properties
proposed in [51]. A protocol guarantees a participantB (for example, the receiver) agree-
ment for certain data items~x if each time a principalB completes a run of the protocol
as a responder using~x, supposedly withA, then there is a unique run of the protocol with
the principalA as initiator using~x, supposedly withB.
A weaker non-injective agreement does not ensure uniqueness, but requires only
that each time principalB completes a run of the protocol as responder using~x, appar-
ently withA, then there exists a run of the protocol with principalA as initiator using~x,
apparently withB. We prove the weaker agreement by showing that whenever a bundle
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Figure 4.6: Strand Space Model representation of initial message exchange
in the extended TESLA certificate protocol
C contains a receiver strand using~x, thenC also contains a source strand using~x. We
establish agreement by showing thatC contains a unique source strand using~x.
4.3.1 Strand Space Model for extended TESLA Certificate Algorithm
Figure 4.6 shows the SSM representation of the initial message exchanges in the
extended TESLA certificate algorithm, withA as the source or initiator,B as the receiver
or responder, andS as the Certificate Authority. We consider only these three principals
in our analysis, withB representing the set of receivers. To prove that messages authen-
ticated byB are sent uniquely byA, only the first few steps shown in figure 4.6 are
important, since subsequent message authentication is simply a repetition ofM5 through
M7. In the analysis we consider only the important units of the messages, which are
termedcomponents[50]. We prove the authentication properties of the extended TESLA
protocol using a series of authentication tests, of the typedefined in [50].
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Let Σ be a strand space model of the extended TESLA certificate protocol. In Σ,
the regular strands are defined to be of the form:












3. CA strands in CA[A, s, K] with trace:
〈−A|sA,0sA,n|, +A|sA,0|tkCA,1MAC(..), +sCA,0|H(sCA,0)|KCA−1 ,
+ sCA,1|H(sCA,1)|KCA−1, +sA,1〉
HereA, B, CA ∈ Tname andsA,i, s′A,i, sCA,i, tkCA,i ∈ K ∀i.
Let LT be the set of long-term keys, which includes the public-private key pair of
the CA, and the long-term secret keyKCA,A that each principal shares with the CA. We
further assume:
1. The CA generates keys in a reasonable manner, i.e., CA[*,s, K]=Φ unless:sCA,i, tkCA,i /∈
KP ; tkCA,i = H(sCA,i); sCA,i = sCA,i−1, tkCA,i = tkCA,i
−1; sCA,i is uniquely orig-
inating (and thereforetkCA,i); andsCA,i, tkCA,i /∈LT ∀i ∈ [0..n].
2. Similar to above, the source generates the authentication keys in a reasonable man-
ner.
87
The authentication guarantees provided by the protocol areachieved in the follow-
ing steps.
1. The long-term keysLT are not uttered by the protocol. Thus ifK ∈LT andK /∈
KP , thenK ∈ S0 whereS0 is the set of safe keys as defined in definition 2.3 of [50].
Hence, if the CA signs a message with its private keyKCA
−1, then the certificate is
valid.
2. The short-term authenticating keys are valid till they are uttered by the protocol.
ThustkCA,i ∈ S0 till eventM5. Similarly,sA,0 ∈ S0 till eventM5 andsA,1 ∈ S0 till
eventM7.
3. The CA receives an unsolicited test that authenticates thinitial positive node of
the source.
4. The source strand contains an outgoing test forsA,0 in |sA,0sA,n|KCA,A. This au-
thenticates the server strand.
5. The receiver strand receives an unsolicited test that authenticates the second positive
node of the CA strand.
The receiver authenticates the source only in that it authenticates the CA strand,
which has authenticated the occurrence of the source strand’s initial positive node.
We use unsolicited tests to prove the CA’s authentication guarantee.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose that C is a bundle inΣ; KCA,A /∈ KP ; ands ∈ CA[A, s,*] has
C-height 1.
Then there existsi ∈ Src[A, s, M, ∗] such thatsi has C-height 1.
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PROOF. The term|sA,0sA,n|KCA,A is an unsolicited test, and therefore Authentica-
tion Test 3 [50] occur on positive regular nodes inC. LetS be the set of all regular nodes
in C having|sA,0sA,n|KCA,A as a component. SinceS is non-empty, it has≤C minimal
membern0 (Lemma 2.6 in [49]). By Lemma 2.7 in [49], the sign ofn0 is positive. Since
the sign ofs ∈ CA[A, s,*] is negative and it has C-height 1,n0 can only be of the form
〈si, 1〉 for si ∈ Src[A, s, M, ∗].
The following two propositions cover the receiver’s authentication guarantees.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that C is a bundle inΣ; A 6= B; KCA,A, KCA−1, sCA,1 /∈ KP ;
andsr ∈ Recv[s, M, ∗] has C-height 3.
Then there existsCA ∈ CA[A, s, ∗] with C-height 4. Furthermore, there existssi ∈
Src[A, s, M, ∗] such thatsi has C-height 3.
The next proposition is similar to proposition 4.2, but includes the case to cover the
authentication guarantee of the receiver for eventsM6 andM7:
Proposition 4.3 Suppose that C is a bundle inΣ; A 6= B; KCA,A, KCA−1, sCA,1, s′A,1 /∈
KP ; andsr ∈ Recv[s, ∗, ∗] has C-height 5.
Then there existsCA ∈ CA[A, s, ∗] with C-height 5. Furthermore, there existssi ∈
Src[A, s, ∗, ∗] such thatsi has C-height 4.
4.4 Security Analysis: Prevention of Authentication Attacks
The extended TESLA certificate authentication protocol is resistant to active attacks
by malicious nodes in the network. In the following sectionswe discuss the security
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provided by the protocol against specific active attacks. Inour analysis, we assume that
the CA is always secure, since compromise of the CA is a singlepoint of failure for
security in the network.
4.4.1 Malicious Node with Connectivity to Source and Receiver
We consider the case where a malicious nodeX in the network attempts to create
fake packets from a source to the receiver(s). Without loss of generality, we consider
one sourceA is sending data to one receiverB, the data being authenticated using the
extended TESLA certificate protocol. We assume thatX can hear packet transmissions
from A, and can also transmit toB. X can also receive the broadcast messages from
the CA. Therefore, shortly after timet0 + d, X has knowledge ofCertCA (A), message
M0 from A to B, sCA,0 broadcast by the CA, andsA,0 from the certificate.X can verify
that s′A,0 belongs to the authentication hash chain ofA by performing the verification
procedure. Having obtained a verified element ofA′s authentication chain,X can attempt
to spoof messages as coming fromA, starting at timet0 + kd, wherek > 0. To achieve
this, X needs to generatesA,k from sA,0 wheresA,k = F
−k
1 {sA,0}. Due to the one-way





where each element of the hash chain isK bits andK is assumed to be large. Without
a validsA,k, it would be impossible forX to spoof a message that would be successfully
authenticated byB.
X could also attempt to spoof packets fromA at any time between〈t0, t0 + d〉.
This would require thatX successfully generate an element ofA′s hash chain without
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and is computationally infeasible for anyX with finite resources.
A third approachX could attempt would be to generate an independent hash chain
that produces the hash valuesX,0 that is computationally indistinguishable fromsA,0. This
would allowX to use elementsX,0 of its own hash chain to authenticate messages pur-
portedly generated byA. However, this is computationally infeasible due to the collisi n-
resistance property ofF1 andF2.
Failing any attack onA′s hash chain as above,X could attempt to masquerade as the
CA and generate a fake certificate for A as in equation (4.7), and also generate fake CA
key disclosure broadcast message similar to equation (4.10). However, unlessX knows
the CA private key−KCA, it will not be able to correctly sign the fakeCertCA (A),
and therefore the fake certificate will be rejected byA. Likewise, the fake CA broadcast
message fromX will be rejected by the receivers unless the signature in themessage is
verified as correct using+KCA. As per our assumption of the security of the CA,−KCA
is known only to the correct CA, and thereforeX would not be successful in this attack.
X could attempt to fake CA key disclosure messages subsequent to (4.10), but (a)
the fake hash elementsCAX ,i will not verify successfully to the anchor elementsCA,0 and
(b) this does not allowX to fake elements ofA′s hash chain.
4.4.2 Attack on the CA Revocation Messages
A malicious nodeX in the network can attempt to broadcast fake revocation mes-
sages, similar to (4.15), and thereby attempt to disqualifylegitimate sources in the net-
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work. To generate a fake revocation message that will be succe sfully accepted by the
receivers,X should be able to compute a MAC on the fake revocation messageusing
the keysCA,i+1, with knowledge of at most the keysCA,i wheresCA,i+1 = F1
−1{sCA,i}.





and is infeasible forX. At most,X can trick the
receivers in buffering the fake revocation message, till the next message disclosure from
the CA, when the MAC on the fake message will not verify correctly using the recently
disclosed (correct)sCA,i+1, and therefore be discarded.
Based on the security analysis above, the extended TESLA certificate approach is
secure against message spoofing attacks by malicious nodes in the network.
4.5 Performance Analysis of extended TESLA Certificate Algorithm
We have run simulations of the extended TESLA certificate authentication protocol
to analyze the demands the protocol can make of node resource, and also to compare it
with widely-used signature-based authentication protocols. In our performance analysis,
we consider that all security protocol and data messages from the source to the receivers
are sent over the satellite channel where the satellite is inKa-band and geostationary
orbit. Therefore, we also assume that the one-way satellitepropagation delay is of the
order of 130ms and the terrestrial propagation delays from the group nodes to the local
gateways are negligible in comparison. Moreover, the satellite uplink bandwidth is much
less in comparison to the satellite downlink bandwidth and usually also lower than the
terrestrial wireless bandwidth (assuming the wireless MACprotocol is 802.11agn). By
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Figure 4.7: Receiver buffer size for varying network bandwidths and key use intervals
our assumption, all data has to traverse the satellite uplink and hence we limit the overall
network bandwidth to be equivalent to the satellite uplink bandwidth. In the following
analyses, the uplink bandwidth is varied between 64Kbps and10Mbps.
An important resource consideration is the amount of memoryor buffer required
in the receivers for temporary storage of the data packets tha are pending authentication
(that is, they MAC key has not been disclosed by the CA). Figure 4.7 shows the variation
in the size of buffer required for different∆ and varying network bandwidths. In theory,
the receiver buffer size depends on the time interval of key use (since the key disclosure
delay is a function of that) and the network bandwidth. As figure 4.7 shows, the buffer
size varies little with the key disclosure delay since it is limited to a narrow range by the
network propagation delay. However, the buffer size is significantly affected by the rate
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Figure 4.8: Key use interval∆ as a function of receiver buffer size and net-
work bandwidth
at which data is received - for higher rates, larger buffer isrequired. Even so, the buffer
requirement is only in the order of hundreds of kilo-bytes, which is a small fraction of the
memory present in mobile computers today.
For network scenarios where the receiver buffer is fixed due to hardware constraints,
the key disclosure delay (and hence the key use interval) hasto be dynamically determined
based on the smallest buffer size available, and the networkbandwidth. As shown in figure
4.8, the key use interval can be longer for larger buffers, while it is shorter as for higher
network bandwidths.
The size of the TESLA certificate and the MACs computed on eachmessage, com-
pare favorably to digital certificates and signatures used in public key-based cryptography.
If the MAC algorithm is based on SHA-1 [52], the key used is 160bits. For a TESLA
certificate with fields as shown in 4.2, the certificate size iscomputed as follows.
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• 32 bits for the ID - this will cover 4 billion nodes;
• 160 bits for the encrypted anchor element (128 bits if MD5 is used instead of SHA-
1);
• 64 bits for the time field - this gives the current time in UTC since January 1, 1900,
with a resolution of 200 pico-seconds [53];
• 160 bits for the MAC; and,
• 1024 bits for the CA digital signature (assuming PKCS# 1-based [54] digital signa-
ture with modulus 1024 bits)
Therefore, the total size of the certificate is 1440 bits or 180 bytes. In contrast, a typical
X.509 certificate size is of the order of 1KB.
The size of the MAC appended to each message in our protocol is128 bits for
HMAC-MD5 or 160 bits for HMAC-SHA1 (and with r-factor 1). In comparison, if RSA
based digital signature is used, the signature size would be512 bits, 1024 bits or 2048 bits
for RSA modulusN = 512, 1024, 2048 respectively. For DSA or ECDSA-based digital
signatures, the signature size is 320 bits for a security level of 80 bits [55]. A comparison
of the size overhead incurred for authenticating 500MB datausing our proposed protocol
or DSA or RSA, is shown in figure 4.5. Figure 4.9(a) compares extended TESLA with
HMAC-MD5 against DSA and RSA, while figure 4.9(b) compares extended TESLA with
HMAC-SHA1 against DSA and RSA. Since the size of the message is larger than the
size of the maximum bytes allowed per transmission, the message is split into smaller
chunks for transmission and each individual chunk is authenticated separately. The graphs
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show how the overhead varies as a percentage of the total bytes transferred (message +
MAC/signature) as the size of the IP packet varies between 316 bytes and 1528 bytes.
For extended TESLA, we consider three cases based on the degre of non-repudiation
present - for each packet, r-factor is 1 (one MAC), 0.25 (fourMACs) or 0.125 (eight
MACs). These are compared to DSA with signature sizes 40, 64 and 128 bytes, and RSA
with signature sizes 64, 128 and 256 bytes (N=512,1024 and 2048 respectively). For all
the cases, the overhead decreases with increase in the packet size because for the higher
packet sizes there are lesser number of chunks and hence lesser number of MACs or
signatures. The overhead for our basic protocol is the lowest of all the cases. As we add
more MACs for non-repudiation, the overhead goes up and is a significant percentage for
eight MACs (r-factor 0.125). This is the tradeoff in terms ofsize for our non-repudiation
scheme. However, even then the overhead for our protocol is significantly less than the
overhead due to strong RSA (256 byte signature) or DSA (128 byte signature)-based
security. The graphs suggest that we should go for the largest packet size allowed by
the underlying link layer protocol, since the overhead drops significantly. However, this
has to be considered against the energy expense for authenticating larger packet sizes, as
shown in some following figures. Figure 4.10 shows that the siz overhead with HMAC-
SHA1 is more than that with HMAC-MD5 for all r-factors, sinceeach individual MAC for
the former is 1.25 times in size that of the latter. However, for higher r-factors and larger
packet sizes, the overheads tend towards equal values. The graphs again emphasize the
need for larger packets, since the overhead drops from 50% for the worst-case scenario
(HMAC-SHA1, r-factor 0.125, 316 byte packet), to 8.72% (1528 byte packet).
The number of cryptographic keys required for computing theMAC on each block,
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(a) HMAC-MD5, DSA and RSA (b) HMAC-SHA1, DSA and RSA
Figure 4.9: Comparison of percentage byte overhead due to authentication
for 500MB data
for 1GB data, as a function of the buffer size and the network bandwidth, is shown in
figure 4.11. Here for each time interval∆, one key is used.∆ is also lower bounded
by 10ms. The buffer size is varied from 64KB to 1536KB in stepsof 64KB. All the
graphs exhibit a knee for buffer size 128KB. The graphs show that for high transmission
rates, the number of keys required is high for small buffers,while it decreases sharply
as the buffer size increases. The decrease with increasing buffer sizes is more smooth
for bandwidths lower than 1Mbps. For large buffer sizes, thenumber of keys required
becomes largely independent of the network bandwidth. Whent buffer sizes are small,
the key use intervals have to be small too, and they are more susceptible to variations in
the data rate. For large buffers, the effect of the bandwidthis less important. Therefore,
one should consider the receiver buffer size as a more important factor than the network
bandwidth in designing the protocol parameters.
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Figure 4.10: Percentage size overhead comparison between HMAC-MD5
and HMAC-SHA1, 500MB data
Figure 4.11: Number of keys required for authenticating 1GBmessage
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Processor Key length (bits)
1024 2048 4096
PIII-500MHz 14.6 85.6 562.8
Table 4.1: RSA signature timings (ms) per packet on 500MHz Pentium III
An analysis of the processing delay overhead of the extendedTESLA protocol,
and its comparison to the processing delay for RSA signatures, is given in figure 4.12.
We simulate the delay due to authentication for 500MB data on500MHz Pentium III
machine. The delay figures for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1 are computed based
on the approximation that each operation is executed in one processor clock tick for the
500MHz PIII processor. The delay figures for RSA per packet for the 500MHz PIII
processor are from [56] and are reproduced here in table 4.1.
(a) Processing delay per packet (b) Processing delay per message
Figure 4.12: Comparison of authentication processing delay for 500MB data,
PIII500MHz
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Figure 4.12(a) validates a key feature of each algorithm compared here. For the
HMAC algorithms, the processing delay is proportional to the number of 512-bit blocks
being processed. As the packet sizes increase, the number ofblocks per packet also
increase and therefore the processing delay for HMAC increases. Also, HMAC-SHA1 has
performs more operations (1110 per 512-bit block) comparedto HMAC-MD5 (744 per
512-block) and this fact is reflected in the graphs. For RSA, the processing delay depends
only on the size of the modulusN and is independent of the size of the message. The
cheapest RSA delay, 14.6ms per packet (for modulus 1024 bit), is still significantly higher
than the most expensive HMAC delay, 0.43ms (for HMAC-SHA1 with eight MACs). This
is a major advantage of our protocol over signature-based schemes.
The total processing delay for authenticating 500MB data isshown in figure 4.12(b).
The total number of 512-bit blocks in the overall message is independent of the size of
each packet, and hence also the HMAC processing delay for theentir message. However,
for RSA the processing delay is directly proportional to thenumber of message chunks
processed. Here also our protocol performs significantly better than using RSA signatures
- the worst-case delay is 204 seconds (for HMAC-SHA1, 8 MACs), while the best-case
delay for RSA is a prohibitive 5321 seconds (forN=1024, 1528-byte packets).
We analyze the energy consumption of our protocol for authenticating 500MB data
in figure 4.13. We simulate the energy consumption for a Compaq iPAQ H3670 handheld
computer [57], which is fairly representative of the low-power terrestrial mobile nodes
that we have considered in our protocol design. The handheldcontains an Intel SA-1110
StrongARM processor clocked at 206MHz. It is powered by a Li-polymer battery with
capacity 950mAh at 3.7V. The base figures for energy expenditure of different crypto-
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Algorithm Key size (bits) Sign (mJ) Verify (mJ)
RSA 1024 546.50 15.97
DSA 1024 313.60 338.02
ECDSA 163 134.20 192.23
HMAC 1.16 (µJ/B)
Table 4.2: Energy cost of digital signature algorithms and HMAC, for Compaq iPAQ
H3670
graphic operations of the handheld are obtained from [58] and are reproduced here in
table 4.2. Figure 4.13(a) shows that the energy consumptionfor authentication each
packet ranges between 0.7238mJ and 12.73mJ, with larger packets and higher r-factors
consuming more energy, as is expected. The total battery capacity is 12654 Joules. Figure
4.13(b) shows the total energy consumed for authenticating500MB data, as a percentage
of the battery capacity. For higher r-factors, the energy consumption is a significant per-
centage of the capacity and implies that more than 500MB datacannot be authenticated
without recharging. It is to be noted that in most cases, the higher energy expense for the
higher r-factors is incurred by the source node only. The reciv rs can authenticate the
messages by computing only one MAC and hence the figures for r-factor 1 is indicative
of the energy expense of the receivers. Given the energy constraint , the maximum num-
ber of packets that can be authenticated by our protocol, using HMAC-MD5, is given by
figure 4.14. In this simulation we assume that only 50% of the total energy is used in
the protocol operation and the rest for other purposes such as packet transmission. The
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(a) Energy consumed per packet (b) Percentage energy consumed for 500MB data
Figure 4.13: Energy consumption for HMAC-MD5 authentication only, iPAQ H3670
graphs show that for larger packet sizes, the total number ofpackets that can be processed
are lower, since more energy is spent per packet, due to the higher number of 512-bit
blocks. In the worst case, a source with r-factor 0.125 can process between 1.3 million
(IP packet size 668 bytes) and 0.49 million (1528 byte per packet) packets. On the other
hand, a receiver (with r-factor 1) can process between 8.74 and 3.66 million packets for
packet sizes 668 bytes and 1528 bytes, respectively.
Figure 4.15 compares the amount of energy that would be required to authenticate
500MB data on the iPAQ handheld for different authentication algorithms. Clearly, au-
thenticating 500MB data without additional energy sourcesis not possible except for the
extended TESLA protocol. Given the energy constraints above, authenticating 5MB data
on the handheld is more realistic - figure 4.16(a) compares thpercentage of the total
node energy that is spent in authenticating 5MB data. The graphs validate our claim that
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Figure 4.14: Total number of packets processed by extended TESLA with
HMAC-MD5 on iPAQ H3670
Figure 4.15: Comparison of total energy required for authenticating 500MB
data on iPAQ H3670
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the energy consumption of the extended TESLA protocol is significantly less in compar-
ison to standard signature protocols, even efficient protocols like ECDSA. Moreover, the
graphs show that for nodes with limited energy, the standardsignature algorithms cannot
be applied for authenticating every packet - even in the bestcase scenario, ECDSA sign-
ing algorithm consumes nearly 4% of the node energy for only 5MB data. For the iPAQ
handheld, the standard protocols can authenticate only a few m ga-bytes of data before
they completely spend the available energy, as shown in figure 4.16(b). Here we assume
that upto 50% of the node energy is spent in authenticating the data packets. The best
scenario for the standard protocols is for RSA signature verification, where a node can
authenticate nearly 543MB of data if it is split into 1528 byte packets. The worst scenario
is for RSA signature generation, where only 6MB of data can beauthenticated, for 668
byte packets. The extended TESLA protocol with HMAC-MD5 performs significantly
better in comparison - being capable of authenticating 682MB even with r-factor 0.125.
(a) Percentage energy consumed for 5MB data (b) Maximum amount of data processable
Figure 4.16: Energy performance comparison of different authentication pro-
tocols on iPAQ H3670
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Figure 4.17: Total energy required for authenticating 500MB data, ARM1176JZ(F)
The analysis above with iPAQ H3670 has the limitation that the processor power
and battery capacity is on the lower end of the scale for mobile nodes that are avail-
able today. To illustrate the energy performance of the extended TESLA protocol for
a more representative handheld, we have performed a simulaton analysis of the energy
consumption for different message sizes on the Apple iPhoneprocessor, ARM1176JZ(F)
[59]. The processor has an operating frequency of 620Mhz andco sumes 0.45mW per cy-
cle. We consider the node energy capacity to be equivalent tothe iPhone battery capacity,
1400mAh at 3.7V [60]. Under the assumption that one HMAC operation is performed in
one cycle of the processor, figure 4.17 gives the total energyconsumed for authenticating
500MB data, for both HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1. As is expected,HMAC-SHA1,
r-factor 0.125, consumes the most energy. However, even in the worst case, the 1541
joules of energy consumed represent 8.2% of the total battery capacity. Finally, figure
4.5 shows how much energy is consumed for authenticating varying message sizes. Fig-
ure 4.18(a) gives the values for the node energy as a percentage of the battery capacity
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(a) Percentage of total energy for varying r-factor(b) Percentage of total energy for varying packet sizes
Figure 4.18: Energy consumption of extended TESLA protocolon
ARM1176JZ(F) for different message sizes
for both HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1, when the r-factor is varied. Here the individual
UDP payload is held constant at 768 bytes. Even the highest consumption - HMAC-
SHA1, r-factor 0.125 authenticating 1280MB data - is only 13.7 % of the total battery
capacity. When the packet size is varied, while keeping the r-factor constant (0.25), the
energy consumption percentage is shown in figure 4.18(b). The maximum consumption
is again for HMAC-SHA1, for UDP payload size 1500 bytes, but it is still an accept-
able 21.16% of the total energy. Even though these figures areonly approximate, they
demonstrate that the extended TESLA protocol can be efficiently used for authentication
in present-day mobile computers.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a source authentication protocol for group com-
munication in hybrid satellite/wireless networks. As a basic building block of the pro-
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posed protocol, we have used an extension a new class of lightweight, symmetric-key
certificates called TESLA certificate. We have modified the TESLA certificate construct
by including a keyed hash chain in each certificate that extends the lifetime of each cer-
tificate to multiple uses. The TESLA certificate construct binds the identity of the sender
to the anchor elements of the sender’s key chain. Messages from the sender are authenti-
cated by MACs computed with keys from the chain. For the authentication protocol, we
have used the satellite as the Certificate Authority to generate and distribute the TESLA
certificates to all the nodes in the network. We have also usedth satellite as the proxy
node for the senders in disclosing the MAC keys to the receivers in the network. Further-
more, we have proposed a novel concept of probabilistic non-repudiation that is based
on having the satellite node as the proxy for key disclosure to the receivers. In terms
of performance, due to the use of symmetric MAC functions, the proposed protocol is
much less expensive on node processing power and energy compared to digital signa-
tures. Through simulations, we have shown that the performance of the authentication
protocol is superior to using public-key based digital signatures for authentication, for the
metrics node energy and processing delay. We have shown throug security analysis that
the protocol is secure against malicious adversaries. We hav also proven the correctness
of the protocol through Strand Space analysis.
4.7 Related Work
There has been significant research on efficient multicast source authentication al-
gorithms based on symmetric cryptography that attempt to minimize the computation
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expense on the devices. Canetti et al [61] proposed one of theearly solutions to use sym-
metric MACs for multicast source authentication. In their scheme, the source hasl keys
and computesl MACs on each packet. Each recipient holds a subset of thel keys, and
verifies the MAC according to the keys it holds. The authentication protocol has proba-
bilistic security - the choice of key subsets held by each recipi nt is critical in insuring
that with high probability no coalition of up tow colluding members know all the keys
held by a good member (wherew is the security parameter), and thus maintaining the
security of the scheme. The scheme also requires the multicast group members to store
a large number of keys. [62] has proposed a method known as stream signing, where
one regular digital signature is transmitted at the beginning of a stream, and each packet
either contains a cryptographic hash of the next packet, or aone-time public key using
which the one-time signature on the next packet can be verified. However, this approach
requires reliable packet transmission, since the loss of even one packet means that the
information required to authenticate future packets will be ost. For most multicast proto-
cols, such reliability cannot be guaranteed, since the transmission protocol is UDP, which
is best-effort. [63] has proposed an approach where the source is allowed to delay and
group together several consecutive packets. The source collects the packets in a time-
interval into an authentication tree and signs the root of the tree. The root signature and
hash information on the nodes of the tree are included in eachtr nsmitted packet. The
signing and verification operations are thus amortized overmany packets, and the proto-
col operations are one to two orders of magnitude faster compared to individual packet
signatures. Rohatgi has proposed a hybrid scheme [64] usingoff-line/on-line signature
generation scheme for creatingk-time public/private key pairs so that the cost of signa-
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ture generation can be amortized overk signatures. The size of the keys is reduced by
using hash functions with target collision resistance. Thesiz overhead of the proposed
scheme is however still considerable on a per-packet basis (of the order of 300 bytes per
packet). Anderson et al have proposed the Guy Fawkes protocol in [65], which achieves
source authentication using a small number of hash computations. In this protocol, the
source selects a series of one-time secretsX0, X1, X2, ..; the source commits toXi in
messageMi−1 and reveals it in messageMi+1. The commitment forXi has the form
h (Mi+1, h (Xi+1) , Xi), while the first secretX0 is committed by some external mecha-
nism such as a conventional digital signature. In the Guy Fawkes protocol, the secrets
are not related to one another, and the authentication mechanism cannot tolerate packet
losses - if a commitment is lost, the corresponding secret cannot be authenticated. Per-
rig has proposed a broadcast authentication scheme named BiBa [66] which exploits the
birthday paradox in trying to find two or more colliding hash computations on a given
message, where the hash values are computed using a set of self auth nticating values
(SEALs) s1, ..., st. The two or more SEALs for which the hash on the message collide
form the signature. The scheme exploits the asymmetric property that the source has more
SEALs than the adversary, and hence it can easily generate the BiBa signature with high
probability. However, the adversary only knows the few SEALs disclosed by the source,
and hence has a low probability of forging a valid BiBa signature. The algorithm is prob-
abilistic in nature in the signature generation, and has a significant computation overhead
at the source to find a valid signature. Also, the probabilityof an adversary to forge a
signature increases with time as more and more SEALs are disclosed by the source.
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Chapter 5
Efficient and Secure Multicast Routing in a Hybrid Satellite/Wireless
Networks
5.1 Overview
Group communications is one of the most important applications in wireless net-
work scenarios we consider. For example, applications likemilitary operations or disaster
relief require coordination amongst the users for correct operation. Group communica-
tions can be enabled efficiently by multicast routing. Therehave been several protocols
proposed for multicast routing in wireless networks of mobile hosts - AMRoute [67],
AMRIS [68], MAODV [69] and ODMRP [70], amongst others. All the protocols assume
a flat network topology where the nodes are peers and routing paths from the sources
to the receivers are available. If the network gets partitioned due to link breakages each
partition forms its own multicast group. However, the proposed protocols are not efficient
for the wireless hybrid network topologies we consider where the links are not uniform
throughout and the nodes have different capabilities and conectivity. The networks are
large in size and the multicast group members might be widelys parated, even located in
physically disconnected wireless LANs, as illustrated by the logical diagram of the hier-
archical network topology in fig. 5.1. The gateway nodes offer multiple paths between
different segments of the terrestrial network. The path through the satellite channel has
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Figure 5.1: Hierarchy in the hybrid satellite network
high propagation delay and the routing protocol should consider this delay in establishing
the multicast distribution tree. In the event of a network partition, there is no purpose for
a partition to form its own multicast group if there are no sources within that partition.
Rather, there should be a mechanism such that the partition can take steps to establish
connectivity with the rest of the group. Therefore, attempting o implement one of the
proposed “flat” wireless multicast protocols in this network will lead to large overhead in
routing traffic, inefficient multicast distribution tree (for example, the root node is located
in a part of the network far from the sources and destinations), constantly changing tree
topology and packet drops for the multicast traffic.
Securing the multicast routing protocol in a wireless network is important since the
network layer is susceptible to a number of attacks that threa en the correct functioning
of the multicast routing protocol. For example, a maliciousnode can inject, modify or
delete routing control packets to prevent the multicast routing protocol from establishing
a correct distribution tree. An active attacker could also eavesdrop on the communica-
tion traffic attempting to read the multicast data or performtraffic analysis. Based on the
multicast routing protocols for hybrid and wireless networks proposed in the literature,
the active attacks on a routing protocol can be broadly classified into eitherroute dis-
111
ruption attacks orresource consumptionattacks. These attacks can be successful if node
authentication and message integrity checks are not included in the control of the routing
protocol. The following briefly summarizes a few well-knownroute disruption attacks.
• In protocols that use the hop count metric (number of hops from s urce to destina-
tion) to discover routing paths, a malicious node can modifythe hop count value
in the routing protocol control packet and set it to a lower value, to include itself
in the distribution tree. Subsequently, the node might dropall the data traffic that
it receives, thereby disrupting the communication. This iscalled ablackholeattack
[71]. A special case of this is thegrayholeattack, where the malicious node selec-
tively drops some packets but not others, for example, dropping data packets while
forwarding routing control packets correctly.
• For protocols that usesequence numbersto track the freshness of route discovery
messages, a malicious node could set the sequence number in th rou e reply mes-
sages to a value higher than the actual, to redirect group traffic through itself. Sub-
sequent correct route reply messages received by the source, with lower sequence
numbers, would be discarded. The attack is similar to the blackhole or grayhole
attacks described previously.
• Two or more malicious nodes operating in collusion could launch atunnelingor
wormholeattack. Malicious node A would use pre-existing routing paths to unicast
every control packet to malicious node B, thereby circumventing several hops, and
vice versa. Thus the forwarding path that goes through the nodes A and B will
appear to be several hops shorter than it actually is.
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• On-demand routing protocols with duplicate suppression (e.g. AODV [72]) are vul-
nerable to therushing attack[71]. An attacker can spread fabricated route request,
route reply or other control messages quickly through the network, thus suppress-
ing legitimate route request or other control messages becaus nodes will drop the
packets received later due to duplicate suppression.
• A mobile attacker can move around the network and broadcast spoofed route reply
messages as coming from legitimate nodes, such that a routing loop can form in the
network [73].
• Wireless routing protocols that allow intermediate nodes to learn routes by sniffing
packets in promiscuous mode (e.g. DSR [74]), are vulnerableto route cache poi-
soning. An attacker which is in the vicinity of nodes in the forwarding path to a
destinationD, can broadcast spoofed packets declaring (non-existent) routes toD
through itself. Neighboring nodes may update their route caches with the wrong
route on hearing the spoofed message.
• An attacker could send several route reply messages to the source with different
spoofed addresses, making the source node believe that multiple paths exist to the
destination.
Multicast routing protocols with no mechanism to control group membership at the
network layer level are vulnerable toresource consumptionattacks, some of which are
briefly described below.
• A malicious node might inject fake data packets into the network, which will be
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forwarded to all group members along the distribution tree.This will consume
network bandwidth and the transmission will waste energy ofthe orwarding nodes.
• Similar to the above, an attacker could inject fake control packets into the network
at a high rate or flood the network with packets for non-existent groups, consum-
ing network bandwidth in forwarding the packets along the distribution tree, and
wasting energy at the forwarding nodes in processing the packet.
• Several malicious nodes might join the multicast group as receiv rs. This will cause
the multicast distribution tree to be extended to the unauthorized receivers, and thus
not reflect the correct group membership. Forwarding nodes will waste network
bandwidth and their own energy in forwarding the data packets to the malicious
receivers, who might simply drop the packets. This attack isalso possible by a
single attacker who spoofs multiple receiver addresses.
All the above attacks result indenial of service(DOS) to the legitimate nodes in
distributing and receiving multicast data correctly in thenetwork.
Therefore, the correct operation of the multicast routing protocol requires that the
routing control messages be verifiable and the membership inthe multicast group be
tightly controlled. These can be achieved by the following security mechanisms:
• authentication of user nodes to join or leave a multicast group,
• authentication of in-tree multicast routers that forward multicast traffic meant for
the group,
• authentication and message integrity check of the control messages required to
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maintain and update the multicast tree, and
• authentication of sender nodes before they are allowed to send data to the multicast
group.
In this chapter, we describe the design of a secure multicastrouting protocol for hy-
brid networks that takes into consideration the physical hierarchy in the network topology.
We propose a hierarchical multicast routing protocol that takes into account the different
performance characteristics of the wireless and the satellite channels, and minimizes the
amount of routing traffic exchanged over the satellite linksso that the delay overhead for
the group creation and maintenance is minimized. The protocol also proposes a method
to reconnect partitions to the rest of the group, instead of all wing the partitions to cre-
ate new groups. Subsequently, we use the authentication algrithm proposed in chapter
4 to build a framework to secure the multicast routing protocl. The use of symmetric
cryptographic primitives makes the proposed secure multicast protocol efficient in terms
of node processing power, delay and energy consumption. Thebyte overhead of the pro-
posed protocol is lower in comparison to using digital signatures, and therefore it can be
used for securing the multicast routing protocol without introducing high control over-
head for maintaining the multicast tree.
5.2 A Hierarchical Framework for Multicast Routing
We consider the hybrid network topology of figure 5.1 as the basis for designing our
multicast routing protocol. Each wireless LAN has one or more stationary gateway. For
our present design, we consider the case where there is one gateway node in each LAN.
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A gateway node connects the local users to users in other LANs, and to the Internet,
through links to other gateway nodes. The gateway nodes interconnect by both multi-hop
terrestrial links, and one-hop bidirectional satellite links. The satellite has multiple spot-
beams, an on-board router and is capable of on-board processing and switching between
the LANs. We consider the case where a multicast group existswith group members
(sources and receivers) spread across different LANs.
The physical network topology in figure 5.1 forms a logical hierarchy in three lev-
els. At the lowest level are the user nodes grouped into terrestrial LANs. The user nodes
route data traffic in a LAN using ad hoc routing protocol. The wireless user nodes have
limited energy and processing power. At the second level arethe gateway nodes, each
of which connects the users in its local LAN to users in other LANs. We define each
LAN as a level-0cluster with its local gateway node as the clusterhead. At the highest
level is the satellite which connects all the LANs and has a global view of the network.
We define the group of gateway nodes as forming alevel-1cluster with the satellite as
the clusterhead. We propose a hierarchical multicast routing framework that effectively
and efficiently utilizes the hierarchy in the network topology. Our design minimizes the
multicast routing overhead in the level-1 cluster to minimize the impact of the propaga-
tion delay of the satellite channels. We aim to minimize the control overhead for routing
via satellite channels to limit network bandwidth expense.We also aim to re-connect
partitions in an efficient way using the satellite backbone.
Multicast routing in a terrestrial LAN is mostly similar to the routing in a “flat” ad
hoc network. The important difference is that in the hybrid network the satellite gateway
always has to be in the multicast distribution tree of any multicast group that has members
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in its local LAN. We therefore base the multicast routing in the terrestrial LANs on an
existing ad hoc multicast protocol that closely matches ourdesign objectives, but modify
the protocol to make efficient use of the hierarchy in the hybrid network. The selection of
the base multicast routing protocol depends on the following design criteria:
• the protocol should require low state maintenance in the group members,
• the protocol should limit the flooding of control messages and redundant data trans-
missions,
• the protocol should be be loop-free, and
• the protocol should have at least one core node in the multicast group.
The multicast extension to Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector routing protocol
(MAODV)[69] satisfies the desired properties. We thereforeadopt MAODV for multi-
cast routing in the terrestrial segment, and modify it for ouhierarchical topology. A
description of the MAODV algorithm is found in [69]. In the foll wing, we describe
our hierarchical algorithm that utilizes and adapts MAODV messages for multicasting in
the terrestrial network, and introduces new control message for multicasting using the
satellite overlay. For ease of understanding the similarities of our hierarchical multicast
protocol with MAODV, we follow the description in [69].
The routing in the hierarchical multicast protocol can be segm nted into two parts
based on the logical hierarchy in the network: (a) multicastgroup formation within a ter-
restrial LAN, and (b) extending the multicast group across terrestrial LANs. We fuse the
two segments by making use of core nodes, which are an extension of the multicast group
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leader concept defined in the MAODV specification. The following sections explain the
role of the core nodes, and how the multicast group is formed within a LAN and across
LANs.
5.2.1 Role of Multicast Group Leader
MAODV has a multicast group leader who is responsible for maintaining the mul-
ticast group sequence number (which is primarily used to eliminate stale routes) and dis-
seminating this information to all the group members. MAODVspecifies that the first
member of a multicast group becomes the leader for the group,and remains in that posi-
tion until it decides to leave the group, or until partition merging.
We look upon the group leader as the “core” of the multicast group, and propose
additional functions for the group leader. In our design, the gateway node in a LAN is
alwaysthe group leader ofall multicast groups that are active in its LAN. Each LAN
with members in the same group, has its own unique multicast group leader, namely,
the local gateway. Thus in our design, a multicast group may have multiple peer group
leaders. Since there is no longer a single group leader, we refer to them as the multicast
groupcore nodes. In the hierarchical routing protocol, a core node is thu responsible
for maintaining the local sequence numbers of all multicastgroups active in its LAN, and
periodically distributing this information to the local group members. In addition, a core
node is responsible for periodically sending information about all local active groups to
its peer core nodes. This mechanism is described later. Mostof the modifications we
make to MAODV are related to the choice of the core node and itscapabilities.
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5.2.2 Multicast Group Formation in a LAN
When a node has data to send to a multicast group, or it wishes to join the multicast
group to receive data, it generates a Route Request message (RREQ) if it does not already
have a route to the group. If the source node is aware of the address of the local core
(gateway) node and it has a route to the core, it unicasts the RREQ to the core node.
Otherwise, the RREQ is broadcast within the local network.
If the group is nascent, such that the multicast distribution ree is not yet formed,
the RREQ message will eventually reach the core node, which replies with a Route Reply
message (RREP) to the requesting node. (We do not consider the case of a network
partition whereby the core node is unreachable from the requesting node.) Otherwise,
if the multicast tree is already set up, response to the RREQ message follows standard
MAODV algorithm. The local distribution tree is thus created with the gateway as the
core. The core is also a member of the multicast group, and it thus receives the multicast
data from its local sources.
5.2.2.1 Core Notification Message on Member Join/Leave
When a receiver nodes broadcasts a RREQ message to join a group, it can receive
multiple RREP messages from nodes in different branches of the multicast tree. The new
node joins the multicast group by unicasting a Multicast Activation message (MACT) to
its selected upstream node in the multicast distribution tree [69]. The MACT message
propagates up the distribution tree till it reaches the on-tree router that had originated
the RREP selected by the joining node. On receiving the MACT message, the router
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realizes that a new branch has been grafted in the multicast tree, with itself at the root of
the branch, and the joining node (whose address is obtained from the MACT message)
located at the branch leaf. We propose that the router unicasts a Join Notification
message to the core node, informing the core of the address ofthe newly joining member.
If the router is the root of multiple new branches, it can include all the addresses in the
Join Notification message.
Similarly, when a group member leaves, it sends a MACT message to its upstream
node with thePrune flag set. The prune MACT message eventually reaches the root of
the multicast branch, which unicasts aLeave Notification message to the core inform-
ing it of the address of the leaving member.
The Join or Leave Notification message has no effect on the operation of the mul-
ticast routing protocol within the LAN, but it is required bythe core node for efficient
routing between LANs, as described in the following section.
5.2.3 Multicast Group Formation across LANs
Each node in the network that supports MAODV maintains threetables: (a) the
Route Table, (b) theMulticast Route Tableand (c) theRequest Table[69]. We propose
that in addition, each gateway node maintain aCore Tableto share information about
existing multicast groups with other LAN gateways in the network (figure 5.2). Each
entry in the core table has the following information:
• Multicast group address
• List of sourcecore addresses
120
Figure 5.2: Multicast Core Table maintained by each core (gatew y) node
• List of receivercore addresses
• Local source addresses
• Local receiver addresses
We term a gateway node which has multicast sources in its local LAN as a source
core, whereas a gateway node with multicast receivers in itslocal LAN is a receiver core.
A gateway can thus be both a source core and receiver core for agr up.
A core gets the addresses of its local sources either from theRREQ messages that
it receives, or from the multicast data packet headers. The cor gets the addresses of
the local receivers either from RREQ messages, or from the join n tification messages it
receives from multicast tree members. A timer is associatedwith each active source; if no
data is received from a source node within a timeout interval, the source node address is
removed from the list of local source addresses. A receiver add ess is removed from the
list of local receivers either when the core receives a MACT message with thePruneflag
set, or when the core receives a leave notification message from a multicast tree member.
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5.2.3.1 Core Hello Message
When a multicast group is created in a LAN, the local gateway node enters the
information in its core table. If the group creation is driven by a source node RREQ, then
the core enters its own IP address in the list of source core addresses, and the address of the
source node in the list of local source addresses. The core subs q ently broadcasts a Core
Hello message to all the gateway nodes over both the satellite channel and the terrestrial
links between the core nodes. The Core Hello message has the following fields:
〈H flag, Broadcast ID, Source Addr, Num Groups, Group Addr〉 (5.1)
TheH flag is set for Core Hello messages. The broadcast ID is incremented by
the core for each Core Hello message it sends out. The core plac s its own address in
theSource Addr field, and a list of the multicast group addresses for which ithas local
sources in theGroup Addr field. Num Groups gives the number of group addresses
present in theGroup Addr field.
The Core Hello message informs other gateways that the gateway that generated
the message has sources in its local LAN for the multicast groups identified in the mes-
sage. A gateway node receiving the message enters the informati n in its own core table.
Corresponding to each multicast address in the message, it cr ates a new entry, with the
address of the source gateway node added to the list of sourcecore addresses correspond-
ing to the new entry. A timer is associated with each source cor address. A core with
local sources periodically re-broadcasts the Core Hello message. Every reception of the
Core Hello message by a gateway resets its local timer corresponding to that particular
code node; if no message is received within a timeout period,the address of the source
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core node is removed from all entries in the multicast table that have the address. If the
table entry becomes empty, then the entry itself is deleted.The Core Hello message also
allows gateway nodes that have been recently activated to learn of all the active groups in
the network.
5.2.3.2 Core Join Message
When a multicast group is created in a LAN with receivers, thelocal core updates
the information for the group in its core table. It places itsown IP address in the list
of receiver core addresses for that group, and the addressesof all known local group
members in the list of local receiver addresses. The core then sends a Core Join message to
the source core nodes for the group. The addresses of the source core nodes are obtained
from the core table. The Core Join message has the following fields:
〈J flag, Broadcast ID, Source Addr, Num Groups, Group Addr〉 (5.2)
TheJ flag is set for Core Join messages. The broadcast ID is incremented by the
core for each Core Join message it sends out. The core places its own address in the
Source Addr field, and a list of the multicast group addresses for which itwants to re-
ceive data, in theGroup Addr field. Num Groups gives the number of group addresses
present in theGroup Addr field. When a source core node receives the Core Join mes-
sage, it adds the address of the receiver core node to the listof receiver cores for each
relevant multicast address entry in its core table, and starts sending the multicast data
packets for the subscribed groups to the joining core. The joining core on receiving the
packets forwards them to its local distribution tree.
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5.2.3.3 Core Leave Message
When all the members of a multicast group in a LAN leaves the group, the local
core updates the group entry in its core table. It deletes thelocal receiver addresses from
the group entry. If it was receiving group data from remote LANs, it sends a Core Leave
message to the remote source core nodes. If also there are no local sources for the group,
then the core removes the group entry altogether from the tabl . The Core Leave message
has the following fields:
〈L flag, Broadcast ID, Source Addr, Num Groups, Group Addr〉 (5.3)
TheL flag is set for Core Leave messages. The broadcast ID is incrementd by
the core for each Core Leave message it sends out. The core places its own address in the
Source Addr field, and a list of the multicast group addresses which it wants to leave,
in the Group Addr field. Num Groups gives the number of group addresses present
in the Group Addr field. When a source core node receives the Core Leave message,
it removes the address of the receiver core node from the listof receiver cores for each
relevant multicast address entry in its core table, and stops sending data for those groups
to the leaving core node.
5.2.4 Multi-path Routing in the Satellite Overlay
A core node might have both local sources and local receiversfor a multicast group,
or only sources or receivers. It might also be receiving multicast group data from multi-
ple remote source core nodes, and/or it might be sending group data to multiple remote
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Figure 5.3: Multicast distribution tree in the wireless hybrid network
while each LAN has a multicast tree. Multicast routing across the hybrid network is thus
achieved in a hierarchical manner, with a hybrid distribution method (figure 5.3).
The gateway nodes are interconnected by both terrestrial fowarding paths and the
satellite links. In traditional wireless multicast routing protocols, the metric for selecting
the forwarding path is usually shortest distance measured in number of hops. For the
multiple paths between the gateway nodes, this metric will lead to the single-hop satellite
link being selected in case the terrestrial forwarding pathhas two or more intermediate
nodes. This will not reflect the fact that the satellite link might have more delay compared
to a longer terrestrial path. On the other hand, the satellite links are more robust (the
intermediate node is always available), can reach multipleoth r gateways in a single
transmission, and offers very high bandwidth. Also, for terestrial forwarding paths that
are longer than a few hops, the delay in the two paths might be comparable.
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We propose that a gateway node sends out the Core Hello on all its physical inter-
faces, both terrestrial and satellite. A gateway node that receives the message over both
paths selects the one that arrives first (lower delay), and unicasts the Core Join message
back to the source core using the selected path. In case no terrestrial path is available,
the gateway will receive the Core Hello message from the satellite transmission. How-
ever, when a receiver core sends a Core Join or Core Leave message for multiple groups
with several source cores, the receiver uses the satellite transmission to efficiently reach
multiple core nodes simultaneously.
A source core sends multicast data traffic to other core nodesalong all the interfaces
at which it received Core Join messages. Therefore the data might follow both terrestrial
and satellite paths. A receiver core can potentially receive the data from both paths - it
forwards the data received on the interface on which it joined th group, and discards data
received on the other interface. For high data-rate traffic,data forwarded along terrestrial
paths might see more packet drops compared to the satellite channels. A receiver core
that is receiving data on a terrestrial interface and suffers from packet drops, can switch
to the satellite interface for better reception. For this, it first sends a Core Join message
to the source cores over the satellite links, and then sends aCore Leave message over
the terrestrial paths. The source cores will add the receiver core to the satellite forward-
ing path for the specific group (theBroadcast ID of the Core Join message indicates
its freshness), and delete the same receiver from the terrestrial interface. The intermedi-
ate nodes in the overlay also delete the corresponding forwarding path on receiving the
Core Leave message. A receiver core node therefore has to maintain information for the
multicast packets it receives on a per-group basis (to drop duplicates), and also maintain
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information on packet receive rates and drops for each interfac .
The satellite links also provide robustness against failure of terrestrial forwarding
nodes in the overlay. When one or more intermediate nodes in the forwarding path from a
source core to a receiver core fail, the receiver core can still receive Core Hello messages
from the source core over the satellite links, and it can subscri e to the group over the
satellite forwarding path.
5.2.5 Dealing with Network Partitions
Due to node mobility or failure of intermediate nodes in the forwarding paths, a
subset of group members in a LAN can become disconnected fromthe rest of the group.
The MAODV protocol specifies that the multicast tree node downstream of the link break
initiate a recovery and that the disconnected partition elect its own group leader, and
the group continue to function independently in its partition till a merge with the rest
of the network is possible. We propose that the partition re-establish connection to the
network as a newly-joining LAN. This is possible only if there are one or more nodes
in the partition with dual terrestrial/satellite connectivity. Therefore we propose that a
subset of the normal user nodes have dual connectivity, withthe satellite transmission
being activated only in emergencies such as network partitions.
In our proposal, we deviate from the MAODV specification in the algorithm for
selecting the group leader for the partition. A node can become the group leader only if it
is both a group member and has dual connectivity. To discoversuch a node in the partition,
the node (sayA) downstream of the link break broadcasts aP rtition Leader message
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to the other nodes in the partition. Any node receiving the broadcast and satisfying the
criteria for becoming a group leader, unicasts a reply toA. If A receives multiple replies,
it selects the node with the lowest IP address and unicasts aMACT message with the
GL flag set. As per the MAODV specification, the new group leader annou ces itself to
all the nodes in its partition. In addition, the new group lead r connects to the satellite,
creates a Core Table and updates it with information for all the group members in its
partition. If it has local sources, it broadcasts a Core Hello over the satellite links. If it has
local receivers, when it receives a Core Hello for the group from other gateways, it sends
a Core Join message in reply. A new branch of the multicast group is thus established in
the partition, and it gets re-connected to the rest of the network.
In case none of the dual connectivity nodes present in the partition is a group mem-
ber, then one of them joins the group on receiving thePartition Leader message broad-
cast. Selection of the group leader then follows the method outlined above.
In the event of the partition re-connecting to the local LAN,we follow the MAODV
specification. But the group leader is always selected as theoriginal gateway node in the
LAN, and the group leader of the partition ceases this functio .
5.3 Methodology: Authenticated Multicast Routing using TESLA Cer-
tificates
We use our proposed approach for TESLA certificate authentication, along with
public-key cryptography for bootstrapping, to design a framework for secure multicast
routing in the hybrid terrestrial/satellite network. We use the hierarchical multicast rout-
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ing protocol described in section 5.2 as the base routing protocol for the security frame-
work.
5.3.1 Security Assumptions
We assume the terrestrial wireless channel protocol provides reliable transmission
on a link-basis (for example, IEEE 802.11) and we do not consider the attacks that are
possible against the link layer protocol. The satellite channel is also assumed to be al-
ways secure. The wireless links are bi-directional. A one-to-one mapping exists between
the link layer address and the IP address of each node. All thenod s operate with omni-
directional antennas and the transmission of each node can be received by all its neigh-
bors.
In the security framework, we propose to utilize the infrastucture in the hybrid
network to build a certificate authority. We propose to use two levels of CAs. The GEO
satellite is at the root of the hierarchy and it serves the rolof a centralized CA that is
universally trusted by all the nodes and gateways. Each gateway node acts as the CA for
its local LAN, with appropriate delegation by the central CAso that the user nodes trust
a gateway node for certification purposes. A local CA carriesa certificate signed by the
central CA which establishes its credentials to act as the local CA for the particular LAN.
A user node can contact the local gateway for TESLA certificaton, instead of having to
contact the central CA. The peer gateways in level-2 are can communicate directly with
the central CA, and exchange their own node certificates signed by the central CA. We
therefore make use of two different authentication algorithms in different levels in the
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network. In a terrestrial LAN, we use TESLA certificates for authentication, with the
local gateway as the CA. At the higher level of the gateway nodes, we use traditional
public-key certificates for authentication. The use of public key certificates in the higher
level is acceptable since the gateway nodes have significantprocessing power, storage
and energy. Also, the network bandwidth available in this level is high, provided by the
broadband satellite channels. We propose to dedicate a small percentage of the satellite
bandwidth as a “signaling” channel, which is to be used strictly for exchanging control
messages for routing and security. In the following description of the operation of the
secure multicast protocol, we assume that nodes do not move across LANs, but they can
be mobile within their local LANs.
5.3.2 TESLA Certificate with Source/Receiver Information
A node initially obtains a TESLA certificate from the local CAbefore it can partic-
ipate in any authenticated communication. If the node knowsthe address of the local CA,
it can unicast a request for TESLA certificate to the CA, and include the anchor element
of its authentication chain in the request. Otherwise, the node broadcasts a CA discov-
ery message to its neighboring nodes. The CA discovery broadcast message propagates
through the local network till it reaches a node that has the credential certificate for the
local CA, which is signed by the central CA, or till the message reaches the local CA
itself. In either case, the node with the CA certificate, or the CA itself, replies to the
requesting node by sending the CA certificate, and the anchorelement broadcast message
from the CA, given in equation 4.5. The new node thus obtains the CA address and the
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anchor elements of the CA hash chains. In addition, the localCA periodically broadcasts
its credentials and the signed anchor elements of its key hash chains to the local network.
In the request to the CA for a TESLA certificate, a nodeA also specifies the multi-
cast group addressG and whether it wants to join the group as a sender or a receiver. Th
CA includes this information in the TESLA certificate it generates for the node:
CertCA (A) =
(
IDA, GRPG, {IDA, GRPG, {src|rcv}, sA,0}tKCA1 , t0 + d,
MACtKCA1 (..) , SIGN−KCA (..)
)
(5.4)
A general TESLA certificate, as specified in (4.7), is sent toA if the request does not
specify the multicast group. The response from the CA to the requesting node also con-
tains the current group sequence number, and the hop count ofthe CA from the requesting
node. This information is needed for the correct operation of the MAODV protocol.
5.3.3 Hop Count Authentication Using Hash Chains
The mutable fields in MAODV control messages are (i)Hop cnt andMgroup hop
in RREP message, and (ii)Hop cnt in the Group Hello message which is periodically
broadcast by the group leader. These fields are set to 0 by the node generating the RREP
message or the Group Hello message, and they are incrementedby one by every node that
forwards these messages. For a source node, theHop cnt field in the RREP message it
receives, indicates the distance of the source node from theresponding node that has a
current route to the MAODV distribution tree. For a node joining the group as receiver,
the Mgroup hop in the RREP message it receives, indicates its distance fromthe root
node of the local branch in the distribution tree. TheHop cnt field in the Group Hello
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message indicates the distance in hops from the group leader.
To prevent intermediate nodes from claiming a lower hop count than the actual, we
make use of one-way hash chains that are tied to the hop count value [75, 76]. A node
A creating a RREP message (or the group leader/core node creating the Group Hello







n (hn) = h0 wheren is the maximum number of hops in the network.A
includeshn in the RREP message, and the anchor element of the chainh0, which is
authenticated usingA’s TESLA key. TheHop cnt andMgroup hop fields are set to
0. A neighbor nodeB receiving the RREP, computeshn
F1−→ hn−1, and re-transmits the
RREP message withHop cnt andMgroup hop incremented by 1 andhn replaced by
hn−1. An intermediate nodeC that is1 hop away fromB can check the accuracy of the









The use of one-way hash chains to secure the hop count still allows a node to claim
to be one hop closer to the group leader than its actual distance, if it simply forwards
to its downstream node the hop count chain element that it obtained from its upstream
node [77]. In addition, this method is vulnerable to attacksby a mobile attacker operating
in promiscuous mode, unless the hash chain element is encrypted. A mobile attacker
can move several hops upstream and sniff the control messages as they are broadcast
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downstream by a forwarding node closer to the source, and thus obtain a hash chain
element associated with a lower hop count value. The attacker can then move downstream
and use this hash chain element to advertise a false path withlo er hop count to the source
or multicast tree, thereby potentially drawing all forwarding paths in its vicinity to itself,
and thus making sure that all the traffic in its neighborhood flws through it.
5.3.4 Secure Multicast Protocol Operation
5.3.4.1 Route discovery and establishment
When a user nodeA wants to find a route to a multicast groupG in the interval
< ti, ti +d >, it broadcasts a authenticated RREQ message to the network.A computes a
MAC on the RREQ message using a fresh (undisclosed) key from its TESLA key chain,
and includes the MAC along withCertCA (A) with the RREQ message.
Any intermediate nodeB receiving the RREQ message compares the destination
address in the RREQ message to the group address in the certificate. If the two do not
match, the RREQ is discarded. Otherwise,B buffers the RREQ message along with the
certificate, and processes the message.B computes a MAC on the RREQ message using
its most current (undisclosed) TESLA key, and forwards the message with the MAC and
its TESLA certificate. Each subsequent node (sayC) that receives the RREQ stores the
RREQ message withB’s MAC and TESLA certificate.C then replacesB’s MAC and
TESLA certificate with its own MAC and TESLA certificate and forwards the message.
The forwarding nodes also set up reverse path pointers to node A according to MAODV
operation. (The above assumes that two neighboring forwarding nodesB and C are
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communicating for the first time and henceB needs to send its TESLA certificate toC.
If B previously had authenticated communication withC, it does not need to send the
certificate sinceC already has an authenticated element ofB’s TESLA key chain.)
When the RREQ message reaches a node (sayD) that has a fresh enough route to
the group (as determined by the sequence number in the RREQ message), the processing
depends onA’s intended role in the group, and whetherD is a router in the multicast tree,
or merely a node with a current route to the tree.
(i) If A is a source node forG, D does not need to be an on-tree router.D creates
a RREP message to be sent to A and includes its hop count authenticatorHn (which in
this case indicatesD’s distancen in hops from the multicast tree) and the anchor element
H0 for the hop count in the RREP message.D computes a MAC on the RREP message
and sends it along with its TESLA certificate toA in the reverse path. Intermediate nodes
receiving the RREP message increment the hop count and accordingly modify the hop
count authenticator in each step. The forwarding nodes alsostore the RREP message and
the TESLA certificate ofD and the preceding node who had forwarded the RREP. The
next hopfield in the route table entry for this path is not enabled tillthe stored messages
are authenticated. Figure 5.4 shows the message exchanges that take place.
At time ti + d, the local CA broadcasts the TESLA key it has used for the certifi-
cates generated in< ti, ti + d >. A, D and the intermediate nodes in the forwarding path
can subsequently verify the TESLA certificates they have cached. IfA, D and any inter-
mediate node are using fresh TESLA key chains to authenticate their MACs in the above
route discovery process, then the key used to authenticate the MAC is obtained from the
TESLA certificate itself, and the MACs can be immediately verifi d. Otherwise, the CA
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Figure 5.4: Message exchange for authenticated route discovery using
TESLA certificate algorithm.A is the source andD is a node that responds
to A with a fresh route to the group.B andC are intermediate nodes.
broadcasts the TESLA key the node has used to compute its MAC in < ti, ti + d >.
Intermediate nodes can subsequently verify the MACs of their upstream or downstream
neighbors. The TESLA keysD,i used by nodeD for the RREP message is received byA
from the CA broadcast who can then verify the RREP message created byD. If the MAC
verifications are successful, theopcount field is enabled in the route table entry and the
forwarding path fromA to D becomes active. If any node cannot verify the MAC from
its neighbor (orA or D cannot verify their MACs), the forwarding path is canceled an
the node which noticed the error sends an error message toA.
(ii) If A wants to join the multicast group as a receiver,D has to be either a group
member or an on-tree router so that it can reply with an RREP message.D creates an
RREP message to be sent to A and includes its hop count authenticatorhDn and the an-
chor elementhD0 for the hop count in the RREP message. The hop count authenticator n
this case authenticates both theHop Cnt andMgroup hop fields in the RREP message,
which are both set to 0 byD. D computes a MAC on the RREP message and sends it
along with its TESLA certificate toA in the reverse path.D also creates both a route
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Figure 5.5: Authenticated MACT message for activating the cosen route fromA to D.
table entry and a multicast route table entry forA, but does not activate them. Interme-
diate nodes receiving the RREP message authenticate it similar to the RREQ message,
incrementing the hop count and accordingly modifying the hop c unt authenticator in
each step. The forwarding nodes also store the RREP message and the TESLA certificate
of D and the node who had forwarded the RREP. Thenext hop field in the route table
entry and multicast route table entry forA is not enabled till the stored messages can be
authenticated and a MACT message is received fromA.
At time ti+d, the local CA broadcasts the TESLA key it has used for the certificates
generated in< ti, ti + d >. A, D and the intermediate nodes in the forwarding path can
subsequently verify the TESLA certificates and the MACs of the control messages that
they have cached, as described in the previous section. The joining nodeA might have
received multiple RREP messages along different paths to the multicast tree. It selects
one of the paths according to MAODV operation and the selected path must have been
successfully authenticated.A generates a MACT message and authenticates it with a
MAC computed using the next undisclosed key from its key chain. A then unicasts the
authenticated MACT message to the selected next hop. The MACT message propagates
upstream, with each forwarding node authenticating it witha MAC computed using the
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Figure 5.6: AuthenticatedMACT Prune message for deleting the multicast
branch from nodeD to A. HereA is a group receiver, andD is the root of
the branch withA as leaf node.
next undisclosed key in its key sequence, till the message reaches the on-tree router. At
the next time interval of key disclosure, the TESLA keys usedto compute the MACs
are disclosed and subsequently the MACs can be authenticated. If the authentications
are successful, each node enables the corresponding entry in i s multicast routing table
and the new branch of the multicast distribution tree is activ ted. Figure 5.5 shows the
authenticated MACT message propagating upstream fromA to D.
5.3.4.2 Multicast tree branch pruning
A group member or a routerA can leave the multicast tree only if it is a leaf node.
To do so,A unicasts a MACT message with theP flag (Prune flag) set, to its upstream
neighbor on the tree. The MACT message is authenticated witha MAC computed using
the most recent undisclosed key fromA’s key chain. The next hop processes the message
only if A is its downstream neighbor (which is established during theroute discovery pro-
cess). The next hop buffers the MACT message till the next interval whenA’s MAC key is
disclosed by the CA broadcast. If the MACT message is subsequently authenticated, the
next hop deletes the entry forA from its multicast route table, and sends a authenticated
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Figure 5.7: Authenticated Group Hello message broadcast from the core
node. HereN is the diameter of the network, and nodeB is one-hop away
from the core.
notification to the core that group memberA has left. The next hop can similarly prune
itself from the tree if it is not a group member andA’s leaving makes it a leaf node. The
process continues recursively till a current group member or a non-leaf router is reached.
Figure 5.6 shows the authenticatedMACT Prune message propagating upstream from
leaf nodeA to branch root nodeD.
5.3.4.3 Group Hello messages
The core node periodically broadcasts Group Hello messageswith the latest se-
quence number for the group. TheHop Cnt field in the Group Hello message is authen-
ticated using a hop count authenticator. The core includes the hop count authenticator and
the hop count anchor element with the Group Hello message. The message is also authen-
ticated by a MAC which is computed using the next undisclosedkey from the TESLA key
chain of the core. Nodes receiving the Group Hello message update the hop count and the
hop count authenticator before forwarding the message. Each node buffers the message
till the next interval when the core TESLA key is disclosed, when the message can be
authenticated. Figure 5.7 shows the authenticated Group Hello m ssage being forwarded
by nodeB one-hop away from the core node.
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5.3.4.4 Authenticating Core Hello, Core Join and Core Leavemessages
At the upper level of the peer core nodes, the multicast routing messages are au-
thenticated using public-key-based digital signatures. Any core node sending a routing
message to another core node verifies the message by computing a d gital signature on
the message, and also includes its public-key certificate gen rated by the top-level CA,
namely, the satellite.
5.4 Security Analysis of the Routing Protocol
5.4.1 Active-y-xAttacker Model
We consider an active attacker model. The attacker may attemp to compromise the
correct operation of the routing protocol by exhibiting arbitrary, Byzantine[78] behav-
ior. The attacker may try to create, modify, drop or replay routing packets, as described
in section 4.1, and in general cannot be expected to behave corr ctly with respect to the
routing protocol functionality. Based on the attacker model in [71], we characterize the
attacker on the basis of the number of malicious nodes it ownsand the number of good
nodes it has compromised. We denote such an attacker asActive-n-mattacker, wherem
is the number of malicious nodes the attacker owns andn is the number of good nodes it
has compromised. We assume the attacker owns all the cryptoga hic keys of the nodes it
has compromised and can distribute them amongst all its nodes. Classified in the order of
increasing attack capability, the attacker hierarchy is: Active-0-1 (attacker own one mali-
cious node and has compromised no good nodes), Active-0-x (attacker ownsx malicious
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nodes), Active-1-x (attacker ownsx nodes and has compromised 1 node) and Active-y-x.
In addition, we define an Active-VC attacker as an attacker that controls all the nodes in
a vertex cut of the network, such that the network is partitioned into disjoint sections and
the good nodes in one section has to go through the attacker nod s t communicate with
good ones in another section. We also make the assumption that the ttacker can own
only the lowest-level terrestrial nodes in the hybrid network; the network nodes of the
higher level have more security and behave correctly. This includes the satellite and the
gateways.
5.4.2 Security Against Active Attacks
Based on the attacker model above, the multicast routing protocol described above
is secure against several attacks mentioned in section 4.1.
1. Authentication of the hop count using one-way hash chainsin RREP or Group Hello
messages prevents a malicious forwarding node from claiming a shorter distance
than the actual to the multicast tree member or the core node,respectively. This
prevents blackhole or grayhole attacks. However, the malicious node can claim
the same distance as the previous node from which it receivedthe RREP or Group
Hello message. Also, the attack where a malicious node increases the hop count
more than the actual value, is also not prevented. The effecto this attack is similar
to the case where the malicious node simply drops the packetsinstead of forwarding
them.
2. Authentication of the RREQ or RREP messages by the generati g node using
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TESLA key-based MACs prevents intermediate nodes from modifying the sequence
number in the control messages. This prevents the attack where a malicious for-
warding node sets the sequence number to a value higher than the actual to attract
routes to itself.
3. The use of TESLA certificate to specify whether a node wantsto join the group as
source or receiver prevents unauthorized nodes from being able to find a path to
the multicast tree to send messages or to graft new branches on the tree to receive
messages. Thus the on-tree nodes are spared from unnecessary forw ding of data
packets and wasting their energy in doing so.
4. The secure multicast protocol assumes that the CA generats TESLA certificates
for authorized nodes only. We also make the assumption that the CA does not
generate more than one TESLA certificate for a node. If legitima e nodes behave
correctly, then attacks based on spoofing control messages are prevented, since any
unauthorized node that tries to send spoofed packets will not have a correct TESLA
certificate to authenticate the packets it generates. Therefor the rushing attack,
route cache poisoning attack and creating routing loops areprevented. The attacker
also cannot spoof multiple paths to the multicast tree, since t would be unable to
obtain multiple TESLA certificates for the different identities required to launch
this attack.
Due to the TESLA key disclosure delay involved in authenticating control messages
in our protocol, an attacker could initially succeed in having fake control packets
forwarded by legitimate nodes. However, once the TESLA keysare disclosed and
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the attacker’s control packets fail authentication, legitimate nodes in the attacker’s
neighborhood would refuse to forward packets from the attacker.
The secure multicast routing protocol thus protects against Active-0-1andActive-0-
x attackers. It also prevents several attacks byActive-1-xandActive-y-xattackers, though
not all the attacks are prevented. For example, if the attacker an compromise one legiti-
mate node with valid TESLA certificate, it can use the compromised node to send spoofed
control messages. Multiple compromised nodes can be used tolaunch tunneling attacks
or network-partitioning attacks. However, if the network is able to detect the compro-
mised nodes, then the CA can revoke their certificates to prevent future instances of these
attacks.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have described the design of a secure multicast routing proto-
col for hybrid networks. We have discussed the importance ofgr up communication in
hybrid networks and why the group communication in the wireless environment in es-
pecially susceptible to attacks by malicious adversaries.We have described a range of
attacks that are possible on the routing protocol that formsthe underlying construct for
enabling group communication. For the design of secure multicast protocol, we have
proposed a hierarchical multicast routing protocol, basedon MAODV, that takes into
consideration the physical hierarchy in the network topology. The proposed multicast
protocol minimizes the amount of routing traffic exchanged over the satellite links so that
the delay overhead for the group creation and maintenance isminimized. The protocol
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also incorporates a method to reconnect partitions to the rest of the group, instead of al-
lowing the partitions to create new groups. We combine the authentication algorithm pro-
posed in chapter 4 with the multicast routing protocol to build a secure multicast routing
framework. The control messages in the secure multicast protocol are authenticated using
TESLA certificates and symmetric MACs. The use of symmetric cryptographic primitives
makes the secure multicast protocol efficient in terms of node processing power, delay and
energy consumption. The byte overhead of the proposed protocol is lower in comparison
to using digital signatures, and therefore it does not have high control overhead for main-
taining the multicast tree.
5.6 Related Work
Several protocols have been proposed for multicast routingin wireless ad hoc net-
works, for example, AMRoute [67], ODMRP [70], MAODV [69]. All the protocols
assume a flat network topology and uniform wireless links.
There have been relatively fewer proposals for hierarchical multicast routing in
wireless networks. Gui and Mohapatra [79] have proposed twomethods to construct a
hierarchical multicast tree -domain-basedandoverlay driven. The authors use Differ-
ential Destination Multicast (DDM) [80] as the base routingprotocol, and enhances it
by adding an overlay of root nodes, thus creating the Hierarchical DDM protocol. The
hierarchy in the proposed approaches is a logical hierarchy, w ich is created by dividing
a flat ad hoc network into clusters with root nodes. The use of DDM limits the scalability
of their protocol since DDM usessource routesto multicast the data to the group mem-
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bers. Ko et al [81] have proposed PHAM (Physical Hierarchy-driven Ad Hoc Multicast),
which is a multicast routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks that have a physically hi-
erarchical architecture, for example, low-powered nodes grouped into clusters with more
powerful clusterheads. The authors describe the operationof PHAM in a two-level hierar-
chy with level-1 nodes in each physical group managed by a dedicated level-2 super-node
with higher capabilities. In their proposal, a super-node is knowledgeable of all the level-1
nodes in its group, and the level-2 super-nodes are inter-connected via tunnels. In PHAM,
control packets are flooded in the multicast group. Source nod s always register with the
super-node, but receiver nodes do not need to do so. A multicast group in a physical group
might not include the local super-node. When a super-node inanother group receives data
packets, it floods the packets to the local physical group. The authors simulate the PHAM
framework using ADMR (Adaptive Demand-driven Multicast Routing) [82] in each phys-
ical group, and the performance evaluation shows higher throughput, more efficient use of
control packets and shorter latency for PHAM compared to pure ADMR protocol. In [83],
the authors propose an integrated architecture for multicast routing in cellular networks,
using ad hoc relays for the last mile to the node with the lowest throughput. The paper
characterizes the relay capability of IEEE 802.11b ad-hoc network for multicast traffic,
and based on a general interference model, derives a polynomial-ti e 4-approximation
algorithm for constructing an optimal-throughput multicast forest.
In the area of secure routing for wireless networks, severalprotocols have been
proposed for secure unicast routing in ad hoc networks. Mostof these protocols, for
example, ARIADNE [71], SEAD [77], ARAN [73], SAR [84] and SAODV [75], have
focused on adding security mechanisms to previously proposed unicast protocols AODV
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or DSR to remove security vulnerabilities that are present in the original specification
of the routing protocols. SRP [85] has been designed as a unicst routing protocol with
integrated security mechanisms.
Roy et al. [76] have proposed security additions to the MAODVprotocol to protect
the multicast routing against attacks. This is one of the first p oposals for secure multi-
cast routing in ad hoc networks. The paper proposes the use ofpublic key cryptosystem
to authenticate node identities and routing control messages. Group members and non-
members who act as in-tree routers need authorization in theform of digital certificates
(callednode certificate) signed by a CA. Only nodes that possess a node certificate can
take part in routing. A group member needs an additionalgroup membership certificate
to to prove that it belongs to a particular multicast group. This certificate binds the group
member’s public key to its IP address and the multicast groupIP address. All nodes
that are in the MAODV multicast tree have an additional credential called thetree key,
to distinguish them from non-tree nodes in the network. Also, a node on the multicast
tree establishespairwise shared keyswith each of its immediate neighbors. All messages
exchanged between neighboring nodes include a MAC computedusing the shared key to
provide strong source authentication and to prevent impersonation attacks. The pairwise
keys are also used to securely disseminate the tree key amongst the tree members along
the multicast tree. To prevent modification of the hop count in the routing control mes-
sages, the authors propose usingone-way hash chainsto securely bind the hop count to
elements of the hash chain [75]. The group leader generates the hop count hash chain, and
securely disseminates the hop count authenticator (the anchor element of the chain) to all
the group members along with the tree key. Using these cryptographic mechanisms, all
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the control messages in MAODV are secured. A node S joining the multicast group signs
its route request RREQ message using its public key. Each intermediate forwarding node
adds its own signature to the RREQ message, replacing the signature of the previous for-
warding node, in a technique similar to ARAN [73]. The route reply RREP message from
an in-tree node is similarly authenticated as it travels in the reverse path to S. S includes
a hash computed over its ID and the tree key when it sends the subs q ent link activation
(MACT) message to prove it was the node that had initiated theroute discovery. Branch
pruning messages are authenticated by a MAC computed using the pairwise key shared
between a node and its upstream neighbor, to prevent impersonation attacks.
The secure multicast protocol design in [76] helps to prevent s veral attacks against
MAODV, but it also suffers from several limitations. The useof public key cryptography
is expensive in terms of byte overhead, computation and energy xpenditure. As the
simulations in the paper illustrate, the security additions increase the byte overhead of
MAODV by 3.5 to 4.2 times, and the overhead increases rapidlywith node mobility. The
use of public key cryptography actually makes the network vulnerable to additional DoS
attacks - an attacker can send spurious control messages with fabricated signatures at a
very high rate, and the good nodes will have to spend considerable processing power
verifying the messages, thereby eating up CPU computational cycles and depleting the
node energy rapidly. Flooding the network with fake signatures also increases the chance
of network congestion due to the additional byte overhead. These problems are not limited
to [76] alone, but is applicable to all secure ad hoc routing protocols that rely on public-
key cryptography (e.g.[73]). The method of distributing the ree key in [76] suffers from
the cyclic redundancy problem [86], since it initially usesthe multicast tree to distribute
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the key. Apart from the byte overhead, the protocol in [76] isalso not efficient. The use of
pairwise neighbor keys is superfluous when public key cryptosystem is used, since digital
signatures can prevent impersonation attacks.
For security in satellite networks, Howarth et al. [87] havelooked at the problem
of data encryption for large multicast groups with high membr dynamics in satellite net-
works. The authors propose performing encryption of the traffic t the application level,
by using Logical Key Hierarchy [88] integrated with multi-layer IPSEC [89]. The solu-
tion does not deal with security of the routing protocol at all. In a related work, Cruick-
shank et al. [90] have proposed modifications to the Digital Video Broadcasting Return
Channel System (DVB-RCS) [91] to provide secure multicast services over satellites.
The solutions deal with providing traffic encryption at the link layer with different keys
for different multicast groups. Multicast routing at the network layer is not considered.
Duquerroy et al. [92] have proposed “SatIPSec”, for key distribu ion and secure com-
munication for both unicast and multicast in a satellite network.The solution is based on
IPSEC [93], with the addition of the Flat Multicast Key Exchange (FMKE) to support key
management for secure group communication. This proposal is also meant for encryption
of the data traffic, and does not consider security of the routing protocol. Kong et al.
have designed and evaluated a security framework for multi-level wireless networks with
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in [94]. The paper providesa framework for the secu-
rity services by using both symmetric key cryptosystems andpublic key cryptosystems.




Performance-aware Security of Unicast Communications in Hybrid
Satellite Networks
6.1 Overview
6.1.1 Use of Performance Enhancing Proxy Server (PEP) and HTTP Proxy
Server in Satellite Networks
Satellite links suffer from longer propagation delays compared to terrestrial links.
The delay can be as high as 500ms round-trip for a geostationary satellite link. Most of the
Internet traffic uses the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), which is highly susceptible
to the delay-bandwidth product and exhibits very poor performance in satellite channels.
Satellite TCP connections need large transmit windows to fully utilize the available band-
width. However, due to the TCPslow start algorithmand large propagation delay in the
satellite channel, it takes much longer for satellite TCP connections to reach the target
window size, in comparison to terrestrial TCP connections.Also, the window is very
vulnerable to congestion due to the multiplicative decrease strategy of TCP. The prob-
lem is compounded by the fact that TCP misinterprets link layer corruption (which is the
prevalent source of loss in satellite links) as congestion (which is rare) and consequently
reduces the window.
To mitigate the negative effects of the satellite propagation delay on Internet traffic,
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commercial satellite networks usually implement a split-connection TCP Performance
Enhancing Proxy (PEP) [95]. A PEP agent is installed at the sat llite gateway between
the satellite network and the Internet. The PEP agent inspect every TCP packet that flows
through the network. For data packets, the PEP sends back premature acknowledgments
to the TCP senders, without waiting for the TCP segments to beactually delivered to the
receivers. These premature acknowledgments are speciallyformatted to be indistinguish-
able from real acknowledgments and they considerably shorten the perceived round-trip
delay. Studies have shown that this technique leads to significa t performance improve-
ment in satellite networks [96, 97, 98]. TCP PEPs have hence been widely deployed in
satellite networks today.
Commercial satellite networks also employ an HTTP proxy server to improve the
speed of response to web browsing requests for Internet traffic. When a user browses
content on the Internet, the application layer protocol in use is the Hyper Text Transfer
Protocol (HTTP). A typical HTTP exchange involves a requestby the browser for a web-
page (“GET”), and a response from the web server, which contains he HyperText Markup
Language (HTML) text of the requested webpage. A typical HTML page contains multi-
ple embedded “objects” such as images, embedded media or scripts, etc. Each embedded
object has to be retrieved with a separate HTTP request-and-response exchange. There-
fore, a webpage that contains− 1 embedded objects takesn ∗ RTT time to load fully,
whereRTT is one round-trip time. This can be extremely costly in the sat llite network
due to the highRTT .
The HTTP proxy server (also known by various other names depending on the
vendor) is implemented in satellite networks to get over this problem. In a typical im-
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plementation, this requires a local web proxy server at eachuser location, and a remote
proxy server at the central hub facility of the satellite network, i.e., the NOC. The web
browser at the user location should be able to recognize the local proxy (which can be
either software on the client machine, or a separate hardware connected in between the
client machine and the local satellite terminal). When the browser makes a request for
a webpage, the HTTP GET request is sent to the local web proxy,which forwards the
request to the destination web server. The web server respond with the requested base
HTML page. This page is intercepted by the proxy server at thenetwork hub facility. The
hub proxy server reads the base HTML page and sends multiple GET requests to the des-
tination web server for all the embedded objects in the base HTML page. This exchange
occurs over a high-speed terrestrial connection between the hub and the Internet, thereby
saving the time each request would have needed for a round trip over the satellite link. As
the objects of the web page are retrieved by the hub, they are immediately forwarded to
the proxy at the user location. As the user browser receives the base HTML documents,
it generates appropriate GET requests to fetch the objects corresponding to the links em-
bedded in the document. The browser GET requests are terminated at the local web proxy
server, which forwards the pre-fetched documents to the user browser immediately. The
net result is that only a single GET request from the user browser traverses the satellite
link, while a set of rapid responses quickly deliver the requested webpage and associated
elements to the browser. The need for satellite capacity is also reduced, which is the most
costly element of a satellite network.
In figure 6.1, the proxy server at the user represents both thePEP (user side) and
the HTTP proxy (user side). There is a hub proxy server located the NOC with the
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Figure 6.1: Proxy server placement in a commercial satellite network
hub satellite gateway - this proxy server represents the gatway proxy for both TCP and
HTTP performance enhancements.
6.1.2 Proxy Performance Problem with Unicast Communication Secu-
rity
Two protocols that are widely used for secure unicast communication are the Inter-
net Security Protocol (IPSEC) [93] and the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol [99].
IPSEC is a network layer security protocol that performs cryptographic operations
on the IP packets. IPSEC creates an end-to-ends cure channelat the network layer for the
secure transfer of traffic between two end users. The two end poi ts in the communication
negotiate security parameters known asSecurity Association(SA) before traffic can be
encrypted. Once the SA has been established in the handshakep s , the IP packets are
encrypted using the algorithms and the keys specified in the SA. This is done when IP
Encrypted Security Payload (IPSEC ESP) [100] is used. IPSECESP provides for both
data encryption and authentication. There is another variant c lled IP Authentication
Header (IPSEC AH) [101] which provides only authentication, but no encryption. In our
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discussion, we will imply IPSEC ESP whenever IPSEC is mentioned.
The problem with using IPSEC in satellite networks is that itdisables the function-
ality of the PEPs. The IP packet payload, which includes the TCP header, is encrypted
with keys known only to the end points (figure 6.2(a)). Therefo a TCP PEP, which is
an intermediate node in the communication path, cannot reador modify the TCP header,
since the PEP does not know the keys. Consequently the PEP cannot fu ction, leading
to a degradation in the performance of the TCP protocol. The HTTP proxy also cannot
function when IPSEC ESP is used. Since the HTML page is encrypted end-to-end, the
HTTP proxy cannot read the webpage to pre-fetch the embeddedobj cts. Therefore use
of IPSEC leads to a degradation in performance for both the TCP PEP and HTTP proxy.
(a) Original IPSEC ESP tunnel mode encryption (b) Layered IPSEC ESP tunnel mode encryption
Figure 6.2: Packet format for IPSEC and Layered IPSEC encryption. Key
K1 is shared between end-points only. KeyK2 is shared between end-points
and TCP PEPs.
The Secure Socket Layer (SSL), on the other hand, operates above the transport
layer in the protocol stack and establishes a secure sessionfor web browsing on a need
basis. The resulting connection is known assecure HTTP, or HTTPS, and it encrypts the
application layer HTTP data end-to-end between the client and the server. SSL works
only with a connection-oriented transport protocol like TCP. SSL encrypts the TCP pay-
load between the client and the server, but the TCP header is tran mitted in the clear.
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Figure 6.3: IPSEC and SSL encryption on a packet
Therefore the TCP PEPs can function correctly with SSL. However, SSL encryption does
not allow the HTTP proxy to function correctly. The HTML webpage encrypted into
SSL records are readable only by the client and the server whohave the decryption keys.
The keys are not available to the proxy, and therefore the proxy cannot read the HTML
webpage. Consequently, the hub proxy server cannot send requests to the web server for
the embedded objects in the page and therefore HTML object pr-fetching cannot take
place. The net result is that a web page withn−1 embedded objects takesn∗RTT to get
loaded, an increase in delay by a factor ofn. Fig. 6.3 illustrates the encryption regions of
SSL and IPSEC.
Our objective is to propose solutions that allow IPSEC and SSL to work in con-
junction with TCP and HTTP proxy servers in hybrid satelliten tworks, so that the
unicast communication is secured without sacrificing the performance optimization al-
gorithms. For this, we look at prospective candidate protocls and evaluate their perfor-
mance through simulations.
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6.2 Methodology: Layered IPSEC for co-existence with TCP PEs
For network layer encryption and integrity protection, we consider the Layered
IPSEC Security protocol (LES), which is based on the conceptof breaking the IPSEC
encryption in multiple encryption regions or zones on a single packet basis. The method
has been proposed independently in [89, 102]. Although the finer details in the two ap-
proaches are different, the basic idea is the same. Known as multilayer IPSEC or ML-
IPSEC [89], and Layered IPSEC [102], the idea is to encrypt different regions of the IP
packet using different keys (fig. 6.2(b)). The TCP payload isencrypted with keyK1
which is shared only between the endpoints. The original IP header and the TCP header
are encrypted with keyK2 which is shared by the endpoints with intermediate authorized
nodes like the TCP PEP. Therefore a TCP PEP can decrypt the head r portion of the ESP
packet withK2 and read the TCP header to do its performance optimizations.But the
PEP cannot read the TCP payload and therefore cannot access the actual data since it does
not posses the keyK1.
In [102], the authors have demonstrated the correctness of operation of LES by
implementing the protocol for firewalls and network monitoring. The authors have also
evaluated the performance of LES for packet encryption and have shown that the perfor-
mance is comparable to IPSEC for the specific cryptographic algorithms used. A quan-
titative analysis of the packet byte overhead and software overhead between IPSEC and
ML-IPSEC is given in [89]. The paper shows that the throughput overhead of ML-IPSEC
in a simple test-bed is 2%-7% compared to IPSEC.
We believe that the Layered IPSEC approach would be an effective security solution
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in hybrid satellite networks that would allow TCP PEPs to function effectively. However,
whether the protocol improves the delay performance in a hybrid satellite network, com-
pared to IPSEC, is an open question. This is because Layered IPSEC introduces higher
complexity and higher communication overhead compared to IPSEC in the establishment
of the secure channel that now requires co-ordination not only between the end points,
but also with the proxy servers. We therefore investigate the performance of end-to-end
traffic when Layered IPSEC is implemented in conjunction with TCP PEP optimizations
in a hybrid satellite network, and compare to the case where IPSEC is implemented (and
therefore the TCP PEPs cannot function). In this context, the performance criteria of
interest is the application round-trip delay.
6.2.1 Modification to Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) for Layered
IPSEC
Both [102] and [89] assume pre-shared keys between the end poi ts and the proxy
servers to establish the secure channel. However, a more realistic situation is the case
where the end points do not have any apriori security associati n; the keys required for
IPSEC encryption are dynamically determined at the time theend points want to establish
a secure communication channel. In this case, the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [103] is
used to generate the keys. IKE performs a series of handshakes between the end points to
establish the two keys used by IPSEC for encryption/decryption and two keys for authen-
tication (the usage of the keys in IPSEC is uni-directional).
IKE operates in two phases -phase 1andphase 2. The phase 1 exchange happens
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once initially, based on the identities of the two endpointsand security parameters such as
public key pairs or digital signatures or pre-shared secrets b ween the two identities. The
phase 1 exchange creates a security association that allowsmultiple phase 2 connections
to be set up between the client and the server. The phase 1 exchange as 3 steps:
1. Negotiation of protection mechanisms, in which the initiator and responder peers
exchange information on their identities and the security algorithms that each uses;
2. Diffie-Hellman exchange, in which the initiator and the responder exchange public
keying data that is used for generating the session keys; and,
3. Authentication, in which the two parties verify the keying material that each has
independently generated by exchanging hash values computed on the keying mate-
rials.
The IKE phase 1 exchange can happen in either themainmode, in which there are 3 pairs
of message exchanges between the end points, or in theaggr ssivemode, in which all the
exchanges are condensed into a total of 3 messages.
In the IKE phase 2quickmode, there is a total of 3 exchanges between the initiator
and the responder peers, during which the two parties verifythe keying material that each
will use for the session. The phase 2 exchange uses the session keys established in phase
1 to do mutual authentication and establish a phase 2 sessionkey. Based on the phase 2
session key, the two end points agree on a set of four keys thatis used by IPSEC to protect
the data traffic between the two nodes by performing authentication and/or encryption in
each direction of the secure channel.
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Figure 6.4: Addition to IKE handshake mechanism for LayeredIPSEC key management
We propose to modify the IKE protocol to incorporate the generation of additional
keys needed for Layered IPSEC. In the modified protocol, in IKE phase 1 the initiator
entity (which would be the remote client node in our scenario) includes the certificates
of the remote and hub proxy nodes in the protection mechanismegotiation stage with
the responder entity (the server node in our scenario). The keying data that is exchanged
between the end points in the modified IKE phase 1 is subsequently used in IKE phase 2,
so that the client and the server agree on a set of six keys - thefour keys for forward and
reverse encryption and authentication between the client and server, and two additional
keys to be used by the sender to perform layered encryption onthe IP header and also
layered authentication. We add a fourth message dissemination to IKE phase 2, in which
the client distributes the two additional keys to the local and remote proxy servers. The
client encrypts the IP header encryption keys using the public keys of the proxy servers
(we assume that the public keys and certificates of the proxy servers are available to the
client), authenticates the message using a digital signature, and sends the authenticated
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message to the proxy servers. Figure 6.4 illustrates the step that we add to IKE phase 2
for key management for Layered IPSEC.
Additionally, in situations where the security association between the end points
require dynamic establishment, we propose to use only the aggressive mode of IKE phase
1 exchange, and the quick mode of IKE phase 2 exchange. This isto contain the negative
effect of the long round-trip delay on the overall performance - we have to ensure that
the delay incurred due to the IKE message exchanges do not neutralize the advantages
that might be gained due to the use of Layered IPSEC. The IKE phase 1 aggressive mode
will reduce the delay by 50%, compared to the IKE phase 1 main mode. Whether that is
sufficient savings, we evaluate through simulations in section 6.2.2.
6.2.2 Performance Evaluation of Layered IPSEC with IKE modifications
for Hybrid Satellite Networks
We have analyzed the performance of Layered IPSEC with IKE modifications through
simulations on a Opnet Modeler [3] testbed (figure 6.5). The simulation setup consists of
a remote client connected to a server via a satellite link. The connection to the server goes
through the satellite NOC or hub. TCP PEPs exist both at the remot site and at the satel-
lite hub. All communications between the client and the server pass through the remote
and hub TCP PEPs. The satellite is in geostationary orbit, with link delay of 130 milli-
seconds. The uplink bandwidth is set to 256 kbps, while the downlink bandwidth is 70
Mbps. Simulations have been run on various combinations of the parameters that affect
TCP acceleration in satellite networks, and these have beencompared to the base case.
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Figure 6.5: Opnet Modeler Simulation Testbed for Layered IPSEC with IKE
Modifications
The following enumerates the different simulation scenarios that have been considered.
1. We have used TCP with default parameters in the cases whereno TCP acceleration
is enabled, while for scenarios where TCP acceleration is enabl d, full-featured
TCP is used with various performance improvements, such as much larger receive
buffers (1000000 bytes as compared to 8760 bytes for the default c se), window
scaling and fast retransmit. Figure 6.6 shows the differentTCP parameters that we
used for the enhanced version of TCP.
2. Satellite channel bit-error-rates (BER) of1 × 10−6, 1 × 10−5, 1 × 10−4 have been
considered in the scenarios.
3. We have considered two cases when Layered IPSEC security is used - with mod-
ified IKE and with pre-shared keys (and hence no IKE). Likewis, scenarios with
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Figure 6.6: TCP Enhancements for Layered IPSEC Simulation Testbed
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traditional IPSEC also had two sub-types - with standard IKEand with pre-shared
keys. We have also considered basic scenarios with unsecured data transmission.
4. The overhead of the IKE handshake over the satellite linksbetween the client and
the server may introduce substantial delay in the overall communication. Therefore
to mitigate the negative consequences of IKE, we have used the aggressive mode
of IKE phase 1, which condenses the client-server handshakeinto 3 exchanges,
compared to 6 exchanges for themain modeof IKE phase 1. For a similar reason
we have used thequick modeof IKE phase 2.
5. For applications, we have considered two application types. One is a custom appli-
cation where the client and the server engage in a series of secure data exchanges
where the client both stores and retrieves data from the server. This simulates a se-
cure telecommuting session executed by an off-site employee with the office server.
The second application we have considered is web browsing with HTTP 1.1 over
the secure IPSEC tunnel.
The primary objective in the simulations is to verify the theor tical assumption that
Layered IPSEC improves the secure client-server communication since it allows TCP
enhancements, compared to standard IPSEC. This is verified by comparing the end-to-
end application response times in the two cases. We also compare to the case where no
security is present to identify the additional delay introduced by the security protocols
(that is, the tradeoff). In addition to demonstrating the improvement in application delay
response, if any, we are interested in quantifying how much overhead is introduced by
Layered IPSEC over that of standard IPSEC. This is done by comparing the TCP load in
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the various cases.
(a) Satellite link BER1× 10−5 (b) Satellite link BER1× 10−6
Figure 6.7: Comparison of custom application response time(global average)
of Layered IPSEC, IPSEC and unsecured transmission.X-axis is the simula-
tion time in minutes; Y-axis is the application response time n seconds.
Figure 6.7 shows the overall average application response time when the custom
application at the client is communicating with the server.When the satellite channel BER
is high,1× 10−5, the application response time for layered IPSEC is significantly better
than that of IPSEC, both for the case when IKE is used for secure hannel establishment,
and also when pre-shared keys are used (figure 6.7(a)). This follows because when IPSEC
is used, the TCP optimizations are not working and thereforeTCP considers the channel
BER to be signs of congestion and thus goes into recovery modequicker. The graphs
also indicate that using IKE adds significantly higher delaycompared to using pre-shared
keys, which is further explored in later simulation resultswhen the IKE handshake is
de-coupled from the actual data transfer. This is due to the multiple message exchanges
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between the client, the server and the PEPs that are needed byIKE to establish the secure
channel. Each message exchange goes over the satellite links and adds to the overall
delay. In fact, the delay for Layered IPSEC with pre-shared keys is nearly as low as that of
unsecured data transmission with full TCP optimization, which has the lowest delay. The
slightly higher delay for the former is primarily due to the IPSEC processing overhead
at the nodes, and the slight transmission overhead due to thelarg r packet sizes due to
Layered IPSEC headers and trailers. The effect of TCP optimizations is so pronounced
that the lack of optimizations can have a greater effect on the overall delay than the IKE
overhead. This is illustrated by the delay graph of IPSEC with pre-shared keys, which
starts out much lower compared to Layered IPSEC with IKE (as can be expected), but it
climbs higher when the un-optimized TCP in the former case runs into channel errors.
When the channel BER is lower at1× 10−6, the IKE overhead dominates the TCP
enhancements and hence Layered IPSEC with IKE has higher overall response time com-
pared to IPSEC with IKE (figure 6.7(b)). Both Layered IPSEC with pre-shared keys and
IPSEC with pre-shared keys have significantly lower delays in this case compared to the
IKE graphs, with the former being much lower than the latter and is almost the same as
the delay for unsecured transmission.
We also ran simulations for satellite channel BER1 × 10−4. The very high BER
meant that TCP was unable to establish and/or maintain connetio s for long enough
such that meaningful application data could be transferred. Simulation logs indicated that
the connections were continually broken for both basic TCP and its enhanced flavor, and
hence we could not obtain any meaningful simulation data forthis BER scenarios.
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(a) Satellite link BER1× 10−5 (b) Satellite link BER1× 10−6
Figure 6.8: Custom application average response time at client for Layered
IPSEC, IPSEC and unsecured transmission.X-axis is the simulation time in
minutes; Y-axis is the application response time in seconds.
The analysis above is reinforced by the average applicationresponse time as seen
from only the client in figure 6.8. The graphs in this case follow the same trend as for the
global response time graphs in figure 6.7.
Figures 6.9 and 6.10 respectively show the network parameters TCP delay and re-
transmission counts overall, for both BER1 × 10−5 and1 × 10−6. For the high channel
BER, the basic TCP (for the two IPSEC graphs in figure 6.9(a)) hve higher delay since
they cannot take advantage of the TCP optimizations that areavailable to enhanced TCP
(the other graphs in figure 6.9(a)). However, for lower BER when the TCP connection
is broken less frequently, the IKE overhead dominates and hece the two scenarios with
IKE have higher TCP delay (figure 6.9(b)). The advantage of the larger buffer sizes in
enhanced TCP is indicated in the higher retransmission counts for the Layered IPSEC and
164
(a) Satellite link BER1× 10−5 (b) Satellite link BER1× 10−6
Figure 6.9: Average of overall TCP delay for Layered IPSEC, IPSEC and
unsecured transmission.X-axis is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is
the TCP delay time in seconds.
unsecured transmission graphs in figures 6.10(a) and 6.10(b) The enhanced TCP version
makes multiple attempts to transmit the TCP segments if no acknowledgment is received
before timeout, while basic TCP drops the segments since thebuff r gets filled up much
faster.
The byte overhead due to the security additions is shown by the network TCP load at
the client in figure 6.11. Figure 6.11(a) shows that the average TCP load due to Layered
IPSEC with IKE is much higher than the other cases. At simulation ime 1 hour 40
minutes, the Layered IPSEC TCP load is89.938562bps, which is42% higher than the
TCP load for unsecured transmission (63.333333bps), and37.7% higher that IPSEC with
IKE (65.318627bps). However, this high overhead is mostly due to IKE. In thecase
of Layered IPSEC with pre-shared keys, the TCP load is66.686275bps at simulation
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(a) Satellite link BER1× 10−5 (b) Satellite link BER1× 10−6
Figure 6.10: Average count of overall TCP retransmissions for Layered
IPSEC, IPSEC and unsecured transmission.X-axis is the simulation time
in minutes; Y-axis is the TCP retransmission count.
time 1 hour 40 minutes (figure 6.11(b)). This is only1.1% higher than IPSEC with pre-
shared keys (65.941176bps), and5.3% higher than unsecured transmission. The values
are consistent with the case for satellite channel BER1×10−5 (not shown). These results
indicate that Layered IPSEC can be a viable alternative to IPSEC for satellite networks,
with comparable byte overhead while providing significant improvement in application
performance. However, this holds true only if the secure channel is established apriori.
While using IKE will still result in improved application response times for high channel
error conditions, it might introduce unacceptably high overhead even with the proposed
modifications.
The dominant effect of IKE when channel errors are low, is highlighted in figure
6.12. The global average of the response time for IKE handshake when the channel BER
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(a) Satellite link BER1× 10−6 (b) Satellite link BER1× 10−6, sectional closeup
Figure 6.11: Average TCP load at client for Layered IPSEC, IPSEC and un-
secured transmission.X-axis is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is the
TCP load in bytes/second.
is 1 × 10−6, is shown in figure 6.12(a). With this IKE overhead de-coupled from the
the actual application, the response times for the application are given in figure 6.12(b).
The latter figure clearly shows the advantage of Layered IPSEC over IPSEC, which is
obscured when IKE handshake is integrated into the responsetime (see figure 6.7(b)).
Finally, figure 6.13 compares the IKE handshake time and application response
times that are obtained for web browsing when Layered IPSEC with IKE is used, com-
pared to IPSEC with IKE and unsecured transmission. The results are consistent with
those for the custom application discussed above. For higher channel BER, the advantage
of enhanced TCP with Layered IPSEC is visible but this advantage is neutralized by the
IKE overhead when the BER is lower (figure 6.13(b)). However,as figure 6.14 shows,
when pre-shared keys are used, Layered IPSEC is clearly better than IPSEC and is close
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(a) Response time for IKE handshake (b) Response time for custom application without IKE
handshake
Figure 6.12: Effect of IKE handshake on application response times, BER
1 × 10−6. X-axis is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is the application
response time in seconds.
to unsecured web browsing.
6.3 Dual-Mode SSL: HTTP proxy-friendly Secure Web Browsing
When the HTTP traffic is secured using SSL only, and there is noIPSEC tunnel in
use, and the security policy does not allow for trusted thirdparties, we propose the use of
a modified SSL protocol, theDual-Mode SSL(DSSL) protocol. As shown in fig. 6.15,
the secure connection in DSSL has two modes - an end-to-endmain mode connection
between the client and the web server, and asecondarymode connection that has the
hub HTTP proxy as an intermediate node. When secure HTTP traffic is requested, the
DSSL main mode connection is first negotiated between the client and the server. As
part of the handshake for the main mode, the client and the webserver also negotiate
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(a) IKE handshake time (b) HTTP response time
Figure 6.13: Comparison of IKE handshake time and application response
times for HTTP traffic with Layered IPSEC, IPSEC and unsecured t ans-
mission. X-axis is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is the application
response time in seconds.
the parameters for the secondary mode. As shown in figure 6.16, in DSSL the client first
contacts the hub proxy and obtains its certificate. The client then initiates a traditional SSL
connection to the server. However the client now forwards tothe server information about
the proxy, including the proxy certificate, in addition to its own security information. The
key exchange done by the client includes the secondary key for the proxy. Once the client
and server have agreed on the keys for the DSSL connection, the client triggers the hub
proxy to contact the server. The proxy initiates a DSSL connection to the server and the
latter sends the secondary key materials to the proxy. Once the handshake between the
server and the proxy is over, the proxy informs the client that it has obtained the secondary
key material from the server, and the handshake phase is completed by the client. All the
message exchanges in DSSL are authenticated using digital cer ificates.
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Figure 6.14: Comparison of HTTP application response timeswith Layered
IPSEC and IPSEC with pre-shared keys and unsecured transmission. X-axis
is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is the applicationresponse time in
seconds.
Let K1 be the encryption key for the main mode, andK2 be the encryption key
for the secondary mode. When the client makes a HTTP request,th client proxy sends
local replies to the client browser. The web server, on receiving the request, parses the
requested HTML page to obtain the embedded object links, which are collated into a
new HTML page. The object links HTML page is then encrypted byDSSL usingK2 to
create the proxy SSL record. DSSL encrypts the base HTML pageusingK1 to create
the primary SSL record. The two records are appended together and sent to the client in
an IP packet (fig. 6.15). The hub proxy intercepts the IP packet, extracts the object links
from the proxy SSL record usingK2, and pre-fetches the embedded objects. The web
server always encrypts the actual objects usingK1, so that the hub proxy cannot read
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Figure 6.15: Dual-Mode SSL for HTTP optimization
the base HTML page data. The hub proxy transfers the embeddedobj cts to the client
together at one time. Therefore the HTTP proxy functionality is preserved in DSSL while
maintaining end-to-end security of the HTML page contents.
The DSSL concept is partly similar to the multiple-channel SSL concept proposed
in [104]. However, in that the authors do not differentiate encryption in primary and sec-
ondary SSL records - they suggest that HTTP traffic with lowersecurity requirements be
encrypted entirely with keys known to intermediate nodes. For our security requirements,
that approach would not be acceptable.
6.3.1 DSSL: Protocol Specification
Figure 6.16 illustrates the message exchanges in DSSL. Since DSSL extends the
SSL protocol to include support for HTTP proxy servers, the mssage structures and
many of the protocol steps are similar. DSSL introduces a serie of additional message
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Figure 6.16: Handshake between client, server and proxy in DSSL
exchanges between the client and the HTTP proxy server, and between the proxy server
and the web server. As shown in the figure, the DSSL protocol can be divided into several
stages.
• Client-proxy handshake phase 1: When a remote client wants to establish a secure
session with a web server for the very first time, it might not be aware of the security
parameters of the HTTP proxy. It therefore establishes a connection to the HTTP
proxy and initiates the first stage of the DSSL protocol, the client-proxy handshake
phase 1. In this phase the client sends its security certificate to the HTTP proxy,
which in turn responds with its own security certificate. Thecli nt thus obtains the
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public key of the HTTP proxy server from the proxy’s certificate. The start and end
of the communication in each phase is marked by a ”Hello” and a”Done” message
respectively, for each of the participating entities. Thisis in accordance with the
original SSL protocol.
This first stage of the protocol is required to be executed only ce between each
client-HTTP proxy pair. At future instances, whenever the cli nt wants to establish
a secure web session through this proxy, it uses the proxy certifi ate that it had
acquired the first time. This stage does not need to be repeated. The stage will be
executed again if the proxy or client certificate expires or is revoked, or if the client
communicates with a new proxy server.
• Client-server handshake: Once the client has obtained the security certificate of
the HTTP proxy, it contacts the web server to exchange security credentials and to
establish the session keys for the secure web session. This stage i similar to the
SSL protocol, with two exceptions - (i) the client sends bothits own certificate and
the HTTP proxy certificate to the web server, and (ii) in the key exchange step, the
client generates both primary and secondary keys and sends them to the web server.
• Client-proxy handshake phase 2: After the client and the web server have estab-
lished the session keys in the second stage of DSSL, the client again contacts the
HTTP proxy and instructs it to obtain the session keys from the web server.
• Proxy-web server handshake: The HTTP proxy contacts the web server and sends
its certificate to authenticate itself. Upon correct authenication, the web server
sends the secondary session key to the HTTP proxy.
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• Client-proxy handshake phase 3: This final stage of the key establishment pro-
tocol is essentially a continuation of the client-proxy handshake phase 2. After the
proxy obtains the secondary key from the web server, it contacts the client to con-
firm that it has received the key. The establishment of the primary and secondary
keys between the client, the web server and the proxy is now complete.
Once the DSSL protocol handshake is executed, the HTTP “Get”request from the
client HTTP browser is sent to the web server. The client requests are intercepted by
the local proxy, who sends spoofed replies to the client browser, while forwarding the
request to the web server via the hub HTTP proxy server. The web server, on receiving
the request, parses the requested HTML page to obtain the embdded object links, which
are collated into a new HTML page. This “object links HTML page” is then encrypted
by DSSL using secondary session key to create the proxy SSL record. The web server
encrypts the requested HTML page using primary session key to create the primary SSL
record. The two records are appended together and sent to theclient in an IP packet (fig.
6.15). The hub HTTP proxy intercepts the IP packet, extractsthe object links from the
proxy SSL record using secondary session key, and pre-fetches the embedded objects.
At the same time, the HTTP proxy forwards the IP packet to the client. When the client
sends further “Get” requests for the embedded objects, the requests are intercepted and
blocked by the client’s local proxy. The web server receivesonly the “Get” requests from
the HTTP proxy, encrypted with the secondary session key. Inresponse to these “Get”
requests, the web server posts the embedded objects to the client. The web server always
encrypts the actual objects using primary session key, so that the hub proxy cannot read
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the data, even though it had generated the HTTP requests. Thehub proxy transfers the
encrypted HTTP posts to the client together at one time. Any encrypted data that the
HTTP proxy cannot read, it immediately forwards to its destination. Thus the HTTP
proxy functionality is preserved in DSSL while maintainingend-to-end security of the
HTML page contents.
6.3.2 Performance Evaluation of Dual-Mode SSL
We have analyzed the performance of the DSSL protocol and associ ted web brows-
ing through simulations on a Opnet Modeler [3] testbed (figure 6.17). The simulation
setup consists of a remote client connected to a Internet webserver via a satellite link.
The connection to the web server is through the satellite NOCor hub. A HTTP proxy
server is located at the satellite hub site. All communications between the client and the
web server pass through the HTTP proxy. The satellite is in geostationary orbit, with link
delay of 130 milli-seconds. The uplink bandwidth is set to 256 kbps, while the downlink
bandwidth is 70 Mbps. In all the simulations, the client retrieves a webpage containing
multiple embedded objects from the server. The multiple simulations that were conducted
can be broadly classified into three sets:
1. Scenarios where the web browsing is unsecured and the HTTPproxy is fully func-
tional.
2. Scenarios where SSL is used for secure web browsing and therefor the HTTP
proxy is non-operational.
3. Scenarios where DSSL is used for secure web browsing, allowing the HTTP proxy
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Figure 6.17: Opnet Modeler simulation testbed for the DSSL protocol
to be functional.
To motivate this discussion, figure 6.18(a) highlights the importance of HTTP proxy for
reducing the web browsing delay in satellite networks. The figure compares the time av-
erage of overall application response times when the clients rver retrieves a unsecured
webpage with multiple embedded objects, from the server. The response time is a pro-
hibitive 25 seconds without the proxy, but it reduces to only5 seconds when the HTTP
proxy is used. Figure 6.18(b) shows that when SSL is used, theoverall response time for
retrieving the same webpage increases to the factor when theHTTP proxy is not used.
The additional delay due to SSL is split into two graphs - the SSL handshake time takes
on the order of 43 seconds, while the secure web browsing takes 25 seconds. This clearly
demonstrates that SSL makes the HTTP proxy non-operational.
Figure 6.19 addresses the question whether using enhanced TCP with optimizations
can suffice to mitigate the performance negation on web browsing due to lack of HTTP
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(a) Reduction in application response time with HTTP
proxy server
(b) Comparison of HTTP response times
Figure 6.18: Performance improvement with HTTP proxy server in satellite
networks and the detrimental effect of SSL on HTTP proxy performance.X-
axis is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is the application response time
in seconds.
proxy acceleration. The motivation is that since the TCP enhancements operate below
SSL in the network stack, they are not affected by SSL. However, as the graphs show,
while TCP enhancements do contribute to reducing the web browsing response time by
a fraction (around7.5%), the HTTP proxy has a much more pronounced effect - the
response time reduction is by nearly74%. Therefore, it is important that we investigate
solutions for HTTP proxy acceleration in the presence of SSL. Finally, when both TCP
optimizations and HTTP proxy acceleration are used, the improvement is in the order
of 81.5%. Hence, in all subsequent analysis, the experiments were condu ted with TCP
optimizations in effect.
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Figure 6.19: A comparison of the effect of TCP enhancements ver us HTTP
proxy acceleration on web browsing performance in satellite networks.X-
axis is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is the application response time
in seconds.
Figure 6.20 gives the application response times when DSSL full mode (figure 6.16)
is used to secure the web browsing. In all the simulations with DSSL, we considered three
categories of web browsing:
1. The client establishes a single secure session with one web browser. In this case, the
DSSL handshake amongst the client, the web server and the HTTP proxy happens
only once and the web traffic flows in one session for the rest ofthe simulation.
This is shown in the graphs tagged by ”single session”.
2. The client establishes multiple secure sessions with oneweb browser. In this case,
phases 1 and 2 of DSSL handshake (figure 6.16) happen only once, but phases
3, 4 and 5 are repeated at the beginning of every new session. This allows the
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(a) Response times for DSSL handshake (b) Comparison of HTTP response times with SSL
and DSSL
Figure 6.20: DSSL (full) handshake times and comparison of SSL, DSSL
web browsing response times.X-axis is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis
is the application response time in seconds.
HTTP proxy to obtain from the web server the secure session key for that particular
session. This setup is tagged as ”single server multiple sessions” in the graphs.
3. The client establishes individual secure sessions with multiple web servers. In this
case, phase 1 of the DSSL handshake happens once at the beginning, while phases
2-5 happen multiple times, once for each web server/sessioncombination. The
graphs tagged as “multiple servers multiple sessions” illustrate this setup.
Figure 6.20(a) compares the response times for completing the DSSL handshake against
the SSL handshake. The DSSL handshake here follows all the exchanges illustrated in
figure 6.16. The graph highlights the delay overhead of DSSL due to the additional steps
of the client communicating with the proxy server in phases 1, 3 and 5, and the proxy
179
server contacting the web server in phase 4. The DSSL overhead anges between20.3%
and20.74% over the SSL handshake delay. The response time for the secure web traffic is
shown in figure 6.20(b). The figure shows the response time-averaged over all the sessions
for each scenario. The graph shows that for each category of web browsing enumerated
above, the response time for DSSL web browsing is significantly lower than that for
SSL web browsing - for example, for one server single session, DSSL web browsing is
approximately 5 seconds, compared to 24 seconds for the corrsponding SSL case. Figure
6.20(b) also shows that for either DSSL or SSL, the response tim is lower for single-
server-single-session compared to single-server-multiple-sessions, which again is lower
than multiple-servers-multiple-sessions. This is because for single-server-single-session,
the DSSL handshake happens only once; while for single-server-multiple-sessions, the
DSSL handshake phases 3, 4 and 5 are repeated as many times as th number of web
sessions; and for multiple-servers-multiple-sessions, DSSL handshake phases 2 to 5 are
repeated the number of times as there are web sessions.
6.3.3 DSSL Two Phase Protocol
Even though figure 6.20 demonstrates that DSSL response times are better than that
of SSL, the advantage is largely negated by the higher delay involved in DSSL handshake,
as compared to SSL. As a solution to this issue, we propose a condensed version of DSSL,
in which the handshake stage consists of only the first two phases from figure 6.16. In
the first phase, the client contacts the HTTP proxy and exchanges each other’s digital
certificate. Subsequently, the client contacts the web server. Once the client and the web
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(a) Response times for DSSL handshake (two phase)(b) Comparison of HTTP response times with SSL
and DSSL (two phase)
Figure 6.21: DSSL two phase handshake times and comparison of SSL,
DSSL web browsing response times.X-axis is the simulation time in minutes;
Y-axis is the application response time in seconds.
server have established the security parameters in phase 2 of DSSL, the client makes
the first HTTP “Get” request. This request goes through the HTTP proxy and triggers
the proxy to send its certificate to the web server, and a request for the DSSL session
secondary keys. The HTTP proxy request is piggy-backed on the client HTTP “Get”
request. The server responds to the client request with the bas webpage in a HTTP
“Post” response. In addition, the server responds to the proxy key request with its own
certificate and the DSSL secondary session keys, encrypted wi h the proxy’s public key.
This response to the proxy is piggy-backed on the HTTP response to the client. The
proxy receives the combined response from the web server andis thus able to retrieve the
secondary session keys from the encrypted message, using its private key. Consequently,
it is able to decrypt the relevant portions of the HTTP “Post”response and therefore can
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perform the HTTP acceleration. We refer to this variant of DSSL asDSSL two phase.
(a) Comparison of response times for DSSL hand-
shake
(b) Comparison of HTTP response times for single
server, single session
Figure 6.22: Comparison of handshake times and web responsetimes for
different versions of DSSL and SSL.X-axis is the simulation time in minutes;
Y-axis is the application response time in seconds.
Figure 6.21 gives the application performance graphs for DSSL two phase. Figure
6.21(a) shows that the response time for the DSSL handshake is much lower for DSSL
two phase compared to DSSL full mode. The DSSL two phase handske response time
is also comparable to or even lower than that for SSL. The response time for the web
browsing traffic for DSSL two phase, compared to SSL, is givenin figure 6.21(b). The
graphs prove that for each category of web browsing, the response times in case of DSSL
two phase are much lower than that for the corresponding SSL case.
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6.3.4 DSSL Quick Mode Protocol
The first phase in DSSL two phase is necessary in the situationthat the client and
the HTTP proxy server do not share any security association beforehand. However, if
the two entities are apriori aware of each other’s security information (via their digital
certificates), then this phase is not needed. Every time the client contacts a web server
to initiate a secure web session, it passes to the web server alocally cached copy of the
HTTP proxy’s certificate. The DSSL protocol can thus be furthe reduced to just one
phase, that of phase 2 in figure 6.16. The DSSL secondary session key is transmitted
to the HTTP proxy piggy-backed on the first response from the server, in the method
described in section 6.3.3. We refer to this optimization ofthe DSSL protocol asDSSL
quick mode.
The optimization in section 6.3.3 or 6.3.4 are proposed to overcome the detrimen-
tal effect of the long propagation delay of the satellite channel on the DSSL handshake
protocol. This optimization however requires further changes to the HTTP protocol, to
allow piggy-backing the DSSL secondary keys on the initial HTTP exchanges between
the client, the web server and the proxy server.
Figure 6.22(a) compares the response times of DSSL handshake for its various ver-
sions. At simulation time 1 hour and 20 minutes, DSSL quick mode handshake time is
33% less than DSSL two phase (11.5 seconds and 17.2 seconds, respectively). The quick
mode time is nearly half (48.8% less) than the handshake time for full version of DSSL
(22.465 seconds), and is38.8% less than that of SSL (18.61 seconds). The web brows-
ing response times for single server, single session, are compared in figure 6.22(b). The
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times for all cases of DSSL are much lower than that for SSL, and are comparable to
unsecured web browsing. The additional delay is primarily due to the security overhead
at the different nodes to maintain the secure session and to encrypt/decrypt the traffic.
(a) Single server, multiple sessions (b) Multiple servers, multiple sessions
Figure 6.23: HTTP response times for different versions of DSSL and com-
parison to SSL and unsecured web browsing.X-axis is the simulation time in
minutes; Y-axis is the application response time in seconds.
Figure 6.23 compares the application response times for multiple secure browsing
sessions with one server (figure 6.23(a)) and for secure browsing sessions with multiple
servers (figure 6.23(b)). For all the cases, DSSL out-performs SSL.
Figure 6.24 compares the application traffic characteristics at the remote client for
multiple-servers-multiple-clients web browsing. The per-s cond requests are the least
increases from the unsecured browsing to DSSL quick mode, two phase, full DSSL and
finally SSL, reflecting the increasing load on the network resources for the web traffic
(figure 6.25(a)). The TCP load at the client is given by figure 6.25, which shows that the
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(a) HTTP application load.Y-axis is the load in re-
quests/second.
(b) HTTP application traffic received.Y-axis is the ap-
plication traffic received in bytes/second.
Figure 6.24: Comparison of HTTP application load and trafficre eived by
client for multiple servers, multiple sessions.X-axis is the simulation time in
minutes.
SSL load is much higher compared to DSSL. This is because due to the lack of HTTP
acceleration with SSL, more long-duration TCP connectionsare established between the
client and the server to retrieve all embedded web page objects. A sectional closeup of
the TCP load in figure 6.25(b) indicates that the TCP load are approximately similar in
all DSSL versions, and comparable to that for unsecured browsing, since they all can take
advantage of HTTP acceleration.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have described how the high propagation delay and large band-
width of the satellite link adversely affects the performance of the TCP protocol. We
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(a) Client TCP load for DSSL, SSL and unsecured
browsing.
(b) Sectional closeup of figure 6.25(a)
Figure 6.25: Comparison of TCP load at client for multiple servers, multi-
ple sessions.X-axis is the simulation time in minutes; Y-axis is the load in
bytes/second.
have also described how web browsing over the satellite linkincurs heavy delay due to
HTTP protocol using serial GET requests to retrieve individual objects in a webpage. We
have described how satellite networks use TCP performance-e hancing proxy servers at
the hub and each remote location to enhance performance throug TCP spoofing, and use
HTTP-proxy servers at the hub and remote locations to greatly speed up web browsing.
We explain how the use of IPSEC for network-layer security break the function of the
TCP proxy by encrypting the network headers with keys known only to the end-points.
Similarly, using SSL for secure web browsing break HTTP proxy function by encrypting
the HTTP segment with keys known only to the end-points.
We have proposed the use of the Layered IPSEC protocol as an alter ative to
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IPSEC. Layered IPSEC uses different keys to encrypt different gions of the packet
header and distributes relevant keys to the proxy servers, so that they can read sections of
the header and perform their functions. The key distribution can be done either manually
(pre-shared keys) or dynamically using IKE. We have proposed a modification to the IKE
protocol so that it can work with Layered IPSEC. Through simulation experiments, we
have demonstrated that Layered IPSEC can lead to significantimprovement in perfor-
mance as measured by the end-to-end delay when pre-shared keys are used. However, the
experiments also show that when Layered IPSEC is used with the modified IKE protocol,
the overhead due to the IKE key distribution neutralizes theadvantage of using Layered
IPSEC.
We have also proposed the DSSL protocol as an alternative to using SSL for secure
web browsing. The DSSL protocol splits the single secure SSLchannel into a primary
channel (with the encryption keys known only to the end-points) and a secondary channel
(with the encryption keys known to the end-points and the HTTP proxy servers). The
embedded object links for the requested webpage are placed in the secondary channel
by the web server, so that the HTTP proxy can read the links andpre-fetch the objects
from the web server, thereby performing its function. Through simulation experiments,
we have shown that the DSSL protocol can lead to substantial improvement in the web
browsing delay. However, the improvement depends to a greatextent on the handhshake
method used amongst the client, the web server and the proxy to establish the secure
DSSL channels. We have therefore proposed several variations to the DSSL handshake
which trade-off the delay performance with the security of the handshake.
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6.5 Related Work
Olechna et al [105] have suggested two solutions to the IPSECproblem. In the first
approach, the paper proposes moving the the TCP PEP gatewaysto the endpoints. The
TCP optimizations are done on the traffic in the clear, and then traffic is encrypted
using IPSEC. There is no TCP PEP at the satellite hub. This appro ch improves the
performance, but when a packet is lost or received in error, TCP goes into congestion
avoidance phase and the transmission is reduced in half. Thesecond proposed approach
which deals effectively with this problem is to split the secure connection into two at the
satellite gateway. One connection is between the client andthe gateway, and the second
connection is between the gateway and the Internet server. This allows the gateway to
decrypt the IPSEC packet and read the headers and thereby do performance optimizations.
This requires trust in the satellite gateway, which can now read all the traffic. This might
be unacceptable to users who require strong end-to-end security.
Several modified TCP protocols have been proposed that perform better compared
to the original specification in the event of channel errors or delay, or when IPSEC is
used. A discussion of these TCP enhancements can be found in [106].
The problem of HTTP proxy performance when SSL is used has been addressed
by the industry by breaking up the end-to-end single SSL connection between client and
server into multiple SSL connections [107]. In this solution, the client browser creates a
secure HTTP connection with the Remote Page Accelerator (RPA) at the client satellite
terminal, a second connection is created between the RPA andthe Hub Page Accelerator
(HPA), and a third connection is between the HPA and the server. The RPA performs
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all necessary handshaking with the client browser. The HPA can decrypt the SSL traffic
from the server and perform the desired object pre-fetching. Taken together, this allows
delivery of secure web content with little performance degradation and with little change
to the standard protocols. The major drawback to this schemeis that it requires a high
level of trust in intermediate nodes. The HPA, which is a third party entity, can read
all the sensitive web traffic that passes between the client and the server. This might be





In this dissertation we have investigated whether the addition of a satellite overlay
interconnecting large terrestrial wireless networks, results in:
• improvement in network performance as measured by certain parameters,
• efficient solutions for source authentication in group communication, and
• advantages or drawbacks for secure unicast communication over the satellite link.
Towards this objective, we have made the following contribuions.
In chapter 2, we have described toplogies for hybrid satellite/w reless networks and
their important applications. We have proved through network modeling and simulation,
that the addition of a satellite overlay network to a large wireless network provides sig-
nificant improvement in end-to-end performance and reliability for different traffic types,
network sizes and communicating parties, amongst other parameters. We have developed
comprehensive network models for different application scenarios that can be used for
further studies on hybrid wireless networks with a satellite overlay. Sections of this work
has appeared in [108].
In chapter 3, we have designed a loss network model for hybridsatellite/wireless
networks and proposed a new method for performance analysisof such networks, by
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combining the loss network models for the MAC and PHY layers,with routing, through
fixed point iterations. By integrating the proposed fixed point model with the technique of
Automatic Differentiation, we have demonstrated a method to compute the sensitivities of
the performance metrics with respect to design parameters.We are thus able to perform
hybrid network design by finding optimal routing strategiesin the hybrid network. We
have demonstrated the validity of our model and its computation l advantage by perform-
ing simulations and comparing with Opnet discrete event simulations. Sections of this
work has appeared in [109].
In chapter 4, we have proposed an algorithm for efficient authentication of wire-
less mobile nodes that have constraints on energy and processing power. The proposed
algorithm takes advantage of the wide reach and security of the satellite overlay net-
work by delegating most energy-intensive operations to thesat llite node and allowing
a source node to send authenticated messages to multiple receiver nodes in a single-hop
satellite broadcast transmission. We have also proposed a nw method for probabilistic
non-repudiation that also makes use of having the satellitenode as a proxy for source
nodes in the network. We have demonstrated the security properties and correctness of
the authentication protocol through analysis, and throughsimulations have shown the ad-
vantage of the proposed protocol for wireless settings, in comparison to traditional source
authentication protocols. Part of this work will appear in [110] and parts have also been
published in [111].
In chapter 5, we have described a hierarchical multicast routing protocol for effi-
cient group communication in hybrid wireless networks. Theproposed protocol has sev-
eral advantages over traditional multicast routing protocls for wireless ad hoc networks,
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since it takes into consideration the different characteris ics of the terrestrial and satellite
links. In particular, the protocol minimizes the amount of cntrol traffic that flows over
the satellite links to mitigate the negative impact of the sat llite link delay. The proposed
protocol localizes the multicast distribution tree only tothe terrestrial LANs that have
multicast group sources and/or members, while providing for an efficient mechanism to
allow LANs to dynamically join or leave the group. The protocol also makes efficient
use of the multi-path routing provided by the terrestrial links and the satellite overlay,
and integrates mechanisms so that the distribution tree canselect high-bandwidth paths
based on the application traffic rate. Furthermore, the protocol provides mechanisms to
re-connect group members to the network in the event of network partitions, and is robust
to link failures. Previously, we have proposed a hierarchical multicast routing protocol
for hybrid wired network with an ATM satellite overlay [112]. The wireless multicast
protocol proposed is an enhancement of the wired protocol, app ied to the more difficult
case of terrestrial wireless clusters.
In chapter 5, we have also described a protocol for secure multicast routing in hybrid
networks. The proposed secure routing protocol is designedby integrating the authenti-
cation algorithm from chapter 4 with the proposed multicastrouting protocol. Through
analysis, we have demonstrated the security properties andcorrectness of the proposed
secure multicast protocol.
In chapter 6, we have investigated the adverse effects of security protocols IPSEC
and SSL on unicast communication over satellite networks. Aa solution to the prob-
lem, we have proposed the use of layered IPSEC with modified IKE for securing unicast
communication while allowing performance optimization algorithms to function simulta-
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neously. Through simulations, we have evaluated the performance of the layered IPSEC
protocol in a hybrid satellite network, and demonstrated that e performance compares
favorably to standard IPSEC when implemented in hybrid networks. We have also pro-
posed the DSSL protocol to replace SSL for secure HTTP in hybrid satellite networks.
Through simulations we have shown that the performance of DSSL protocol is signifi-
cantly better than SSL in hybrid networks. To mitigate the heavy handshake overhead in
DSSL, we have also proposed two variations to the protocol - the DSSL two phase, which
reduces the handshake to only two stages of the full DSSL protocol, and the DSSL quick
mode, which further reduces the handshake to only one stage.We have shown that both
DSSL two phase and DSSL quick mode protocol perform much better compared to SSL.
Sections of this work have been mentioned in [111].
7.2 Future Work
Although this dissertation has covered several important problems for communi-
cation support in hybrid satellite/wireless communication networks, there remain some
issues that need to be addressed. In the following section, we highlight some of these
problems for future work on this topic.
• In chapter 2, we have built simulation models in Opnet Modeler to demonstrate the
advantages of hybrid networks. In the future, we plan to conduct simulation studies
with the Opnet network models to analyze the percentage of network availability
as the number of gateway nodes are varied. Also, we would liketo investigate the
reliability afforded by a given overlay network by varying the number of terrestrial
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node failures so that the terrestrial forwarding paths become unavailable. We plan
to model the simulation scenario where source-destinationpairs are using terrestrial
forwarding paths, but the forwarding path becomes unavailable due to intermediate
node failures, prompting the source to send out new route requests. New routes are
available over the overlay network, prompting the gateway nodes to reply to the
route request and re-establishing the path. We will investigate how the end-to-end
application characteristics are affected by this path re-establishment.
We believe it would be worthwhile to develop algorithms thatcompute the mini-
mum number of gateway nodes required for full network connectivity for the net-
work models in chapter 2. Our current models use the UAV placement algorithm
developed in [4] to calculate the number of gateway nodes requir d and their place-
ment. The algorithm finds the minimum number of gateway nodes(UAVs) such
that at least one node from each cluster would be able to reachone UAV. The algo-
rithm identifies clusters based on physical partitions, anddoes not limit the number
of hops within any cluster. We plan to develop an algorithm tofind the minimum
number of gateway nodes such that no user is more thank hops away from a gate-
way node (wherek is a system parameter). This would be useful in cases where
physical partitions don’t exist, so a different parameter is needed to partition the
network into clusters served by gateway nodes (and the associ ted satellite overlay
network).
We would like to investigate the dynamic allocation of mobile gateway nodes based
on the traffic characteristics in the network. The UAV placement algorithm [4] used
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in our network model allocates the gateway nodes staticallyb sed on the number
of clusters. However, if only a small subset of the clusters are involved in the com-
munication at any given time, a smaller number of gateway nodes would suffice.
Therefore, we will investigate whether we can achieve comparable performance
with a smaller number of mobile gateway nodes, by moving around the gateway
nodes to cover only the clusters that are involved in the communication.
• In chapter 3, we would like to investigate other loss networkmodels using addi-
tional modules for MAC and routing for both the terrestrial wireless clusters and
the satellite overlay. This will include the hidden node problem in the MAC layer.
For the satellite channel, more realistic channel error models need to be considered
and also the effect of satellite link delay on the performance, especially for Ka-band
satellite networks. For the performance metrics, we plan toderive results for delay
and buffer over-flow. We also would like to perform scalability analysis for large
networks, convergence proofs, and accuracy bounds on various metrics.
• In chapter 5, we have given a description of the multicast routing protocol described
for hybrid networks. We would like to model the routing protocol in simulation
software and evaluate its performance. We would like to compare the performance
to basic MAODV, and other multicast routing protocols proposed for wireless net-
works. We plan to include various scenarios in the simulation models, including
testing the robustness of the protocol with node failures and network partitions and
dealing with node mobility.
We would also like to build a model for the secure multicast rou ing protocol as de-
195
scribed in chapter 5. We would like to evaluate its performance through simulations
and quantify the overhead in secure routing by comparing with the base hierarchi-
cal multicast routing protocol. It would also be worthwhileto investigate further
security additions to the multicast routing protocol to protect againstActive-1-xand
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